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Prologue: Down the Rabbit-hole
So she was considering in her own mind (as well as she could, for 
the hot day made her feel very sleepy and stupid), whether the 
pleasure of making a daisy- chain would be worth the trouble of 
getting up and picking the daisies, when suddenly a White Rabbit 
with pink eyes ran close by her.
There was nothing so very remarkable in that; nor did Alice 
think it so very much out of the way to hear the Rabbit say to 
itself, ‘Oh dear! Oh dear! I  shall be late!’ (when she thought 
it over afterwards, it occurred to her that she ought to have 
wondered at this, but at the time it all seemed quite natural); but 
when the Rabbit actually took a watch out of its waistcoat- pocket, 
and looked at it, and then hurried on, Alice started to her feet, 
for it flashed across her mind that she had never before seen a 
rabbit with either a waistcoat- pocket, or a watch to take out of it, 
and burning with curiosity, she ran across the field after it, and 
fortunately was just in time to see it pop down a large rabbit- hole 
under the hedge.
In another moment down went Alice after it, never once 
considering how in the world she was to get out again.
(Lewis Carroll 1865, Chapter 1: ‘Down the Rabbit- Hole’)
I am me and you are you: a banal statement that is hardly worth writing 
a book about. Yet, in the paraphrased form of I have me- ness and you 
have you- ness, it suddenly begins to raise interesting questions. What is 
the nature of the me that I can appreciate as being me? How does the 
me relate to the I that is recognising the me? Are me- ness and you- ness 
the same thing looked at from different angles, or is there an important 
difference between the two? How does the you relate to the I that is 
recognising the you? And what is the nature of the you that I identify as 
being you; is it the same as the me you identify as being you? All of the 
questions raised here are from the first- person perspective because, in 
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the end, it is the only perspective each of us has; but is it the only perspec-
tive we use? And, if not, how do I incorporate the perspectives of others 
into my view of the Universe?
In fact, having a self of which I  am aware is perhaps one of the 
most astounding and unexpected outcomes of being human. Current 
scientific evidence seems to indicate that it is unusual in nature for an 
organism to be able to recognise itself (although the number of species 
able to pass the mirror test of self- recognition is growing constantly – see 
Chapter 2); and we have no evidence that any individual of any species – 
apart from humans – is able to imagine how others might see them. Our 
personal relationship with our selves may even be the ‘holy grail’ that has 
been sought for centuries: the thing that makes us different from other 
animals. If such a difference really exists, selfhood would seem to be a 
good candidate.
We know our species is different from others in important 
ways: every species is a particular outcome of a series of challenges to its 
individuals, such that individuals with strategies to meet the challenges 
do better than those without such strategies. After enough time, the 
species consists of only those individuals with useful strategies; and it 
is those useful strategies that define the nature of the species. Charles 
Darwin (1859 [2001]) formalised this understanding in his theory of 
descent with modification by means of natural selection, and Herbert 
Spencer (1864) summarised it, somewhat controversially, with the 
phrase survival of the fittest. You can identify the challenges that a species 
has met by looking at what its members are good at:  for instance, the 
challenge of surviving predation has, in different species, resulted in 
climbing or running or hiding or fighting skills. Monkeys climb, ante-
lope run, stick insects hide (in plain sight) and porcupines fight – or, at 
least, they are equipped with an effective active defence mechanism with 
which to discourage predators. So what are humans good at? And how 
does having self- awareness help us to be good at it?
First, humans are clearly very good at cooperating; perhaps not as 
effectively as the eusocial insects (ants, wasps, bees and termites) but 
certainly more effectively than any other primate. Second, we have lan-
guage – a communication system that may itself be unique in nature, and 
which seems to be both an outcome of cooperation and a cause of even 
greater cooperation. Third, compared to other primates, we are abnor-
mally willing to work together in joint enterprises that require special-
isation and role- taking. Fourth, and most mysterious of all, we seem to 
be happy to subordinate our own needs to those of others, often to the 
point of self- sacrifice: we are willing to die to keep others living. Eusocial 
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insects also sacrifice themselves; but that is because they only get their 
genes into the future by keeping their reproductive parents and siblings 
alive. When a non- reproductive eusocial insect sacrifices itself, it does 
not disadvantage itself reproductively, and often it advantages itself by 
protecting its fertile relatives: the self- sacrifice of the non- reproductive 
individual does not contradict their evolutionary self- interest. In con-
trast, when humans sacrifice themselves, they forego future reproductive 
opportunities. This could be viewed in some circumstances as somehow 
advantaging their offspring, but humans often self- sacrifice before they 
have even had the chance to reproduce – which looks, in evolutionary 
terms, completely nonsensical. Could the capacity to imagine ourselves as 
having a self somehow be behind this willingness to self- sacrifice? If this 
is the case, it only leaves us with a different evolutionary conundrum: if 
having a self is implicated in such an evolutionarily unfit activity as self- 
sacrifice, how has the peculiarity of human self- awareness survived the 
inevitable evolutionary extinction that self- sacrifice entails?
About this book
This book looks at human selfness as the outcome of evolutionary selec-
tion: what, in our evolutionary history, made having a self a fit strategy? 
Humans have selves, and we consider having a self to be mostly a Good 
Thing (as Sellar and Yeatman 1930, would say); but having those selves 
can often make us unselfish and willing to subordinate our self- interest to 
that of others – which, in evolutionary terms, is a Bad Thing. We cannot 
convert our Darwinian self- interest into self- disinterest unless we become 
aware that we have a self that has an interest in its own survival; but how 
were we able to maintain our awareness of our selfness when doing so 
made us less likely to survive than our selfish neighbours? There is clearly 
an evolutionary tale to be told here.
This book also looks at the role self plays in language. We can self- 
reference – a capacity not unknown outside of our species, but rare. We 
can also model ourselves into a range of circumstances – not just in the 
factual present, but into the future, the past, the might- have- been and 
the maybe- will- be. We can even model ourselves in the never- has- been 
and the never- will- be – once again, a capacity that seems evolutionarily 
pointless. We can also, through language, share our knowledge of our self 
with others; and we seem more than happy to do so, even though it fur-
ther reduces our relative fitness by giving away information that others 
can use against us. Language could be, like many other communication 
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systems, either non- volitional or strictly about external facts; but it is 
actually, compared to the communication systems of other species, 
highly volitional and often about inner cognition, especially what we 
know about our own and others’ selves. Strangest of all, the fact that we 
are able to choose to share own- self and other- self knowledge seems to be 
all the reason we need to do so.
Finally, the book will look at the models of self we hold in our heads. 
What are we modelling when we model a self? Is there a difference 
between our models of our own self and our models of other selves? And 
how did this capacity to model our selves survive and thrive in humans, 
when it seems not to play a significant or useful role in the lives of other 
animals? Does the capacity to model our selves mean that the only self of 
which we can be aware is actually a model, or is there something more 
basic, substantial and actual on which we build our models?
This book proposes a new hypothesis about selfhood, which I call 
the Seven- Selves Modelling Hypothesis (SSMH). The argument for the 
hypothesis is given across eight chapters, the first of which looks at some 
of the existing theories of selfhood. The chapter discusses religious 
viewpoints and the approaches of various key philosophers, what leading 
psychologists think, what neurologists have found about selfhood as a 
cognitive phenomenon and what anthropologists have observed about 
selfhood in human individuals and groups. By sampling the wide range 
of ideas about selfhood available in the literature, the chapter shows that 
the question ‘What is a self?’ still has no single answer from any single 
discipline. Perhaps a new, cross- disciplinary approach will prove more 
productive.
Chapter 2 approaches the question of selfhood from a different 
direction:  where did it come from? It tells a story about the evolu-
tionary development of selfhood from single- celled animals to modern 
humans, showing that it can be seen as the outcome of a series of 
developments in sensing and cognition about self and other individ-
uals. Conscious awareness is a key event in the evolutionary process 
leading to selfhood, creating new ways for individuals to interact and 
new tools, such as Theory of Mind (ToM) and language, to facilitate 
the interaction. The chapter looks at the capacities for self- awareness 
in other animals and considers how human self- awareness may be 
different.
Chapter 3 concentrates on more recent evolutionary events to show 
how modern Homo sapiens evolved to be able to model a personal self. 
It shows that a necessary precursor is the capacity to make models of 
other individuals and the relationships between them – something that 
ProloguE :  Down thE rabbit-holExvi
  
requires a special rule- driven system. Here I use Derek Bickerton’s (2002) 
term, social calculus, to label this system. The chapter explores how this 
social calculus could have arisen, how it became shareable through lan-
guage and how the grammatical complexity of language corresponds 
to the systemic complexity of social calculus. It also considers some of 
the particular features of language that closely reflect those of social cal-
culus, and how the sharing of social modelling requires a communication 
system that is mainly used not for the sharing of truths and facts but for 
the sharing of opinions – a mode of communication for which language 
is especially suited.
Chapter  4 looks at how humans develop self- awareness in 
childhood: we are not born with it, but rather it is something that develops 
progressively through our childhood. The chapter considers devel-
opmental and social features that mould human children in a species- 
specific way, in particular our extended childhood and the extended 
caring network that supports it. A range of current theories of childhood 
are examined in relation to cognitive capacities such as delayed gratifica-
tion, deception and self- expression.
In Chapter  5, the genetic and cognitive origins of social calculus 
are examined in greater detail. If self- awareness relies on the sharing of 
social calculus, then the origins of social calculus are a significant aspect 
of selfhood. The chapter looks for signs of social arithmetic and social 
calculus among a range of non- primate social species – parrots, corvids, 
naked mole rats, meerkats and bottlenose dolphins – before examining 
the development of social calculus in our own evolutionary clade. The 
path to the sharing of social calculus is traced, from the social arithmetic 
in the Machiavellian intelligence of chimpanzees, through various forms 
of altruistic behaviour (kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reci-
procity, costly signalling, altruistic punishment, vigilant sharing and 
reverse dominance) and on to the outcomes of shared social calculus, 
such as our capacity for self- sacrifice.
Chapter 6 looks at the role of self in language, and the role of lan-
guage in sharing modelled selves. The linguistic and socialising roles 
of pronouns and pronominalisation are explored in relation to a selec-
tion of the world’s languages, and the use of names as personal labels 
is discussed as a route into pronominalisation. The origins of the three 
linguistic persons, they, you and me, are also considered  – as markers 
of selfness, possession and reflexivity. The extended self, indicated by 
possessive pronominalisation, and the recursive self, indicated by reflex-
ivity, are also analysed. Finally, the chapter considers how selfhood and 
language synthesise to increase communicative complexity.
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Chapter 7 examines the importance of metaphor within language, 
looking at five key conceptual metaphors of selfhood and self- modelling. 
The first of these, THE MODEL IS THE ACTUAL, shows that we treat our 
social modelling as if it were a calculus of actual relationships between 
members of our group, even though it is just a representation of a set 
of opinions. The second metaphor, THE GROUP IS AN ENTITY, lets us 
treat a group as if it had the same motives and purpose as an individual; 
and the third, SELF IS OTHER, treats both my self and your self as third- 
person constructs, slightly more privileged than they, but essentially the 
same as they. The fourth metaphor, I AM ME, equates the objective self 
(me) with the active and interactive self (I): acting and being acted- on do 
not create different self- models, they are functions of a single self- model. 
The fifth metaphor is a little different from the others:  ONE AMONG 
EQUALS reduces the status of my self as represented to myself, making 
it no more important than other selves as represented to myself; we self- 
police our own humility and obedience to the group.
Chapter 8 sets out the seven selves of the SSMH, showing how they 
work together to create our sense of selfhood. First, there is the unknow-
able Actual self, the genetic but subliminal recognition of the importance 
of the self to the self. Next, there is the Social self, the self others believe 
me to be; this is a self of which I am consciously aware, and it is generated 
from the social models of me that others have shared with me. The third 
self is the self- model, the self I believe me to be; it is my own conscious 
model of me generated from other people’s models of me. Fourth is the 
Episodic self, my self as modelled in my individual memories; and fifth is 
the Narrative self, my self as a continuous entity through time, the story 
that links the individual Episodic selves. The Cultural self is the sixth self, 
the self I should be; it is the model of the perfect citizen offered by others 
in the group, the best me I can be. This leaves the final self, the Projected 
self, the self I want others to believe me to be – which may only vaguely 
resemble my own self- model. The chapter also explores how these selves 
operate together to define our selves to ourselves and to our group.
In this book, we follow the white rabbit of selfness down the rabbit- 
hole of self. We are entering a strange universe where nothing is quite as 
it seems (and even nothing is not quite as it seems); and, once we have 
entered, we will not leave unchanged. Sometimes our self will seem very 
large and complicated, at other times it will seem to shrink and may even 
disappear. One moment we will be running as fast as we can just to stand 
still, the next we will find things changing around us without apparent 
logic or reason. I hope that you will find this journey informative or, at 
least, enjoyable – it is, after all, about you. And I hope you will come to 
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realise, by the end of this book, that there is considerably more down the 
rabbit- hole than white rabbits:
If any one of them can explain it,’ said Alice, (she had grown so large 
in the last few minutes that she wasn’t a bit afraid of interrupting 
him,) ‘I’ll give him sixpence. I don’t believe there’s an atom of 
meaning in it.
(Lewis Carroll 1865, Chapter 12: ‘Alice’s Evidence’)
newgenprepdf
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1
What Is a Self?
The Caterpillar and Alice looked at each other for some time in 
silence: at last the Caterpillar took the hookah out of its mouth, and 
addressed her in a languid, sleepy voice.
‘Who are you?’ said the Caterpillar.
This was not an encouraging opening for a conversation. Alice 
replied, rather shyly, ‘I – I hardly know, Sir, just at present – at least 
I know who I was when I got up this morning, but I  think I must 
have been changed several times since then.’
(Lewis Carroll 1865, Chapter 5: ‘Advice from a Caterpillar’)
Alice’s disorientation is not merely a young girl’s response to a par-
ticularly confusing afternoon. It raises perhaps the most fundamental 
question of human existence: who am I? It is a question that has exercised 
human minds throughout most of our species’ existence, and it was prob-
ably first asked when we were still hunter- gatherers living in Africa – or, 
possibly, even earlier, before Homo sapiens had even evolved. Yet the fact 
that a self can ask questions about its own nature is an unexpected and 
inexplicable capacity. The interests of any living organism are necessarily 
directed outward: survival and replication, the two drivers of Darwinian 
evolution, are both matters of expropriation of external resources – and 
the better the expropriation, the fitter the organism. Where is the evolu-
tionary fitness for an organism in being able to introspect?
As humans, we have access to many different types of knowledge, 
not just in terms of what we know but in terms of how we know. One 
particular distinction is between things we know even if we are not con-
sciously aware that we know them, and things that we know we know. 
This is often referred to as the difference between implicit and explicit 
knowledge (Dienes and Perner 1999). Other terms are available  – 
 especially for implicit knowledge, which is also known as tacit, inherent, 
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inarticulate, unaware, subconscious or subliminal knowledge. However, 
whichever term is used, it is not the same as innate knowledge, which 
is knowledge we have because we are genetically human – it is written 
into our genes. Innate knowledge is a subset of implicit knowledge, which 
means that, while all innate knowledge is implicit, not all implicit know-
ledge is innate.
Knowing something implicitly means that I may not know intellec-
tually that something is the case, but my body behaves as if it were the 
case. For instance, my lack of understanding of how my digestion works 
does not interfere with its working  – my body can do the job without 
my head even being aware that the job is being done. Driving a car is a 
different kind of implicit knowledge, because it involves learning followed 
by sublimation. I did not start out with an inbuilt ability to drive – I had 
to learn a complex multi- tasking activity involving steering, changing 
the gears, listening to the engine, spatial awareness, judging distances 
and so on. However, one sunny June day, many years ago, I realised that 
I was no longer consciously aware of the individual driving tasks I was 
performing; my conscious driving now involved strategic activities, while 
the tactical activities had sublimated into implicit knowledge.
Because implicit knowledge seems to be distributed through the 
body, even though the brain may be acting as a control node for the pro-
cess, it is often referred to as body knowledge. In contrast, explicit know-
ledge involves conscious awareness of ‘facts’ about the universe (the facts 
do not need to be ontologically true, just culturally – or even personally – 
plausible). And, as it is explicit knowledge, we need to be able to explain 
it to ourselves and to others – both the facts themselves and the how and 
why of our knowing. This type of knowledge is essentially cognitive, so 
it is also known as head knowledge. Explicit knowledge can also involve 
explanations of implicit knowledge, a process known as explication; our 
explanation may not actually be correct, but the fact we can express it to 
others makes it explicit. Figure  1.1 shows how these different types of 
knowledge work together.
Intentional
Learning
Explicable
Production
Autonomic
Responses
Incidental
Learning
Automatic
Responses
Learned
Learned Learned
Explicit Knowledge
Implicit Knowledge
Innate
Sublimation
Explication
Fig 1.1 Types of knowledge, ways of learning, ways of responding
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For most animals on this planet, selfhood is implicit, or body 
knowledge. As a non- human animal, I do not need an internal cognitive 
model of myself, I can just let my body do what it has to do. My body is 
dedicated to preserving and promoting itself, and it does not need cog-
nitive self- knowledge to do its job. It has skills honed through millions of 
generations of hundreds of species by a simple rule of fitness: bodies that 
try to self- preserve get their genes into the future more frequently than 
those that do not. Head knowledge is not needed here  – and, indeed, 
in our own species, it sometimes seems to get in the way:  head know-
ledge has overlaid our instinctive self- preservation with a range of self- 
destructive mechanisms (suicide, self- sacrifice, martyrdom) that are 
difficult to explain in simple evolutionary terms.
As Charles Whitehead (2001) shows, these self- destructive 
mechanisms seem to be linked to our capacity to model ourselves; and 
this, in turn, seems to be linked to the information- sharing we are able 
to do with language. The basic question behind self- awareness, ‘Who am 
I?’, is therefore unlikely to have been given ‘headroom’ until the inven-
tion of language; and this book will argue that it is a question that exists 
only because of language, a necessary internal response to the externally 
asked question ‘Who are you?’ The question ‘Who am I?’, therefore, may 
not have been the first question to be asked, but the fact that we are able 
to ask it may be fundamental to the definition of our species.
While it was language itself that allowed us to pose the question 
‘Who am I?’, it was the invention of writing that allowed some of the 
many answers to be recorded, debated and refined over the generations. 
Indeed, we can still explore some of the earlier answers given, because 
of their existence in the written record. This provides us with a rich and 
ongoing debate across the generations, and it shows that the question of 
selfhood has been an active topic and a continuing human conundrum for 
at least millennia. Different intellectual and scientific disciplines have, as 
our knowledge has grown over the centuries, taken their turns in offering 
an answer – or, more often, answers – to the ‘Who am I?’ question. The 
range of possible responses has become quite bewildering and contra-
dictory, as new ideas are constantly being put forward and the literature 
continues to grow. Some of the solutions offered so far are discussed 
here – more in an attempt to map the territory than to identify a winner.
The priest’s turn
Religion has long had a view on self, and its nature has always been cen-
tral to belief structures. Animists believe that all natural things (such as 
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plants, animals, rocks and thunder) have spirits and can influence human 
events; and they have personified natural phenomena as self- aware 
entities for tens, probably hundreds, of millennia, projecting self as a uni-
versal characteristic throughout nature. For animists, everything has a 
self on some level, or is caused by a self (Moor and Luks 2015). A little 
more recently, belief in the survival of selves after death has extended 
self beyond the natural, physical bounds of birth and death – although 
the evidence for such survival is belief- based rather than artefact- based 
(Olson 2015). Even more recently, the invention (or, for some people, 
the discovery) of the soul by the modern Abrahamic religions (Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam) created a whole new type of selfness:  a non- 
physical entity that seems to have little or no control over the physical 
self, but which is nonetheless held responsible for the actions of that 
physical self (Durkheim 1912). The ongoing intellectual debate over the 
different interpretations of self- realisation that are espoused by scions of 
these religions is, currently and all too frequently, being approached with 
bombs and bullets rather than thoughtfully nuanced argument.
Despite the many brutal battles over what self- realisation involves 
and means, actually defining what a self is has never been high on the 
agenda for most religions: it has always been enough that there is a self 
(or aspect of the self) that is more persistent than the body, which must 
take responsibility for the physical actions of its body and which can be 
punished or rewarded regardless of the physical status of the body. For 
most religions, humans are metaphysical selves with physical annexes; 
and the annex is a temporary adjunct to the eternal metaphysical self. 
The Abrahamic religions have even gone so far as to say that the phys-
ical self is the least important aspect of selfhood, and everything that is 
valuable about me is contained in my metaphysical self, or soul. However, 
as the soul remains immeasurable, the metaphysical viewpoint does not 
lend itself readily to a scientific, evidential approach.
The religious approach to selfhood has usually required a con-
stantly intervening deity (or group of deities) to keep existence trotting 
along, following the arbitrary rules set out historically in scripture or 
currently by the religious gatekeepers – the priests, rabbis and imams. 
Some modern religious interpretations have accepted that the universe 
actually needs no such supernatural micro- management, although they 
do seem to maintain the proviso that management is needed at some 
level or other. This approach, however, brings its own problems:  the 
reduced need for micro- management by God or gods has distanced the 
deities from our everyday existence, and this distancing has limited their 
role as interveners in our personal lives. As the gods have receded, the 
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unchallenged, everyday religious concept of the eternal self has been 
steadily losing ground: ever since Nicolaus Copernicus (1543) first cast 
doubt on humanity’s physically central position in the universe, the 
proposed eternal self has become increasingly compromised as the arbi-
trary, interventionist universe of gods is replaced by the rule- driven uni-
verse of science. Science has both reduced our role in the universe and 
increased our role in, and responsibility for, our local environment. It is 
hard for the priests to insist that we should continue to trust in God when 
the solutions to today’s problems are completely in our own hands, and 
there is absolutely no evidence of help from outside.
Indeed, the major contribution to modern society of some of the 
Abrahamic sects seems to be an increasingly ostrich- like tendency to 
ignore the needs of the physical world, because it is soon to be destroyed 
or remade. The social and scientific problems in today’s human society 
are seen as evidence of an inevitable forthcoming apocalypse; they are 
not viewed as vital challenges that we need to address urgently. The 
metaphysical- annex approach to the self lends itself all too easily to 
denial of the physical – a choice that, in the current world, may prove 
to be self- fulfilling: if you spend your time trying to sever your link with 
the physical world then, sooner rather than later, you are likely to find a 
rather terminal way to do so.
I suppose I  should declare an interest when discussing the reli-
gious interpretation of the self, but that interest is probably self- evident 
by now. And, despite my personal opinions, the religious answers to the 
question ‘Who am I?’ should not be underestimated: they have survived 
for thousands of years  – and in the case of animism, maybe hundreds 
of thousands of years. A religious view of self was the only answer we 
needed for a long time; and, although there must frequently have 
been dissenting opinions in the pre- literate past, the different religious 
solutions are the only ideas to have come down to us from those pre- 
literate times. They therefore provide the backdrop against which other 
theories of selfhood need to be viewed.
The philosopher’s turn
With the advent of writing, the belief- driven solutions of the priests 
began to give way to the logic- based explanations of the first scientists, 
the philosophers. The attempts of the philosophers to answer the 
question ‘Who am I?’ initially came directly out of the religious approach. 
Indeed, pre- Enlightenment philosophers seem to have considered the 
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metaphysical self to be a sufficient explanation. Plato (~370 BCE [1871]), 
for example, saw the self as an eternal soul trapped for a while in a phys-
ical body. That is, the metaphysical has more truth, and therefore more 
reality, than the physical. For Aristotle (350 BCE [1908]), the self was 
the essence of the activity of the person. An object has a pre- ordained 
nature and function, and its essence is in the completion of that function. 
Just as the essence of a knife is cutting, the essence of a human is what 
that human does  – and, for Aristotle, what every human does is think 
rationally. His explanation for the self is, therefore, essentially metaphys-
ical. However, unlike Plato, Aristotle sees no need for an external power 
source, or gods, to maintain the form of the soul: the soul is the capacity 
to act.
Aristotle profoundly influenced Abrahamic religious thinking up 
to the European Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, when new approaches to selfhood became popular. René Descartes 
(1641 [1998]) was one of the first Enlightenment philosophers to adopt 
a new approach to selfhood, when he took the view that answering 
the question ‘Who am I?’ does not just prove our essential humanity, 
it proves reality itself. His Dubito ergo cogito, cogito ergo sum (‘I doubt, 
therefore I  think; I  think, therefore I am’) became one of the founding 
principles of modern Western Philosophy. In his effort to find something 
irrefutably real in the universe, Descartes felt able to dismiss all external 
presentations to his senses as possible deceptions by a particularly mal-
evolent demon. Everything I  receive from outside my own self is an 
interpretation of reality, not reality itself; so it cannot prove reality, only 
indicate that there is something to be interpreted. That thing, however, 
need not be outside myself, it could be inside: a subliminal thought about 
an object or event becomes consciously interpreted as a subjective experi-
ence, without the actual world intervening. This is not just an intellectual 
exercise in metaphysics. This kind of hallucination happens frequently 
under the influence of drugs, when hypnotised, or when suffering cer-
tain psychoses:  whether the object or event comes from inside or out-
side my head does not matter in terms of my interpretation of reality, for 
my experience is the same for both. These states of altered reality are all 
conditions in which others’ judgement is a surer indicator of reality than 
my own.
Descartes’ demon is a philosophical dilemma, indeed; but does 
cogito, ergo sum release us from the dilemma? Ambrose Bierce (1911 
[1999]) thought not, when he rephrased the expression as Cogito 
cogito, ergo cogito sum – ‘I think that I think, therefore I think that I am’. 
My thoughts do not prove my existence absolutely, only relatively. If 
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I imagine a self, then I can imagine that self thinking; and one of those 
thoughts could be ‘I (the imagined I) think, therefore I (the imagined I) 
am’. Does this mean that the imagined I is real? Clearly not, because the 
imagined I is … well, imaginary. So all we can really say is, ‘for a given 
characterisation of I, if that characterisation can believe itself to doubt, 
then, doubt being a form of thought, that characterisation can believe 
itself to think; which means that the given characterisation can be seen 
to believe itself to be’. The malevolent demon is even more malevolent 
than Descartes thought.
The Moody Blues (1969), a rock group in the 1960s and 1970s, 
provided another way of looking at the problem, on their album On the 
Threshold of a Dream:
[First man] I think … I think I am … therefore I am … I think.
[Establishment] Of course you are my bright little star, I’ve miles 
and miles of files, pretty files of your forefather’s fruit; and now to 
suit our great computer, you’re magnetic ink.
(Moody Blues, Graeme Edge 1969)
This post- modern exchange between a human voice and a mech-
anical voice provides an unexpected solution to Descartes’ demon:  if 
I wish to prove I exist, I need objective evidence of my existence; and that 
objective evidence can only come from outside myself, from someone 
(or something) else. So the fact that I need you to exist if I am to have 
evidence that I exist means that, for me, you have to exist – and, there-
fore, that I can believe in your belief that I exist. In Cartesian terms, if 
Descartes is being deceived by a demon, then the demon must exist; and 
the demon must believe that Descartes exists to expend effort deceiving 
him. Cogitant ut sum, ergo sum: ‘they think I am, therefore I am’. To put 
it more simply, we get validation of our existence from other people. It 
is a view that Aristotle (330 BCE? [1915]) took when he said:  ‘If, then, 
it is pleasant to know oneself, and it is not possible to know this without 
having some one else for a friend, the self- sufficing man will require 
friendship in order to know himself’.
David Hume (1739 [1896]) spotted another problem with 
Descartes’ Dubito ergo cogito, cogito ergo sum:  before thinking  – and 
before doubting – comes sensation. There must be a sensing- relationship 
between the self and the actual world before there is anything to doubt; 
and there must be thought about that sensing- relationship before there 
can be doubt about it. The order should be Cogito ergo dubito; but then 
cogito ergo sum is unprovable, because there is no prime cause for thought 
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itself; and dubito ergo sum is meaningless. Instead, Hume proposed that 
our self is actually a series of individual ideas and impressions that we 
treat as if they formed a continuous experience; the self is an object 
constructed after the event of sensing, useful both to tie together the 
different sensations into a logical whole and to see them as having a 
common location. Directly regarding selfhood, Hume said that:
… all the nice and subtile [sic] questions concerning personal iden-
tity can never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather 
as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties. Identity depends 
on the relations of ideas; and these relations produce identity, by 
means of that easy transition they occasion. But as the relations, 
and the easiness of the transition may diminish by insensible 
degrees, we have no just standard, by which we can decide any dis-
pute concerning the time, when they acquire or lose a title to the 
name of identity.
(Hume 1739: Part IV Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of 
Philosophy, Section VI Of personal identity, para.21).
For Immanuel Kant (1798 [1974]), this tricky problem of self-
hood could be sidestepped: the world works in a particular way, and our 
minds are designed to appreciate and understand how the world works; 
but this physical understanding requires no self- knowledge. Instead, 
self- knowledge is a transcendent quality, existing alongside the physical 
world in a metaphysical space. This overcomes any need to explain the 
self: it is not physical, so it is not subject to physical laws and cannot be 
studied with physical laws.
This approach does, however, lead back to another problem that 
Descartes also encountered: how do the physical and metaphysical worlds 
interact? There has to be a link between them. Descartes settled, some-
what arbitrarily, on the pineal gland in the brain as the link; he saw it as 
a physical organ that also connects to the metaphysical world of the soul. 
Kant overcame the problem by viewing space and time as impositions by 
the metaphysical self on our appreciation of physical reality. Things in 
the real world have existence independent of our minds; but the detail of 
when and where physical things exist is established by the mind, which 
itself exists in the metaphysical realm. This imposes a heavy burden on 
Kantian reality: it has to exist in an unchanging actual state while accom-
modating mind- established qualities such as change, creation, destruc-
tion and multiple viewpoints. It was a problem that Kant was never able 
to fully rationalise.
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While Kant took the view that self- knowledge was not the con-
cern of philosophy, and that we could never really know ourselves, 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1899 [1909]) found this lack of self- knowledge 
interesting in and of itself. Influenced by Herbert Spencer’s (1864) 
interpretation of Darwinian evolutionary calculus as survival of the 
fittest, Nietzsche proposed levels of self- awareness in the human 
species. Most of us are kept unaware of our true selves by the cultural 
conventions of our socialisation  – the primary convention being, for 
Nietzsche, religion. Religion directs our self- knowledge away from our 
actual existence and toward a metaphysical entity, which therefore 
means that we allow our Actual selves to be manipulated toward goals 
that are not self- directed. If we were able to transcend the bounds 
put upon us by society, then we could also transcend the limits to our 
selfhood and become Übermenschen (supermen); or, rather, we could 
revert to the superman state that humans were in before civilisation 
limited us.
At this point, Nietzsche becomes somewhat vague, leaving many 
questions hanging. What is the enhanced state of self- awareness that 
supermen achieve? The self- awareness that Nietzsche attributes to his 
superman seems to be a misplaced sense of confidence, rather than an 
enhanced self- awareness. Have some of us already become supermen? 
Nietzsche’s one given example, Richard Wagner, became a born- again 
Christian and rather blotted his superman copybook. Can everyone 
become supermen, or just a select few? And if just a few, how many? One 
answer to this was given by Adolf Hitler (you have to be Aryan, what-
ever that may be), and the practical application of Hitler’s solution would 
have appalled Nietzsche. Two of the most telling questions highlight sig-
nificant flaws in Nietzsche’s thinking. The first is, what is so super about 
supermen? If getting rid of supermen was a Good Thing for civilisation 
and socialisation, why would society want them back now? And second, 
perhaps the biggest question of all, what about the women? What about 
the women, indeed …
Nietzsche’s philosophy of the undiscovered self seems to raise more 
questions than it answers, and the fact it is interpretable in so many 
ways has distracted other philosophers into taking some strange and 
dark paths. For instance, the less said about Martin Heidegger’s (1933 
[1993]) interpretation of the superman model, the better. Heidegger’s 
interpretation made him Hitler’s favourite philosopher, but history has 
indicated that this was probably not a Good Thing. Nietzsche attempted 
to show the essential contradiction between existential philosophy and 
metaphysicality, an attempt that existentialist philosophers through 
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the ages would have supported; but he became enslaved by his own 
metaphors, confusing his idealised superman selfhood with actual self-
hood. He remains a much- studied philosopher, but he is regarded by 
many as a cautionary tale rather than a valuable contributor to modern 
knowledge about selfhood.
While these ideas of selfhood could be seen as ‘false starts’, they 
nevertheless emphasise the importance of the contribution of phil-
osophy to scientific method, even when it seems unscientific:  where 
philosophy does not directly support scientific method, it complements 
it, because philosophy celebrates lateral thinking, which the scientific 
method disfavours. Where science is supposed to move linearly from 
hypothesis to evidence to theory to new hypothesis, philosophy relies 
much more on the possible than the probable. Philosophers can ‘jump 
the tracks’ and take us into unexplored territory  – and recently, in 
the study of selfhood, Daniel Dennett and Galen Strawson have done 
just that.
For Daniel Dennett (1991), the self is not a real, physical entity 
that can be identified and measured; it is, instead, more like a story 
we tell ourselves. One of the key features of being human is our will-
ingness to tell, and listen to, stories that we know are not directly true. 
Instead of demanding truth in what is actually said, we identify worth 
in the telling of the tale rather than the tale itself. As part of the tale- 
telling, we are able to place models of others – and ourselves – into our 
stories; and as part of tale- listening, we are able to identify models of 
others and ourselves in the stories we hear. My belief in my selfhood, 
my selfness, is therefore determined by the tales I hear and tell about 
myself: my selfness is not physically real, but it has a cultural and psy-
chological reality in that it affects my own behaviour and that of others 
toward me. Dennett’s approach does not fully explain the simultaneous 
feelings of continuity and discontinuity of selfhood – the fact that I can 
see my historical self as both me and not me – but he does answer many 
questions about the arbitrariness of self- definition. And his explan-
ation, that a self is neither an existent fixed entity nor a non- existent 
delusion, allows us to study selfhood scientifically as both a cultural 
and a personal concept.
Galen Strawson’s (2009) approach is a little different. He, like 
Dennett, accepts the essential non- materiality of the self, and he rejects 
the unprovable metaphysical self. However, he also rejects the narrative 
nature of the self that Dennett (and Bruner  – see The psychologist’s 
turn) views as so important. Strawson contends that there are two ways 
of relating to the world:  seeing yourself as a diachronic entity with 
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continuity through time; or seeing yourself as an episodic entity, a series 
of selves existing at particular points in time. While the first lends itself to 
a narrative view of the self, establishing a single self that can have a con-
tinuous story, the second view has no single self and no continuity. For 
Strawson, being episodic is a viable alternative to being diachronic: you 
do not need a sense of being a continuous Narrative self to live a fulfilled 
human existence, and to insist that you do is to ignore some famous epi-
sodic figures from history, such as the twentieth- century novelist Jack 
Kerouac and the sixteenth- century essayist Michel de Montaigne.
The fact that people without a grounded Narrative self can, and do, 
exist supports Strawson’s position over Dennett’s; but that may not auto-
matically mean that Dennett is wrong. The two extremes may represent a 
range of capacities rather than a binary choice, and most people probably 
live their lives between the extremes, able to adopt either position. In my 
own case, when I think about events in my childhood, they seem to have 
involved a different person who has no logical connection to my present 
self; but when I think about my thoughts in childhood, the relationship 
is close and personal: the child that had those thoughts is, intimately, the 
person I am today.
One final philosophical approach to selfhood that I would like to 
mention is that proposed by Thomas Metzinger (2003). For Metzinger, 
the key question is not about the nature of the self, but its very existence. 
He takes the view that nobody has an actual, core self; all we have are 
so- called phenomenal selves, created by our awareness as explanations 
after the fact for our actions. What we call a self is actually just a way 
of explaining the fact that I experience and remember my actions in a 
different way to my experience and memory of your actions. Phenomenal 
selves are not real, and they do not act as anchors for a psychologically 
real self, whether that self is Narrative or Episodic; they are just ways 
of explaining my actions – and, by extension, your actions – to myself. 
They are internal representations of how the human brain works; but 
the representations are false, both in what they represent and how they 
represent it. Metzinger’s view of the self could be dismissed as nihilistic, 
telling us nothing useful; but it is nonetheless philosophically coherent, 
and it has its supporters in other disciplines.
The list of philosophers presented here gives only a flavour of the 
many views on selfhood offered over the centuries since writing was 
invented. The intention in this discussion was not to provide a compre-
hensive history, but to show that the philosopher’s turn at defining self-
hood is the most carefully argued effort and, after the priest’s turn, that 
with the longest pedigree. Philosophers were working on the problem 
thE origins of sElf12
  
before two of the three Abrahamic religions even became established, 
and they are still providing new ways of looking at the problem. Despite 
centuries of introspection, however, philosophy still has not provided 
conclusive proof of selfhood. It remains, as the twentieth- century com-
edian Spike Milligan commented, ‘all rather confusing, really’.
The psychologist’s turn
While psychology is one of the youngest disciplines discussed here, it is 
nevertheless a distinct discipline from all the others, and it asks different 
questions. For instance, where anthropology (as we shall see) asks the 
question ‘What does it mean to be human?’, psychology asks a decep-
tively similar question:  ‘What does it mean to be a human?’ However, 
that indefinite article sets psychology on a different trajectory to anthro-
pology. Where anthropology is interested in the individual as a social 
creature, psychology is interested in the internal cognition of the crea-
ture. This means that psychology is intimately involved with questions 
about selfhood: what can make an effective self, a happy self, a fulfilled 
self, a useful self? How does the self know itself? What cognitive activ-
ities are involved in forming the self? … and so on.
Psychology’s intimate view of the individual should mean that it 
has a lot to tell us about the nature of selfhood, but this is not necessarily 
the case. Some psychological approaches see the individual as a mech-
anism – and a mechanism is not, by itself, motivated. Just as a bicycle is 
merely a pile of metal without the social conventions that allow it to be 
used as a bicycle, so a person is just a pile of cells without the motivating 
force of other people to provide meaningful purpose. This mechanistic 
approach would seem inadequate as a way to describe human beings: a 
bicycle, to extend the metaphor, has no internal motivation or meaning, 
whereas a human being does. The mechanistic approach is, however, 
considered by behavioural psychologists to be a valid starting point. As 
behavioural psychologists do not concern themselves with the vagaries 
of selfhood, however, their approach will not be explored further here.
Sigmund Freud (1923 [2010]) is perhaps the best- known psycholo-
gist to look at internal motivation as a feature in itself. He saw the cogni-
tive processes of the typical human as a melding of three types of self: the 
ego, which represents the everyday thinking we perform; the id, which is 
emotional, primal and largely subliminal; and the super- ego, which is the 
internalisation of externally enforced cultural rules. He referred to this 
triad of cognitive elements as the psyche.
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Freud believed there was a continuing battle between the id (what 
the physical person wants) and the super- ego (what the intellectual 
person believes is best), with the ego acting as a referee and arbiter 
between them. He saw many of the neuroses that were generated by 
this battle as sexual in nature, and thought that sexuality was the main 
driving force throughout our lives. This sexual approach was strongly 
influenced by Darwinian evolutionary theory, in which the two main 
markers of the fitness of an organism are survival and reproduction.
For Freud, the self was like an iceberg, with the ego and the super- 
ego conscious and visible, and the large and powerful id unconscious 
and hidden. Neuroses were manifestations of the unconscious self, and 
they could only be resolved by bringing them into conscious awareness – 
and this was something only the self itself could do. Freudian therapy is, 
therefore, mostly a matter of getting the client to recognise their uncon-
scious desires and then helping them to integrate those desires into their 
conscious cognition. The conscious self resists recognising the uncon-
scious desires as part of the same psyche, and only time and continuous 
exposure can reconcile the conscious self to the unconscious desires. 
Freudian psychotherapy is therefore not a ‘quick fix’.
Freud’s approach generated several theoretical variants among 
his adherents. Carl Jung (1958 [2014]) saw the unconscious as having 
two halves: the personal subconscious, which is individual and develops 
throughout an individual’s lifetime; and the collective unconscious, 
which is inherited and invariant in all individuals. It is a division that 
reflected the growing concern over the dichotomy of nurture and 
nature:  some aspects of our personality are determined by our experi-
ence, and some by our genetic make- up. Nowadays we recognise that the 
picture is more complicated; most of the aspects of our personality are 
established by the genes we inherit, but they are governed by our experi-
ence and cognition throughout our lives. However, as a first approxima-
tion, Jung’s view challenged Freud’s discrete trinity of selves within the 
psyche, and it raised the possibility that the psyche did not need to be a 
single integrated system.
For Alfred Adler (1927), Erich Fromm (1964) and others, trad-
itional Freudian analysis did not place the individual adequately within 
their social environment. For the neo- Freudians, as they came to be 
known, the healing of the self did not need to involve an essentially 
intimate exploration of the unconscious; instead, the therapist could 
establish a dialogue with the client, working with them to identify and 
address their issues. In this therapeutic model, part of the therapist’s 
job was to represent the voice of society and social convention for the 
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client. The neo- Freudians weakened the unity of the psyche in a different 
way from Jung, showing that the individual needs to be able to present 
different ‘faces’ to different social groupings, and the psyche may need to 
resolve contradictions between those different faces.
More recently, Jerome Bruner (1986) took a quite different psycho-
logical approach to selfhood. He saw the self as a product of a continuing 
narrative, an autobiography that we generate through a lifetime of 
experiences (and it was this approach to which Strawson took exception – 
see The philosopher’s turn). For Bruner, there was no single, transcendent 
ego, but nor was there any multiplicity of selves. We are all extremely 
aware of our own personhood at a practical level, but the person of which 
we are aware is changeable, and constantly being incremented by the 
process of living. The me now is not the me of yesterday, and it will not be 
the me of tomorrow; but there is a continuity of memory between those 
selves that gives them a single wholeness, or me- ness.
Bruner’s approach is based on a common- sense approach to self-
hood. There is no value in pursuing a concept of fractured selfhood if the 
commonly accepted view is that each person is a single self. The single, 
continuous self is the basis of many different human social systems, and 
the generally agreed measure of social acceptability for a self is its con-
tinuity and unity. Bruner believes, therefore, that psychology should be in 
the business of protecting the Narrative self and promoting it as respon-
sible for itself. The aim should be to create self- acceptance, rather than 
Freud’s truce between the id and the super- ego, or Jung’s communication 
with the subconscious. Bruner’s approach has been widely applied, and 
he himself used it extensively in his work dealing with educational and 
linguistic development among children. It provided a timely reminder 
that the self is a social construct as well as a personal one, and that it 
needs to be addressed as such.
The final psychological approach to selfhood to be included 
here is that of Daniel Wegner (2002). His view is in the same trad-
ition as Metzinger, and that tradition has provided inspiration for other 
psychologists, such as Tor Nørretranders (1991) and Bruce Hood (2012). 
For Wegner, the self is an attribution of intention, which happens not 
before but after an act. It seems completely counterintuitive that inten-
tion is caused by action and not the cause of it; but, as we will see in the 
next section, there is neurological evidence supporting Wegner’s position.
Wegner says that attribution of intention requires three things. 
First is priority: the feeling of intention must occur very soon after the 
act has happened, so that the brain can switch the order of the act and 
the intention. If the actor does not identify an intention quickly enough, 
then intention feels like what it really is: a justification after the event. 
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The second requirement is consistency:  the conscious thinking at the 
time of the action should be related to the action, although the action 
is not a product of the conscious thought. If the actor is not deliberately 
aware of the action then there is no need to attribute intention. Third is 
exclusivity: there should be no intimation that the action is caused by an 
external agency. The actor must feel that they could be the cause of the 
action. These three requirements mean that selfhood is only detectable in 
consciously aware acts; it plays no part in subliminal or autonomic acts.
The attribution of intention creates a false feeling that the cognitive 
self controls the actions of the physical self, and it leads to what Wegner 
calls the illusion of control:  my physical self is a machine under the 
control of my brain, and my brain is under the conscious control of my 
cognitive self. The range of physical effects (breathing, digestion, waste- 
processing, blood transportation and so on) that maintain the body, yet 
which clearly need no conscious attention, belie this assumption of con-
trol; but it remains a powerful rationalisation. For Wegner, the self is just 
a cognitive reaction to the body’s activity; it may not even exist in any 
actual sense – but nobody has been able to convince the self of that fact.
The different theories of selfhood presented here point to an 
important distinction between the psychological approach and other 
approaches to selfhood:  the psychological approach is concerned with 
both the study of selfhood and with its application to the cognitive 
wellness of the self. This second role is not just investigative, it is authori-
tative: the theoretical approach to the nature of the self determines the 
appropriate therapeutic treatment to give. This means that different 
views of the self are not just a matter for discussion between psycho-
logical practitioners, but they also affect the wellness of the clients being 
treated by those practitioners. It may be that there is one approach that 
works better than any other, but we currently do not have enough evi-
dence to say which it is. Fortunately, the main way that clinical psych-
ology seems to work is to allow the client to identify themselves as ‘under 
repair’, and to give them the space and time in which to redefine them-
selves. It seems that the client’s definition of self is more important to 
successful treatment than the psychologist’s view of selfhood  – some-
thing that psychologists readily recognise.
The neurologist’s turn
For millennia, the physical nature of the self remained a matter for deduc-
tion and speculation; there was no way to see the cognitive self working 
inside the physical self. This changed in the 1990s, when Functional 
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Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) first appeared. This process uses 
the magnetic properties of red blood cells to show where blood is being 
concentrated in the brain. Active areas of the brain need more oxygen 
than inactive areas, and oxygen- rich blood has a different magnetic sig-
nature from oxygen- poor blood; so, during a particular cognitive task, 
the parts of the brain where oxygen- rich blood is being converted into 
oxygen- poor blood are likely to be the areas performing that task. It is a 
reasonable assumption to make, based on what we know of the role of 
blood and the functioning of living tissue; but it remains a theoretical 
rather than a proven assumption.
Before fMRI, electroencephalography (EEG) and Near- Infrared 
Spectroscopy (NIRS) had provided rough maps of brain activity. However, 
both these methods are quite limited in what they can show: neither is 
able to reliably penetrate more than a few millimetres into the brain. 
Another technique, Positron Emission Tomography, when combined 
with X- ray Computer Tomography (PET- CT) is able to penetrate more 
deeply, but its main use is to show structure, not activity; and it uses X- 
rays, so each subject can be studied for only short periods. So, while not 
dismissing earlier work conducted using less sophisticated techniques, 
we can say with some certainty that the neurologist’s turn at defining 
selfhood began in earnest in 1992, when the first volunteer was slid into 
the first fMRI machine.
What have all the different ways of imaging the brain been able to 
tell us about the self? Currently, we do not have enough evidence to say 
for certain that the self resides in a particular part of the brain, or even 
that it is distributed across the brain. The nineteenth- century case of 
Phineas Gage is still quoted as evidence that the frontal cortex is the seat 
of the self, but that evidence is far from unequivocal. Gage was a railway 
engineer who suffered a terrible accident when a metal bar was driven 
through the front of his brain. Reports of a drastic change in his character 
(from honest and hard- working to feckless and lazy) seem to have been 
exaggerated, and he lived a productive and active life for another 12 years 
after the accident. While there did seem to be some effects on his defin-
ition of his self, it cannot reliably be shown whether those changes were 
caused by the brain damage or the stress of the accident – people often 
change their character after near- death experiences not involving brain 
damage. What is reliably evident in Phineas Gage’s case is that the injury 
changed, but did not wipe out, his sense of selfhood (Kotowicz 2007).
To investigate the location of the self in the brain, Todd Feinberg and 
Julian Keenan (2005) reviewed the evidence from scans of healthy indi-
viduals, individuals displaying Delusional Misidentification Syndrome 
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(a failure to reliably identify self and others) and individuals undergoing 
hemispheric anaesthesia (a medical procedure that suspends awareness 
in half of the brain). They took the view that selfhood comes in a range 
of types; and that the different types of selfhood are not separate phe-
nomena, but actually form a functionally nested hierarchy. The lower 
(semi- aware) levels are not cognitively separate from the upper (fully 
aware) levels; instead, the upper levels incorporate the lower. By looking 
at how the subjects’ brains reacted when presented with a series of self- 
identification tests, such as face recognition, self- voices and other self- 
related stimuli, Feinberg and Keenan were able to show that the right 
hemisphere seems to play a greater role in self- cognition than the left, 
and the frontal cortex plays a greater role than other areas. They did not 
claim that the right frontal cortex is where the self resides, but it does 
seem to be important in self- cognition. They also concluded that, while 
the unified self does seem to behave like a nested hierarchy, this does not 
mean that the neural system supporting it is similarly configured.
Alain Morin (2005) took a different approach. He looked at the role 
of inner speech (talking to ourselves inside our heads) as a determiner of 
selfness. He took the view that inner speech gave us both a mechanism 
to rationalise the actions of others and a method for scrutinising our self. 
By looking at the brain areas active during autobiographical recollection, 
Morin identified the left frontal cortex as implicated in selfhood. This fits 
well with his view that inner speech is associated with selfhood, because 
the left hemisphere is also the traditional locus for language (although 
it must be remembered that 1 in 20 normally functioning human brains 
do not match this model). However, Morin’s theory contains its own 
confounding factor:  because selfness involves inner speech, and inner 
speech involves speech, it is hard to separate out the parts of the brain 
involved in speech from the parts involved in selfness – they should both 
be active during autobiographical recollection. Whether Morin’s model 
really indicates that the neurological self is located in the same hemi-
sphere as language remains debateable.
Bernard Baars et al. (2003) looked at the problem from a different 
angle. By revisiting studies of individuals in a conscious resting state and 
in four different types of unconsciousness (deep sleep, general anaes-
thesia, vegetative state and epileptic loss of consciousness), they were 
able to determine the areas of the brain that were inactive in uncon-
scious states. They identified two key areas: in the parietal cortex (trad-
itionally associated with the integration of sensory information) and 
in the frontal cortex. They also found that there was no noticeable pro-
cessing difference between the two hemispheres (they looked roughly 
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like mirror- images of each other). Based on these findings, Baars et al. 
proposed two brain areas as components of a particular form of self- 
awareness, which they labelled the observing self:  first is the parietal 
component, which is involved in placing the self within a sensory con-
text; and second is the frontal component, which is involved in placing 
the self in a socio- cultural context and in self- evaluation. Together, these 
areas allow us to see ourselves as if we were observers outside our selves.
Benjamin Libet (2004) threw a spanner into the works regarding 
the ‘awareness of selfness’ debate, when he showed that many of the 
events where we appear to show awareness actually happen in the 
wrong order. We think that we perceive an event, become aware of it 
and then react to it; but it turns out that we perceive an event, react to 
it and then become aware of it. If a child walks out in front of a car we 
are driving, we are able to begin braking about 2/ 10 of a second after 
the child appears, but we become aware of the child at 5/ 10 of a second. 
Our awareness of the event is not the trigger for our reaction – it is, as 
Wegner surmises (see The psychologist’s turn), a justification of our reac-
tion after the event.
In a series of experiments, Libet showed that to become aware of 
an event takes a full half- second; the event itself can be considerably 
shorter, as little as 1/ 10 of a second in duration, but awareness of the 
event will not happen before the half- second has elapsed. He also showed 
that, where a short event was followed by a second short event within the 
half- second window, the subject did not become consciously aware of the 
first event. Another timing anomaly that Libet identified is the creation 
of simultaneity: although our awareness happens a half- second after an 
event begins, we believe the event and the awareness of it are simultan-
eous. Our brain is adjusting our awareness to match our expectations 
rather than our reality.
What does this cognitive chicanery tell us about the relationship 
between our physical self and our aware self? Our aware self is, by def-
inition, a product of aware cognitive processes; it cannot be reduced to 
a set of subliminal reactions, because it can view itself reflexively – we 
can be aware of being aware of ourselves. If, however, all of our aware 
cognition is just an explanation after the fact of our subliminal cognition, 
then the aware self is not actually in charge of our physical self, it is just 
along for the ride. The aware self becomes a useful fiction we can employ 
in our interactions with the world, but it does not, itself, interact with the 
world. To put it another way, the physical electrochemistry of the brain 
can be measured while we are being aware of our self, but the self itself is 
not a substance or entity that can be scientifically measured.
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Joseph LeDoux (2002) has attempted to explain the emergence 
of selfhood as a product of basic electrochemical events in the brain. 
He is interested in the structural features of the brain, what they do 
and how they work together to generate a sense of continuity of self-
hood. He proposes seven principles to explain how brains work. First, 
the different subsystems of the brain all deal simultaneously with the 
same actual world, and they can use that common fact to work together. 
Second, the parallel synchrony between different subsystems means 
they do not need to be completely separated; they can work together 
when needed. LeDoux calls this functional plasticity. Third, the plasti-
city of parallel synchrony is coordinated by electrochemical modulators. 
Fourth, there are information- convergence zones in the brain, some of 
which are task- specific (such as the hippocampus) and some of which are 
the product of functional plasticity; and the human brain is particularly 
rich in these convergence zones. Fifth, the brain uses both a bottom- up 
process, building basic units of cognition into more complex units, and a 
top- down process, reducing complexity to components; and it is this con-
tinuous two- way process that coordinates cognitive change. Sixth, emo-
tional cognition dominates the brain, and influences all other cognition, 
including self- definition. Seventh, the self consists of both implicit and 
explicit aspects, which overlap to produce the sense of a continuous self, 
but which are not coexistent.
LeDoux provides a persuasive model of the brain as a computa-
tional entity, but he remains somewhat vague about how it computes a 
self, or the nature of the self that is being computed. He defines the self 
as ‘the totality of what an organism is physically, biologically, psycho-
logically, socially, and culturally’ (LeDoux 2002, 31); but is this a def-
inition of the selfhood of the individual, or a more general definition of 
the boundaries of the individual? Is the self an emergent phenomenon, 
not directly related to the general computation role of the brain? Or is it 
a selected product of evolution, an inevitable component of cognition? 
How does having the human version of the self make our sense of self 
different to that of other animals? And is that difference qualitative or 
just quantitative? LeDoux is correct in his assumption that we need to 
understand the detailed working of the brain, but this may not be the 
correct level of study to show us how cognitive processes like selfhood 
work:  understanding the Haynes Manual for our car does not teach us 
how to drive it.
Antonio Damasio (2010) approaches the subject of conscious-
ness from the direction of selfhood, which reverses the normal method 
of using selfhood to study consciousness. In doing so, he relies less on 
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brain- measuring techniques and more on accepted brain architecture. 
He sees the self as a series of interrelated modules that build upon, but 
do not necessarily nest within, each other. First, there is the protoself, 
the basic and irrefutable physical self. Then there is the core self, which 
is about the relationship between the protoself and the outside world; 
this is a two- way relationship, allowing the world to affect the self as well 
as allowing the self to affect the world. Next there is the autobiograph-
ical self, which involves the collection and ownership of past experiences 
and future plans; this self generates the story of our lives and gives us 
the feeling of integrated continuity through space, time and context. 
The core self and autobiographical self are, between them, able to gen-
erate a meta- knowledge about the self’s knowledge, creating a self- as- 
knower; and they are also able to generate a meta- knowledge about 
the self’s knowledge of itself, creating a self- as- object. However, while 
the protoself, core self and autobiographical self are permanent effects 
(although not always conscious effects), the self- as- knower and self- 
as- object are cognitive constructs, and only exist while they are being 
thought about.
Damasio concludes that these different instantiations of the self 
represent a long evolutionary journey for cognition. However, in a sur-
prise move for a neurologist, he sees the appearance of the final version 
of human selfhood as ‘a recent development, on the order of thousands 
of years’. With his knowledge of genetics, he must realise that this poses 
a big problem: how did the final version of selfhood propagate around 
the world, reaching even populations in Australia, which were other-
wise isolated from the rest of humanity for over 60,000 years (Clarkson 
et  al. 2017)? Yet it seems that the alternative to Damasio’s timescale, 
involving a more ancient appearance of the currently final version of 
selfhood, is also problematic:  if full human selfhood is so important in 
defining human capacities, then it should be accompanied by a sudden 
efflorescence of those capacities. Yet there seems to be no reliable sign 
of this cognitive blooming in the archaeological record before 100,000 
years ago (Henshilwood and Dubreuil 2011), when humans were 
already widespread in Africa and the Near East (Lahr and Foley 2016). 
This timing dilemma is a problem not just for Damasio; it has influenced 
our understanding of human cognitive origins for nearly two centuries. 
In Chapter 6, we will see further examples of this dilemma.
Michael Graziano, like Libet, has asked questions about the role 
of attention and consciousness in our definition of selfhood (Graziano 
2013). He looks at the theory of the cortical ‘homunculus’, originally 
developed by Penfield and Boldrey (1937), and takes issue with its 
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view that our motor cortex and somatosensory cortex act as a physical 
representation of the body inside the brain. The motor and somatosen-
sory cortices are two strips of cells lying laterally across the middle of the 
outer surface of the brain, approximately from ear to ear. The cortical 
homunculus theory says that the two cortices reflect our awareness of 
our bodies in terms of both activity and sensation:  the larger the area 
of motor cortex dedicated to a particular part of the body, the more 
voluntary control we have over that body part; and the larger the area 
of somatosensory cortex, the more aware we are of sensations in that 
body part. Graziano et al. (2002) investigated the two cortical areas in 
monkeys, finding that they are more about attention to the movements 
made than about awareness of the body part making the movement; 
the motor and somatosensory cortices seem to be monitoring the pro-
cess of movement, as opposed to controlling the movements themselves. 
Graziano described this awareness of body activity as a body schema 
rather than a homunculus.
Graziano (2016) went on to look at attention and conscious-
ness in relation to subjective awareness, or awareness of self. Here, he 
showed that paying attention to something is not turning the spotlight 
of awareness onto the external object, it is a process of incorporating the 
something into the individual’s model of reality. Our internal model does 
not just represent the world, it also allows new things that have come 
under conscious scrutiny to be incorporated into the model itself – what 
Graziano refers to as the attention schema. This attention schema maps 
attention in the same way that the body schema maps movement:  it is 
not about controlling attention, it is about recognising attention. He 
describes his attention schema theory as:
… a theory of how information is constructed in the brain and 
used to model the world and guide decisions, conclusions, speech, 
and behaviour. It is a theory of how the human machine claims to 
have consciousness and assigns a high degree of certainty to that 
conclusion.
(Graziano 2016, 11)
Graziano’s attention schema theory turns much traditional neur-
ology on its head. Humans are not cognitively exceptional in having 
novel tools of cognition; they just have a little bit more of what other 
animals have. Cognition is not about controlling the physically active 
(enactive) self, it is about supporting and justifying the physically 
active self. Information is not received from the world and stored in the 
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cognitive self, it is constructed from data noticed in the world; and data 
is not information. The world is not understood by the brain, it is mod-
elled by the brain; and the model need not be accurate. Consciousness 
is not a state of attention, it is an explanation after the fact of attention; 
it is not something we have, it is something we make. Awareness is not 
consciousness or attention, it is ‘… declarative. It is an informational 
representation that depicts, usefully if not entirely accurately, the process 
of attention’ (Graziano and Kastner 2011, 113). Graziano’s ideas about 
cognition form an important backdrop to the hypothesis discussed in this 
book, that self- awareness is attention to a model of the world, not true 
reflexive attention to the self.
Neurological theories of selfhood are usually supported with exten-
sive evidential research, so the neurological approach is the most data- 
rich investigation of selfhood that we have. However, that is both its 
strength and its weakness: data is always more persuasive than theory, 
but it raises its own questions. What does the data represent? How should 
it be interpreted? What level of detail is needed to explain a cognitive 
phenomenon like selfhood? As we have seen in this section, having 
data is not the same as having answers, and the assumptions made in 
gathering and interpreting the data can affect the meanings extracted 
from it. Theory cannot be supported or disproved without data, but the 
data- gathering and analysis processes are not without bias.
The anthropologist’s turn
Anthropology is a relative newcomer to the debate on selfhood. It emerged 
as a subject from the imperial ambitions of European states during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and was initially an effort to iden-
tify the weaknesses and failings of other cultures so that they could be 
exploited and subjugated. It was only in the late- nineteenth and early- 
twentieth centuries that anthropology threw off its intimate links with 
the national and religious organisations it had been serving, and began 
to ask the big question that has informed its research ever since: ‘What 
does it mean to be human?’
For Karl Marx (1844 [1959]), who opposed the imperial version of 
anthropology when it was at its strongest, the problem was socio- political. 
At some point in the past, humans had adopted a stratified social system 
in which individuals became specialised not only in their productive roles 
but also in their social roles. The individual became a puppet of society, 
required to act in certain ways to avoid sanction. Capitalism meant that 
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some individuals became rulers and owners (the bourgeoisie), while 
the rest became the proletariat, workers without the freedom to choose 
in any useful way. The workers were alienated from their work  – they 
had no control over what they did – and alienated from their own selves, 
from their innate potential as individuals. The solution proposed by Marx 
was communism, in which the workers would once again take control 
over their work. The illusion of selfish but powerless individual selfhood, 
fostered by capitalism, would be replaced by a communally aware self-
hood in which the individual is fulfilled by their work for the collective.
The twentieth century was marked by a series of revolutions 
intended to introduce worker control over production and consumption 
(Russia 1917, Germany 1918, China 1946, Vietnam 1954, Cuba 1958 and 
Venezuela 1999, for instance). However, they all encountered opposition 
to worker control, both internally and externally, and they all succumbed 
quite quickly to big man rule (Sahlins 1963). It remains untested whether 
this was because of a failure of communist ideology, the lack of a suf-
ficiently informed proletariat willing and able to police the revolution, 
external pressure to fail or a basic misunderstanding of the nature of 
being human (Lorimer 1997). From the viewpoint of the SSMH, how-
ever, the attempt to direct the consensus of social modelling away from 
individuals and toward collective institutions may have been an attempt 
to plug altruism into the wrong socket. Effacing the individual’s model of 
their own selfhood seems, on the current evidence we have, to lead not 
to altruism but to apathy.
Émile Durkheim (1895), like Marx, saw modern society as a form 
of alienation of the individual; but for Durkheim the alienation was 
caused by an enhanced sense of personal identity, and it was not a Bad 
Thing. Traditional societies have collective awareness and weak self- 
identity, while modern Western societies have individual awareness and 
strong self- identity; traditional societies enforce conformity by dealing 
with deviant behaviour, while modern Western societies deal with the 
deviant individual; and, while conformity in traditional societies means 
adoption of a standard role, modern Western conformity is a matter of 
finding a specialist role in a complex and highly differentiated society. For 
Durkheim, the enhanced selfhood in modern societies is a necessary out-
come of social complexity: social complexity generates new and varied 
ways of being human, so the individual has more choice in their way of 
being human.
Claude Lévi- Strauss (1962) thought that the individual was almost 
entirely the product of their social environment, and any selfhood was 
therefore imposed on the individual by the local culture. Like Durkheim, 
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he saw the collectively defined self as the natural state in traditional soci-
eties, while modern humans were in a state of enhanced individuality. 
However, unlike Durkheim (and more like Marx), he believed the trad-
itional state was preferable to the modern. Modern individuality leads 
to the celebration of individual creativity, which cannot actually exist. 
Everything created is continuous with what has gone before; which 
means that attempting to consciously add newness usually adds imper-
fection – it is not creation, it is destruction. Individuality works against 
the natural human state, and this led Lévi- Strauss (1955 [1963]), to 
assert Blaise Pascal’s aphorism, ‘Le moi est haissable’ (‘The me is hateful’).
Lévi- Strauss incorporated his idea of selfhood throughout his 
anthropology; he took the view that humans are not designed for 
individual fulfilment, and we can only reach personal fulfilment by 
abandoning our individuality. His work on mythology was concerned 
with the essentially impersonal nature of story- telling: mythology is not 
about a story being told, it is about a story being heard, and it is under-
stood through the culture in which it is heard. It is not important that 
the story is told well, it is important that it is heard as the same story by 
everyone every time. The shaman’s or bard’s or skald’s role is to convey 
the message behind the story, and it should therefore be possible to trace 
the same message through the stories told in any area of continuous cul-
ture. Lévi- Strauss traced one message, the Birdnester myth, through the 
stories told from the Antarctic to the Arctic of the Americas; and Chris 
Knight (1991) has since shown that the same Birdnester myth appears 
in different cultures dispersed across the globe. Lévi- Strauss’ theories on 
individuality have also inspired writers such as Michel Foucault (Martin 
et al. 1988), Jacques Derrida (1998) and Pierre Bourdieu (2008) in their 
discussions of selfhood within society.
Joseph Campbell (1949), another anthropologist with an interest 
in myth, took a very different view of selfhood in traditional societies. 
He looked at the myths as hero- myths, descriptions of the growth and 
emancipation of the individual protagonist in the story – who is usually 
male, and usually forced to undertake a series of ego- enhancing tasks. 
However, like Lévi- Strauss, Campbell saw all myth as carrying one single 
message, which he called the monomyth. This myth has four functions: to 
explain nature; to reconcile the conscious experience of life to the sub-
liminal experience; to establish the constraints that society must place 
on the individual to ensure group survival; and to provide a template by 
which individuals should live to ensure personal survival. Campbell was, 
therefore, interested in individuals and individuality as building blocks 
of society, and not as threats to it.
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For Campbell, the monomyth was not a call to abandon indi-
viduality, but an explanation of the interface between the personal 
 individual and the social individual, the ‘selfish’ self and the coopera-
tive self. It explained how the selfish self can move from the safety 
of the known through the unsafe unknown, and emerge once again into 
the known, but with a new social awareness. Campbell acknowledged 
the similarity between his ascending hero and Nietzsche’s superman 
when he said:
Nietzsche was the one who did the job for me. At a certain moment 
in his life, the idea came to him of what he called “the love of 
your fate”. Whatever your fate is, whatever the hell happens, you 
say, “This is what I need”. It may look like a wreck, but go at it as 
though it were an opportunity, a challenge. If you bring love to that 
moment – not discouragement – you will find the strength is there. 
Any disaster you can survive is an improvement in your character, 
your stature, and your life.
(Campbell, in Osbon 1991)
Lévi- Strauss and Campbell approached selfhood from two very 
different directions, and their research into myth led them to very 
different conclusions. There are striking similarities between their 
positions (relating to the existence of a single mythic story, and the 
difference between selfhood in modern and traditional societies, for 
instance), but they also illustrate the fact that, in anthropology, our own 
context is vital. The stories we tell about being human are the stories of 
our own humanity; the evidence we rely on is our own experience of 
being human; and when we hear stories, we understand them through 
the filter of our own experience.
Dorinne Kondo (1986) raised an important issue for selfhood 
in anthropology. Her experience while conducting fieldwork in Japan 
made her realise that her own selfhood had intruded onto her research 
in an unexpected and disturbing way:  in her effort to understand the 
‘Japaneseness’ of her subjects, she had increasingly identified with, and 
adopted, the attitudes and views of her subjects. The transformation 
did not happen in her objective knowledge of being Japanese but in her 
subjective knowledge. Yet it was only through her subjective knowledge 
that she was able to objectively identify the cultural differences between 
being Japanese and being American. Kondo was simultaneously two 
selves, and it was only the maintenance of both selves that allowed her 
ethnographic work to proceed. Her Japanese self was neither subsumed 
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into, nor properly differentiated from, the local culture; instead, it was in 
a constant negotiation with her American self and the context in which 
it found itself.
Thomas Csordas (1990) took a somewhat different direction on 
selfhood, when he proposed that any anthropological study of the 
self needs to recognise the physical body. The existence of a body is 
the cause of the existence of the self, and the existence of groups of 
bodies is the cause of culture  – both the physical culture evident in 
many non- humans and the symbolic culture evident in humans. The 
human self is both a subjective thing experienced in a physical culture 
and an objective thing experienced in a symbolic culture; but the sub-
jective and objective selves are not different things, they are different 
sides of the same thing. Only by acknowledging the embodiment of the 
self can we hope to reconcile our subjective and objective experiences. 
For Csordas, the self is an enduring thing, defining culture by its very 
existence.
More recently, Deacon et al. (2011) presented another anthropo-
logical view of the self, as an emergent feature of cognition. Having a self 
is nothing unusual in nature – it can be viewed as an inevitable outcome 
of motivated matter: as soon as you have cellular life, you have, on some 
level, selfhood. Human selfhood has both subjectivity (we are aware 
of our selfness) and interiority (we can think about our selves); while 
we share subjectivity with other animals, interiority is an extra level of 
selfhood – which may, or may not, be exclusive to Homo sapiens, but is 
certainly not common in nature. Subjectivity and interiority are, in turn, 
products of the cognitive complexity permitted by our brains, they are 
not by- products of an inexplicable human nature. If we are to understand 
selfhood as a social or cultural phenomenon, we must first understand it 
as a cognitive phenomenon.
This short section has illustrated some of the views on the individual 
that anthropology has inspired, but it is only a representative sample. 
Modern analysis of selfhood in anthropology is usually extensively 
informed by scientific knowledge from a range of disciplines. Nowadays, 
anthropologists can look at other species to identify which aspects of our 
nature predate our species; they can identify genetic reasons for some 
of the aspects of our nature; and they can study human brains in action 
to see how some of the aspects of our nature are represented in our cog-
nition. Anthropology is no longer a fully autonomous academic field; 
it is now, in large part, a nexus of zoology, neurology, psychology and 
genetics. It has become the study of the human as animal, as well as the 
human as phenomenon.
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However, anthropology does express a unique view on the issue 
of selfhood: the anthropological approach both starts and finishes with 
the group. The self needs to be seen as a socially defined phenomenon, 
created by both the impression of the group upon the individual and the 
expression of the individual upon the group. Humans have a unique rela-
tionship with other members of their species, both communicatively and 
socially. Our capacity for group living and group institutions exceeds that 
of every other animal on the planet; as we saw in the Prologue, only the 
eusocial insects come close, and their group living is definitely not based 
around selfhood. Anthropology therefore has an important voice in the 
discussion of selfhood; and its motivating question, ‘What does it mean 
to be human?’, is key to understanding our unusual relationship with our 
selves.
Is there an answer?
So, after all the different turns, what is a self? I know that you are you, 
and not me or some other person who is not you; and I know that I am me 
because you tell me I am. We each recognise each other, and ourselves, 
as individual beings; and our society and culture are arranged around 
recognising these details of selfhood. I can own things, or even ideas, and 
you can offer me something I value if you want to use my thing or idea. If 
I do something of which other people do not approve, they can hold me 
responsible and punish me. Other people insist that I am the same person 
I was 50 years ago, even though I look, sound and think differently from 
the self I was then; and at a fundamental level, despite evidence to the 
contrary, I also think I am the same person. So what is this self that is so 
important to other people and ourselves? And where does it come from?
In this chapter, we have encountered a wide range of different 
viewpoints, from ‘the self is the only truly real thing’ to ‘the self is an 
illusion’. Different commentators have shown the self to be a metaphys-
ical reality, a physical reality, a cognitive reality, or a cognitive trope. 
It has been described as a single integrated whole, a series of nested 
functions, a series of separate but interrelated functions and a set of ad 
hoc instances. It has been analysed as a genetic phenomenon, a personal 
phenomenon, a social phenomenon, a cultural phenomenon and a reli-
gious phenomenon. Faced with this milling crowd of selves, it seems not 
at all unreasonable for us to ask, ‘Would the real self please stand up?’ – 
although, if Metzinger and Wegner are correct, this should only result in 
nervous muttering and shuffling of feet.
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So, taking all these ideas into account, what can we say with any 
degree of certainty about the self? Well, we can agree that it is something 
that we all need if we are to be fully functioning humans, regardless of 
how real we believe it to be; we can accept that it is complex and multifa-
ceted, regardless of our particular views of what the complexities are; we 
can recognise that it is not simply an internal thing, for our self is defined 
by others as well as ourselves; and we can probably concur that the self 
we are able to study scientifically is essentially a product of our brains, 
regardless of our views about the metaphysical self. This is quite a lot to 
be able to agree on, and it provides us with a stable enough foundation to 
take our investigation of the self forward.
  
29
2
Where Did Self Come From?
‘I quite agree with you,’ said the Duchess; ‘and the moral of that 
is, “Be what you would seem to be” – or if you’d like it put more 
simply.  – “Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what 
it might appear to others that what you were or might have been 
was not otherwise than what you had been would have appeared to 
them to be otherwise.” ’
‘I think I should understand that better,’ Alice said very politely, 
‘if I had it written down: but I can’t quite follow it as you say it.’
‘That’s nothing to what I  could say if I  chose,’ the Duchess 
replied, in a pleased tone.
(Lewis Carroll 1865, Chapter 9: ‘The Mock Turtle’s Story’)
The Duchess’ admonition to Alice is probably indecipherable (at least, 
I cannot find an unambiguous meaning in it, even when written down), 
but it does represent an important feature of selfness: the self seems to 
be defined through the interaction of different external viewpoints about 
the self. It is not simply an internal description. This range of external 
viewpoints was more simply described in Chapter 1 as ‘they think I am, 
therefore I am’: I am aware of myself because I am aware of you being 
aware of me.
Most humans would say that they are self- aware: we feel that we 
can choose between alternative courses of action, and that we can be 
aware of ourselves choosing between those alternatives. We don’t just 
have a feeling of personal choice, we also feel there is a self making those 
choices  – we have an awareness of our own selfness. René Descartes 
(1649 [1998]) took the view that we are the only animals to have suf-
ficient self- awareness to know there is a self to be aware of. Most 
modern primatologists, however, are less certain about the exclusivity 
of self- awareness, and point to experimental results that can only be 
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satisfactorily explained by acknowledging some kind of self- awareness in 
their primate subjects (for example, Patterson and Gordon 1993). Some 
exceptional non- human subjects, heavily exposed to human culture, 
even seem to exhibit compassion and social mindfulness at levels that 
Cartesian philosophers would like to reserve for humans (for example, 
Savage- Rumbaugh et  al. 1986). But does this mean that those non- 
humans have also reached a level of self- awareness where they are cap-
able of asking themselves the question ‘Who am I?’
Even if we allow that these exceptional non- humans have access 
to a certain level of self- awareness, we usually stop short of accepting 
that they have the same self- awareness as humans. To be human is to 
be, somehow, more aware of yourself than any other species can be. 
We can know who we were, who we are, and that our self has been 
changed between then and now; and we can know who we are going 
to be – often imagining several different future selves at the same time 
(Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts 2015). It is as if we were working with 
multiple versions of our self, emphasising different aspects of our char-
acter in each version. We also often feel that we have individual con-
tinuity, that the self I  was then is somehow the same self I  am now, 
and that the future selves are all continuations of the present self; but 
when we look comparatively at those different selves, it becomes hard 
to see what it is that continues.
The sense of not- self
Let us, for now, leave aside the question of how the human sense of 
self works, and look at some of the ways in which non- humans have 
selves – even if they are not aware of the selves they have. It turns out 
that, for some definitions of selfhood, having a self is far from unusual in 
nature; and, using the most basic definition (that self is the cause of self- 
preservation), it may even offer a viable definition of life itself.
When looking for evidence of any kind of selfhood, we can, in evo-
lutionary terms, start way back with the amoeba, a single- celled animal-
cule endemic on this planet. The choice of the amoeba as the earliest 
candidate is somewhat arbitrary: it stands for any single- celled animal (a 
protozoan, foraminifer, bacterium or archaeon would serve just as well). 
What is said here about the amoeba can be said about any of these single- 
celled animals.
The first point to make about the amoeba is that its apparent sim-
plicity is deceptive. An amoeba is a eukaryotic cell, the same type of cell 
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that makes up the human body, and it is a highly efficient little machine 
(Cordingley and Trzyna 2008). A eukaryotic cell is composed of a series of 
sub- mechanisms that control movement, feeding, and cell division – and 
these sub- mechanisms work together in such a way that the cell appears 
to have a will to survive. The amoeba moves toward, and envelops, food 
items, and it moves away from threats to its survival. On the surface, this 
will to survive appears to work in a similar way to human choice; but it 
does not involve the conscious awareness needed for human choice, it is 
just the outcome of electro- chemical interactions between the amoeba 
and its environment.
The amoeboid eukaryotic cell does not seem a particularly fer-
tile ground in which to look for any type of selfhood, but it actually 
demonstrates the most fundamental version of self. The amoeba is a 
set of mechanisms within a flexible cell membrane, and this membrane 
marks the boundary between the ends of existence (movement, feeding 
and division) and the means by which that existence is maintained. 
Things outside the amoeba’s cell membrane have the potential to support 
or damage its existence; everything inside it is (theoretically) already 
devoted to the amoeba’s existence. It is therefore useful to the amoeba to 
be able to detect and react differently to items outside its cell membrane 
than to items inside it, giving it, for all practical amoeboid purposes, a 
sense of not- self.
It is this sense of not- self, allied with the will to survive, that offers 
a viable definition for life:  living things react to their environments in 
ways that support, or minimise damage to, their existence; non- living 
things do not. The sense of not- self provides a simple and natural way for 
organisms to enhance their personal survival; and the more sophisticated 
and effective the sense of not- self, the fitter the organism will be. Like 
any natural system, however, the weaknesses of the sense of not- self are 
exploitable by other organisms; and, in this case, the key weakness is that 
detection is focussed outward. If something can get inside the cell wall by 
posing as, say, food, it can wreak havoc inside the cell, undetected and 
unopposed by the cell. Viruses, and species of bacteria and fungi, have 
all adopted versions of this trick, exploiting other cells beyond their own 
capsid or cell membrane as part of their own ‘will to survive’.
Despite this key weakness in the single- celled animal’s definition 
of its world, the sense of not- self was sufficient to take life from the 
single cell to multi- cellular cooperation. The survival of genetic clones 
(which, because of cell division, is what neighbouring same- species 
cells are most likely to be) is of almost equal worth to the cell as sur-
vival of the cell itself, and this means that aggregations of single- celled 
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clones can appear to work together to achieve common ends; and the 
common ends give the appearance of shared intention. Slime moulds, 
colonies of cloned single- celled animalcules, can appear to move as a 
single entity, although each cell is actually governed by only two rele-
vant chemosensory imperatives: first, move toward food; second, move 
toward same- species cells, or conspecifics (Hudson et  al. 2002). The 
cells that detect food move toward it (the first imperative), dragging 
along the other cells behind them (the second imperative). This gives the 
appearance, to human observers, of a single, amorphous, multi- cellular 
entity.
One of the strangest outcomes of this colony relationship is what 
happens when there is no food being detected. The cells aggregate, as 
expected under the second imperative, and begin to form what look like 
budding bodies. The cells in these budding bodies form spores (dormant 
cells that preserve their DNA cargo) and blow away. The wind carries 
them to new, hopefully richer, environments, where they can activate, 
propagate and start new colonies. These clonal slime mould colonies, 
with their primitive cell specialisations, provide an evolutionary template 
for what happens in much more complex organisms like we humans. So 
the sense of not- self could be seen as the beginning of an explanation for 
the existence of complex organisms.
The sense of almost- self
From self- organising clonal cooperatives to multi- celled organisms is a 
small step in terms of systemic innovation: a multi- cellular organism is 
just a clonal colony with extra rules – the main one being that, if enough 
cells of a particular type die, the whole organism dies. However, in 
terms of evolutionary innovation, the cell specialisms required by multi- 
cellularity involve a long series of developmental changes, and a full 
explanation is considerably more complex than can be given here. One 
developmental change that should be mentioned, though, is the electro-
chemical recognition by cells of their clonal relatives, allowing different 
reactions to clones and to alien cells. This differentiated response is 
an extension of the external sense of not- self, not the beginning of an 
internal sense of self. It can be described as a sense of almost- self (clones 
are good, non- clones are bad), but not almost a sense of self.
A multi- cellular organism can be described somewhat metaphor-
ically as a clonal colony with enhanced cell specialisation: each cell in 
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the organism has a specialist role. This means that the simple genetic 
programme of the eukaryotic amoeba, which produces undifferenti-
ated copies, must have a secondary programme overlaid on it to control 
cell differentiation. Muscle cells have to be where muscle cells should 
be; and brain cells, skin cells, bone cells and all other cells also need to 
be in the right place. There need to be mechanisms to encourage the 
right sort of differentiation and to discourage the wrong sort. These 
mechanisms must be products of the genetic processes within the cell, 
but they work between the cells instead of inside them. They are essen-
tially about intercellular communication, and it is only recently that we 
have begun to understand how these mechanisms work (Mittelbrunn 
and Sánchez- Madrid 2013).
The secondary genetic programme for cell differentiation there-
fore generates, and relies on, a system of communication between cells; 
and this, in turn, requires a cell to have a sense of almost- self about other 
cells in the multi-cellular organism. Each cell has to react to its clones 
cooperatively and to alien cells inimically – there has to be an autonomic 
and concerted reaction by the clonal colony to non- colony cells to pre-
vent them invading the colony (for this purpose, an autonomic reaction 
can be defined as an electrochemical response that does not involve 
choice; it is the inevitable response to a particular stimulus). The appar-
ently cooperative sense of almost- self at the cellular level is sufficient 
to generate the appearance of a sense of not- self at the colony level, as 
the colony itself appears to have an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’; and this is 
why we tend to refer to multi- celled clonal colonies (such as ourselves) 
as organisms.
Cell differentiation introduces the possibility of another type 
of cooperation for the organism:  some cells can become more vital 
to the continued operation of the organism than others  – or, to put it 
another way, a hierarchy of cells can develop. We see this in our own 
organism: skin cells, which sit right at the edge between the means and 
ends of the organism, are short- lived, and perform most of their barrier 
function by dying. They are on a conveyor belt of constant renewal: over 
three weeks, your skin completely replaces itself. The skin of your colon 
is replaced even faster, every four or five days. This compares to neuron 
cells in the brain, which can last a lifetime, and replace themselves at a 
much slower rate (Gage 2002) – so slow that it was once thought there 
was no replacement at all. In terms of the body as clonal colony, skin cells 
are the poor bloody infantry, sacrificed in droves so that the commanding 
cells in the brain can work in comparative safety. This three- stage cel-
lular evolution (segmentation, differentiation and hierarchy) is, as we 
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shall see, also applicable to the origins of human culture and language, 
and it may represent a standard strategy for dealing with the universe.
The sense of almost- self is a feature of all cells in multi-cellular 
organisms; and, with cellular differentiation and hierarchy, the aggre-
gation of cell reactions gives the organism the appearance of being cen-
trally directed. The central direction, however, is contained in the gene 
programme of every individual cell, and not within a particular organ 
of the organism. This distributed organisational template, with the 
appearance of being centrally directed, works very well for plants and for 
other organisms that have only autonomic functions. However, the intro-
duction of automatic functions (functions under a level of control by the 
organism) requires actual central direction – or, as we express it in terms 
of the organism, a central nervous system and a brain.
Senses of other and sense of self
So far, we have seen that a sense of not- self is valuable at the cellular 
level: a cell has an inside, where everything is dedicated to preserving 
and propagating the organism; and it has an outside, where everything 
provides a means to achieve those ends. The sense of almost- self is simi-
larly valuable at the organism level. The survival of the organism is para-
mount; but it is useful to recognise, and cooperate with, your relatives 
because they carry some of your genes and can pass those genes on to 
the future. Recognition of the existence of relatives by organisms is not 
as valuable as the recognition of clones at the cellular level. Clones will 
nearly always produce exact copies of the original cell; but relatives, 
especially when sexual reproduction enters the mix, will produce only 
partially faithful copies – and the more distant the relationship, the less 
similarity you have with the copy.
The sense of almost- self is therefore variable at the organism 
level:  some almost- self organisms are more almost self than others. 
A  simple rule of cooperating or competing with neighbouring cells, 
depending on their chemical signals, has to be replaced by a system of 
conditional cooperation under some kind of automatic, or cognitive, con-
trol. Response to a stimulus can no longer be divorced from the organism 
generating the stimulus, and different organism– stimulus combinations 
need different responses, depending on the context of the stimulus. 
A  central nervous system gives this level of choice to an organism, 
allowing a range of stimuli to be integrated into an impression of the situ-
ation before a response happens. A central nervous system also allows 
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the development of senses beyond the chemosensory: sound and vision 
become viable conduits for information- gathering and exchange, once 
specialist detector and transmitter systems have evolved.
All of these factors mean that it is advantageous for organisms 
to develop an enhanced sense of not- self that can distinguish between 
different types of not- self. This is, effectively, a sense of other, a sense 
that there are other organisms in the world with me. A simple sense of 
not- self combines with a variable sense of almost- self to create the envir-
onment in which this sense of other becomes possible, and also generates 
the fitness advantage that makes it valuable: the organism can generate 
variable and conditional responses to stimuli based on the context of the 
stimuli, where the context is other organisms.
The sense of other, however, does not lead automatically to the 
evolution of a sense of self; the evolutionary route to a sense of self is 
different. For the amoeba, sensing the outside world is useful, while 
sensing the internal world remains less valuable: no sense of self or self-
ness is needed or desirable. Once an organism’s range of responses has 
been increased by the development of a central nervous system, however, 
the capacity for the individual to see their choices as personally ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ becomes more valuable. To give an example: plants, without a 
central nervous system, can only try to ride out a worsening local envir-
onment, or produce seed on the chance that their offspring may travel 
beyond it; animals, on the other hand, because of their greater cell dif-
ferentiation and hierarchy, can make a personal decision to move to a 
better environment. The introduction of a brain (alongside many other 
cellular specialisations) gives an organism a greater level of control over 
its reactivity: it can choose whether to move, where to move, how fast to 
move – indeed, many survival- related activities become subject to choice. 
It is this new activity of choosing that creates the next level of mindful-
ness, the sense of self.
Sense of self is a representation by the organism of the agenda 
of the organism. It is not a conscious representation, it is more akin to 
feelings of satisfaction when things are going well for the organism, and 
a sense of unease when they are not. The sense of self does not involve 
awareness that there is a self; it is more a sense of being than a know-
ledge of existence. There is no subjective I or objective me recognised by 
the organism, there is just a feeling of the integrity of the self, which is 
augmented by the central nervous system’s ability to globalise localised 
phenomena in the body, such as pain and pleasure:  the whole indi-
vidual can feel well or ill when only a part of them is actually feeling 
well or ill.
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Sense of self and sense of other are not directly related phenomena. 
Sense of other is not a product of sense of self, or vice versa; they are 
separate cognitive representations of the means and ends of survival and 
are ideationally very different. They both have their roots in the relation-
ship between sense of not- self and sense of almost- self, but they elab-
orate these bases in different ways. Sense of other addresses the external 
differences between the organism’s clonal cells and different parts of the 
rest of the universe; sense of self addresses the internal cohesion of the 
organism’s cells. They both, however, rely on a central nervous system 
with a control node, or brain.
Brains are, themselves, very costly organs to build and main-
tain: the human brain, for example, takes up about 2 per cent of the body 
by weight, but uses about 20  per  cent of the energy consumed by the 
body (Raichle and Gusnard 2002); for infants, the brain- to- body energy 
budget is over 40 per cent (Kuzawa et al. 2014). There will, therefore, 
always be a trade- off between an organism’s energy budget and the 
brain’s capacity to perform any cognitive task – which includes sublim-
inal recognition of self and other. In theory, evolution should favour a 
minimal recognition of both self and other; but in practice the fitness 
advantages of a capacity can sometimes outweigh the energy costs, so 
the organisms who pay the energy price are more successful in terms of 
fitness and reproduction than those who do not. It is this simple evolu-
tionary mechanism that drove some organisms, including our ancestors, 
toward the next level of cognition: awareness.
Awareness
Where sense of not- self and almost- self are autonomic chemosensory 
reactions that require no central nervous system, sense of other and self 
are cognitive processes – but they are still automatic and require no con-
scious attention from the organism to make them happen. Awareness, 
on the other hand, is a cognitive process that is all about attention. In 
simple stimulus– response systems, chemosensory mechanisms represent 
both the stimulus and its response, and the first invariably produces the 
second. Simple cognitive processes are more controlled and control-
lable, but they still rely on stimulus– response, even though the range of 
responses is much greater. Awareness, in contrast, introduces another 
dislocation between stimulus and response, creating a third way for 
an organism to react. A  stimulus could provoke the organism into an 
invariant, autonomic reaction; or it could be evaluated by the brain 
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subliminally, causing an automatic response with some variability; or 
it could be consciously evaluated, causing an attentional response. As 
humans, we like to think we are carefully evaluating our responses to all 
stimuli at all times, but we are actually aware of only a tiny number of 
the stimuli we receive (Morsella et al. 2016). This is highly convenient 
for us: instead of, say, trying to control the autonomic muscle interplay 
of walking, or the automatic process of negotiating the terrain we are 
walking over, we can concentrate on where we are going, or even what 
we will do when we get there (Arp 2007).
The presence of a complex brain means, on some level, the presence 
of awareness; and the amount of brain complexity is a good indicator 
of the complexity of awareness possible in a particular species. By this 
simple measure, the uniqueness of human brains in terms of relative size 
and complexity means there has to be something special about human 
awareness; but this does not mean that only humans have awareness. 
Contrary to what Descartes believed, we are far from being the only aware 
species on the planet. The rest of nature is not composed of automata, 
and what makes us the species we are is not a special metaphysical sub-
stance found nowhere else in nature (and, indeed, not yet identified in 
us). The human difference lies, instead, in a natural process of genetic 
and social manipulation that preferentially produces human bodies and 
brains; and, unlike the soul, it is a process that scientific method can 
discover.
Human awareness is often misinterpreted as soul- like; but it is not 
a substance possessed by, or produced by, the brain. It is an aspect of 
the way brains work – a process rather than a state. Awareness is always 
‘awareness of’ something, it cannot exist without a focus; and, as with 
sensing, it is possible to be aware of both what is outside the organism 
and to model what is inside. This, however, raises an interesting con-
undrum: being aware of external objects and events gives the organism 
greater control over its surviving and thriving, and therefore increases 
evolutionary fitness; but what is the advantage of being aware of 
my internal mechanisms  – and, particularly, my internal cognitive 
mechanisms? Being able to second- guess myself would seem to add an 
unnecessary layer of choice and delay to the decision- making process, 
which cannot advantage the organism:  if I  have already selected my 
response subliminally, presumably as the fittest response I  can make, 
what advantage is there in having the capacity to change my mind? In a 
mixed population of deciders and ditherers, the ditherers will lose out.
The advantages of being able to second- guess others are much more 
obvious, and show why awareness of others is likely to have preceded 
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awareness of self. Having a greater range of automatic responses to par-
ticular organism– stimulus contexts increases the number of strategies 
available to the responder; and, as long as that increase enhances sur-
viving and thriving for the responder, it will be selected for. However, if 
the stimulus creator develops a wider range of alternative stimuli that 
plug into alternative responses (and developing this wider range does 
not require attention to, or awareness of, these stimuli), then the number 
of organism– stimulus contexts the responder has to deal with increases. 
And, as long as this wider range enhances surviving and thriving for the 
stimulus creator, it will also be selected for. For instance, the possum that 
first learned to play dead was able to plug into its predator’s response 
to dead prey, and survived when its still- running conspecifics did not. 
This competition between range of stimulus and range of response means 
that members of the same species become locked into a cognitive arms 
race, where more strategies to anticipate stimuli require bigger brains, 
but bigger brains also generate more stimuli that require strategies to 
manage them. Matt Ridley (1993) identified this phenomenon in rela-
tion to sex and sexual signalling, referring to it as the Red Queen problem 
(a reference to the Red Queen in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking- 
Glass, who had to run very fast just to stay still). It is, however, a problem 
that is not limited to sexual signalling; it occurs in any signalling envir-
onment where deception can happen. It is also a problem for any genetic 
effect that can enhance both stimulus response and stimulus production, 
such as increases in general cognitive capacity.
So what is the advantage of awareness for the individual, and how 
does that advantage make awareness valuable in fitness terms? The 
main fitness advantage that awareness offers is that it allows the indi-
vidual to keep up in the strategy– counterstrategy competition to sur-
vive and thrive: once a single individual is using awareness to outfox its 
conspecifics, awareness becomes an evolutionarily fit strategy. However, 
the capacity to second- guess the actions of others also introduces a new, 
reflective and reflexive type of cognition: not only does an organism have 
an enhanced range of responses to others, it also has an enhanced range 
of responses to the responses of other organisms. It is no longer the fastest 
response that is most effective, it is the response with the least effective 
counter- response. As soon as the first glimmering of awareness appeared, 
the race was on, with ever- more outrageous cognitive costs being paid 
to keep up. As long as the fitness advantage of awareness outweighed 
the costs, as for any genetic trait, it was selected for; but the awareness 
selected for would have been other awareness, not self- awareness. As 
long as the self remains opaque to the self, it poses no difficulties in terms 
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of conscious choice. So how did we become aware that we had a self? 
What aspect of being human made self- awareness a possibility, and what 
advantage did it give us that was sufficient to outweigh the disadvantage 
of second- guessing ourself?
Sharing information
One explanation for the origin of self- awareness is that it is an inevitable 
outcome of the sharing of information about relationships in our group 
(Edwardes 2010, Chapter 7). In production, this does not require self- 
knowledge, because it is all about other people; but in reception, it does. 
If I receive information about a social relationship in which I am a pro-
tagonist, the only way I can incorporate that information into my social 
calculus is to envisage a third- person view of myself, a self- as- other. This 
is because all the other entities in my social calculus are theys: identified 
individuals, but essentially means external to me, not ends personal to 
me. So awareness of self (or, at least, awareness that I  am a self) is a 
by- product of sharing social information. As long as that sharing makes 
the individual fitter, the behaviour will survive and thrive; and as long as 
modelling myself is an inevitable consequence that does not completely 
whittle away the fitness advantage of sharing social information, it is 
along for the ride.
A secondary outcome of this awareness of self through the mod-
elling of self- as- other is the awareness that my physical and cognitive 
selves are intimately correlated with that modelled self. I have a cogni-
tive representation of a third party, which is also a representation of me: I 
am not only self- aware, I am aware of my own ‘selfness’ – that my mod-
elled self is simultaneously a special first- person case and a mundane 
third- person case in my cognitive social modelling. There is a hierarchy 
to my self- awareness: awareness that I can be modelled by others, and 
awareness that I, too, can model me. This awareness of selfness is not 
something we are continuously aware of, but it is something that informs 
our relationships with other individuals:  it is the me in ‘what will they 
think of me?’ and the I in ‘I should’.
Sharing social information is, however, not something that 
appeared suddenly and holistically in our evolutionary history; it is 
reliant on other cognitive developments. One key development is the 
capacity to model others as beings with their own agendas – intentional 
beings rather than animate objects. To do this, we need to understand 
that others have minds with which they generate their own agendas; 
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in other words, we need a Theory of Mind (ToM). This term was first 
adopted by Premack and Woodruff (1978) to describe the way humans 
model others as intentional beings, and it can be understood as working 
on two levels. First, it is a theory that others have minds, so they cannot 
be manipulated simply by using stimulus– response sequences; second, 
it is a theory about the kind of minds they have, and how those kinds 
of minds can be manipulated by belief and expectation. Minds make 
decisions based on available data, so they can be biased by the type of 
information they possess; by selectively giving information to others, we 
can bias the range of responses by those others to our stimuli.
This leads us to the two major signalling dilemmas that ToM 
produces. The first is the sender’s dilemma:  why give away valuable 
information? If having the information advantages me, and not having 
it disadvantages you, why should I share it? The second problem is the 
receiver’s dilemma:  if the sender is disadvantaged by giving me true 
information, but advantaged by giving me false information, why should 
I believe the information shared? These two dilemmas do seem to dictate 
the limits on much natural communication, but they are not insurmount-
able. The answer, as with all economic dilemmas like these, is to find a 
condition where giving the information is more valuable to the sender 
than its cost, and receiving it is more valuable than costly for the receiver.
Traditionally, there are four evolutionary routes to stable sharing. 
The first is William Hamilton’s (1964) kin- selection mechanism: I should 
share information with individuals who share my genes because their sur-
vival is also, in part, my own genetic survival. This mechanism explains 
why parents look after their offspring, and why social groupings of any 
species often share a close genetic history. The second evolutionary route 
is Robert Trivers’ (1971) reciprocal altruism:  I should help you today 
because you will help me tomorrow; and you will help me tomorrow 
because you will need my help the next day. If the cost to me of helping 
is less than the advantage to me of your being helped, and if the need 
for help is both random and common, reciprocally altruistic individuals 
will survive and thrive better than less altruistic individuals. The third 
evolutionary mechanism is Amotz and Avishag Zahavi’s costly signalling 
(1997): if it is important to the receiver that a signal be true, then it is 
worth paying attention to the cost of the signal. Cheap signals are easily 
faked and unreliable; expensive signals are difficult (or costly) to fake, so 
are likely to be reliable. This explains a lot of signalling in nature, such 
as the peacock’s tail, the costs of which perplexed Darwin; but it cannot 
help us with deliberate reduced- cost signalling, like language. Finally, 
the fourth route to a stable sharing mechanism is joint enterprise (Melis 
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and Semmann 2010). If we can work together to achieve something that 
we cannot each achieve alone, then it is worthwhile sharing information 
honestly. This type of exchange is typical both in human societies, with 
their high degrees of specialisation, and in human language, in its con-
versational role; so joint enterprise would seem to play a significant role 
in the development of stable sharing.
These four routes to stable sharing are not mutually exclusive, 
and the route that humans took probably involved a mixture of them. 
The topic of sharing information will be examined in more detail in 
Chapter  3; but, for now, the development of self- awareness can be 
summarised in the following four steps. For whatever reason, humans 
became able to share social information; in the sharing of social infor-
mation, we exchanged cognitive models of other members of our social 
group, as both senders and receivers; among the models we received 
there inevitably would have been models of our self; and, to incorp-
orate these into our social calculus, we would have needed to model 
our self as if it were another self.
The path from sense of not- self to awareness of selfness is, in evo-
lutionary terms, long but quite linear, as Figure  2.1 shows. Each new 
Sense of Not-Self
Sense of Other
Awareness of Other
Sense of Almost-Self
Sense of Self
Cellular Life
Will to Survive
Multi-cellularity
Central Nervous System
Awareness
Machiavellian Intelligence
Theory of Mind
Social Calculus
Shared Social Calculus
Altruistic Self-sacrifice
Group Cooperation
Joint Enterprise
Awareness of Self
Awareness of Selfness
Fig 2.1 The development of selfhood
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capacity develops naturally from the one before, and the senses and 
awarenesses of other and self emerge unremarkably from the previous 
capacities. The only time extra capacities were needed was at the point 
at which we began to share our social calculus. If there is anything spe-
cial about the evolution of Homo sapiens then it probably occurred at 
this stage.
Do animals have awareness of self?
If self- awareness is a product of language, and language is a purely human 
capacity, can we say that other animals do not have self- awareness? The 
logical answer is ‘yes’; but, as with all things cognitive, there is a signifi-
cant ‘however’ to be added to that simple affirmative. We need to look at 
different types of awareness of self before we can say unequivocally that 
self- awareness does not exist in other species.
We can start with the question ‘Do other animals have awareness of 
their physical bodies?’ As we have seen, this is far from a given of being 
alive, and is certainly not an attribute of single- celled animals; but how 
complicated does a nervous system have to be before it is capable of phys-
ical self- awareness? Fortunately, we can approach this question from the 
other end by looking at only a small subset of animals, the primates.
In 1970, Gordon Gallup thought he had found a way to investi-
gate physical self- awareness: he tested a small number of chimpanzees 
and monkeys to find out if they could recognise their own reflection in a 
mirror. His experiments involved familiarising his subjects with mirrors, 
then placing a mark on their face while they were anaesthetised and 
seeing how they reacted to the mark when they woke up. The chimpanzees 
began investigating their own faces when they saw the mark  – they 
seemed to know that what they were seeing in the mirror was a reflec-
tion of themselves. Afro- Eurasian monkeys tended to ignore the mark, or 
attempted to investigate the face in the mirror – they did not recognise 
their physical self in a reflection (old- world monkeys were selected for 
testing because humans share a more recent common ancestor with them 
than with the new- world American monkeys). Chimpanzees who had 
not previously encountered mirrors did not pass the test, nor did human 
children younger than about 18 months old (Amsterdam 1972), but it 
did appear that the mirror test was identifying something significant in 
self- recognition.
The test has since been repeated with a range of animals, and it has 
become clear that mirror recognition is not even limited to mammals. 
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All the great apes (bonobos, chimpanzees, gorillas, orang- utans) have 
been shown to pass the test (de Waal et al. 2005), as have several non- 
primates, such as bottlenose dolphins (Reiss and Marino 2001), orcas 
(Delfour and Marten 2001), an Asian elephant (Plotnik et al. 2006) and 
European magpies (Prior et  al. 2008). To complicate matters, a more 
recent experiment showed that rhesus monkeys can also be trained to 
pass the test (Chang et  al. 2015). Contrary to Gallup’s findings, these 
animals co- identify the reflection with their physical self if they are forced 
to pay attention to the face in the mirror and can link current sensations 
with current visual effects.
This does not mean the mirror test doesn’t work, but it does mean 
we should be careful about how we interpret it. As Gallup himself has 
said, ‘Simply because you’re acting as if you recognize yourself in a mirror 
doesn’t necessarily mean you’ve achieved self- recognition’ (quoted in 
Callaway 2015). However, if the mirror test is indeed a measure of phys-
ical self- awareness (and it seems to be), then we can at least say that this 
capacity is not limited to humans.
How exclusively human is cognitive social modelling? This, too, 
seems to be a capacity we share with other animals. Dorothy Cheney and 
Robert Seyfarth (2007) have shown that chacma baboons (Papio hama-
dryas ursinus) maintain quite complex models of their group, allowing 
them to identify both hierarchies of individuals within families, and 
the hierarchy of families within the group. It helps that there seems to 
be no ranking overlap between families: the lowest- ranking individual 
in a high- ranking family is still higher than the highest- ranking indi-
vidual in the next family down. While this social modelling is social 
arithmetic rather than social calculus (as it is about the relationships 
of others to the self rather than the relationships between others), the 
baboons are nonetheless able to adjust their social modelling appropri-
ately for changes of rank both within and between families. Although 
social modelling has been less widely explored in other species, there 
are indications that great apes, dolphins, whales, elephants and some 
birds are capable of social arithmetic; and there are clues that they may 
also be capable of a form of social calculus. The similarity between the 
list of species capable of social arithmetic and that of animals passing 
the mirror test may be telling us something important about social 
 cognition – or it may just be that these are the animals whose cognition 
we have studied in sufficient detail. However, the extent of social mod-
elling beyond the human species is not something that needs to concern 
us here; as with physical self- awareness, it is enough to be able to say 
that it is not exclusively human.
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So is shared social calculus exclusive to the human lineage? Here, 
we have something that has not yet been unequivocally detected in non- 
human communication. This does not mean it is exclusively human; but, 
until we identify the exchange of social information in other species, it 
seems reasonable to treat it as provisionally exclusive. Sharing social 
calculus requires communicative strategies that leave their mark on a 
communication system, and some of these we have yet to identify in non- 
humans – but some we have identified, so we cannot yet be certain either 
way about the exclusivity of shared social calculus.
The first of these strategies is naming, or attributing identity labels 
to other group members. Unlike internal social calculus, a name- label 
needs to reliably identify a particular member of a group to all other 
members of that group, so the labels must be communally shared. This 
type of labelling has only been reliably identified in one species of dol-
phin (Tursiops truncatus) so far:  it appears that every dolphin in a pod 
has a signature whistle (Cook et al. 2004), and they each use that whistle 
to indicate their presence and position to other pod members. This signa-
ture whistle remains the same when the dolphin moves to a new group 
(which they do often), so it is a label the dolphin uses to identify them-
self, not a label given to the dolphin by each group (King et al. 2018). 
Even more interestingly, they also use the signature whistles of other pod 
members to attract the attention of those others. By itself, this does not 
mean dolphins are sharing social calculus, but it does indicate that this 
group of species is worthy of further investigation.
The second requirement for sharing social calculus is signal 
combinatoriality:  you must be able to consolidate individuals into a 
group by linking their names to a particular relationship; and you must 
have the communicative mechanisms to bring this relationship to the 
attention of the listeners. To put it simply, your signal must be able to 
indicate two individuals and the relationship between them. So, for social 
calculus, combinatoriality requires both segmentation (a signal must be 
capable of containing more than one meaning- unit) and differentiation 
(the meaning- units have to represent different things – individuals and 
relationships). This type of combinatorial social sharing has not yet been 
identified in non- humans, but other forms of combinatorial signalling 
have. For instance, Campbell’s monkeys were found to use distinctive 
calls for eagle or leopard predator alert calls, but they also used a suffix, 
the same suffix for both calls, to change their meanings to more general 
alerts (Ouattara et al. 2009). In contrast, the sound- units in the calls of 
putty- nosed monkeys seem to have no individual meaning, but the way 
they are combined can create warning signals of ground predators or 
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aerial predators, or can be used to coordinate group movement to new 
feeding grounds (Arnold and Zuberbühler 2006).
However, these combinatorial calls may not offer sufficient 
proof:  the interpersonal referentiality in shared social calculus is very 
different from that in other combinatorial signalling. In contrast to 
social calculus, which is explicitly about other in- group individuals as 
third persons, other combinatorial signals seem to reference in- group 
members only as receivers, or second persons, and this (except for the 
dolphins) only implicitly; the presence of receivers justifies the making 
of the signal, but the signal is for them, not about them. Other combina-
torial signalling, like most signalling (including the dolphins), involves 
attracting attention; but any third- person reference is to out- group indi-
viduals, which can be treated as events or things rather than individuals. 
Shared social calculus has its origins in, and remains today, largely third- 
person reference about in- group individuals.
So what of the capacity to model the self – to be aware of your own 
selfness? Is this limited to humans? In terms of their natural social and 
communication systems, there seems to be no sign of awareness of self-
ness in non- humans; but then, because of the disadvantages that self- 
modelling brings for the modeller, we would expect to see it only if there 
were identifiable advantages to possessing it. This may be why, when we 
look at animals exposed to human language, we do see some indication 
of awareness of self: experiments in which we have tried to teach human 
language to non- humans have shown that, the more we expose them to 
a human communication system, the more humanlike their behaviour 
seems to become.
Non- humans using human language
From the mid- twentieth century onward, a series of scientific experiments 
were undertaken to teach a range of animals to use human language. The 
earliest experiment, an attempt to socialise a baby chimpanzee called Gua 
by bringing it up with a human child, was a qualified success in terms of 
showing an intellectual and empathic potential in the young chimpanzee, 
but a failure in terms of language: in the nine months of the experiment, 
Gua produced no language- like sounds (Kellogg and Kellogg 1933). 
A second, longer experiment (six years), involving a young chimpanzee 
but no human child, concentrated on language. This too, was a failure; 
the chimpanzee, Viki, mastered only four words (Hayes 1951). We now 
know that chimpanzees cannot vocalise like humans because they do not 
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have the vocal equipment or muscle control to do so. For this reason, later 
experiments used non- vocal modes of communication.
One famous experiment involved teaching a chimpanzee, Washoe, 
to use American Sign Language. By the time of her death in 2007, 
aged 42, she knew several hundred signs and combined them to make 
simple messages, such as [DRINK SODAPOP], [BALL CATCH], [ROGER 
TICKLE], [YOU DRINK], [RED ICE- CREAM] and [HOT DRINK]. She 
had also passed on her signing skills by teaching her adopted son, Loulis 
(Fouts and Mills 1997).
Another experiment trained several chimpanzees to commu-
nicate using magnetic symbol- shapes placed on a metal board. Each 
symbol represented a word, while a rule that the order of the symbols 
on the board affected meaning provided an element of syntax. The 
star pupil, Sarah, was able to produce quite complex instructions 
(such as [MARY GIVE FIG SARAH]), and she responded to more com-
plex instructions (such as [SARAH TAKE BANANA THEN MARY NOT 
GIVE CHOCOLATE]). However, some of the chimpanzees in the group 
never fully understood what they were supposed to do (Premack and 
Premack 1983).
Other species have also been involved in language- learning 
experiments. Bonobos (a species very similar to chimpanzees) were 
trained with a type of ‘keyboard’  – a series of symbols on a grid; each 
symbol represented a word, and the bonobos selected symbols to make 
meaningful sentences. Once again there was a star pupil, a male called 
Kanzi, whose output and humanlike skills continue to surprise and 
amaze. As well as giving and responding to quite complex instructions, 
he has learned how to make controlled fires for cooking and how to make 
stone tools, and he has taught some of what he knows to his son, Teco. 
However, once again, some other members of the trained bonobo team 
only vaguely understood the purpose of the keyboard, and some never 
mastered it (Segerdahl et al. 2005).
A female gorilla called Koko (Patterson and Gordon 1993) and an 
orang- utan called Chantek (Miles 2011) were, like Washoe, both trained 
in American Sign Language. When Chantek died in 2017, he had a 
vocabulary of 150 signs, knew how to use simple tools and, perhaps most 
interestingly, was able to refer to events that had happened years ago. 
Meanwhile, Koko, who died in 2018, apparently surpassed all the other 
signing apes. Her carer, Francine Patterson, claims that she could under-
stand a thousand different signs. While it is difficult for outsiders to verify 
the linguistic claims, there is a tentative view that Koko did seem to be 
using a humanlike communication system (Genty et al. 2009).
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Two other species have been involved in humanlike communication 
experiments. A  grey parrot called Alex (Pepperberg 1999)  was taught 
to recognise words for colours, shapes and materials, and was able to 
pick out items with the correct attributes ([RED WOOD SQUARE], for 
instance). He was also able to recognise the symbols for numbers, and 
was able to describe quite large groups of objects with the appropriate 
number symbol. Of course, Alex had an advantage that other animals do 
not: he could mimic human speech, and there is some evidence that he 
used it communicatively and conversationally.
While dogs would seem a poor source of evidence for linguistic 
competence, they have nonetheless proved themselves capable of lin-
guistic innovation. Two collie dogs, Rico (Kaminski et  al. 2004)  and 
Chaser (Pilley and Reid 2011), were trained to recognise their toys by 
name. Rico was able to retain 200 names for items, while Chaser had 
over a thousand named toys. Both dogs were able to infer that a new 
name should be matched with a new item, and Chaser could also identify 
items by a type label (for example, BALL) as well as by a name- label (the 
over one hundred individual names for his ball toys). That is, there was a 
 hierarchy to his cognitive labelling.
All of these experiments show that some aspects of language use are 
not beyond non- humans, and we should be careful about laying exclu-
sive claim to the capacity. However, even where a particular linguistic 
competence has been demonstrated by the non- human, there remains an 
important difference between human and non- human language use: the 
vast majority of non- human utterances are instrumental (asking for 
something) rather than interpersonal (exchanging social information), 
and only a few are about third parties. Nonetheless, the star non- human 
language users, Washoe the chimpanzee, Kanzi the bonobo, Koko the 
gorilla and Alex the parrot, do seem to be aware, on some level, that they 
are a self; and, while their conversational efforts do not reveal that they 
are aware of their own selfness, some of their other behaviours do dem-
onstrate an awareness of self that is not typical among their species.
For instance, Washoe maintained unusual interpersonal 
relationships with both humans and other chimpanzees, acting as 
interspecies interlocutor on several occasions. Roger Fouts also recounted 
several stories of Washoe’s empathic responses when her human carers 
were injured (Fouts and Mills 1997). Although empathy by itself is not a 
reliable sign of self- modelling, it does mean that the empathic individual 
is able to model, and relate to, what another individual is feeling. Koko 
is famous for her interspecies associations with kittens and cats, with 
which she had a recognisable owner– pet relationship (Patterson 1987). 
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This required her to have the capacity to model herself in the novel role 
of carer for another species. While this may just have been an emotional 
substitute for her frequently expressed desire for a child, her consistently 
benevolent treatment of the felines implies that she does not see herself 
as a standard female gorilla – and that, on some level, she did see herself 
as a self. Kanzi maintains friendships with non- bonobo primates at the 
Yerkes Primate Centre where he lives. He asks for visits and takes gifts to 
the apes he visits, indicating that he seems to be relating to them in an 
unusually human way (Savage- Rumbaugh and Lewin 1994).
It is tempting to over- interpret these examples as evidence that 
there is no real difference between the capacities of the different ape 
species: we are all people, under the hair. However, there is still no evi-
dence for awareness of selfness in non- humans, and empathy alone is 
not sufficient to show that it exists. Unlike humans, other apes do not 
seem to share their empathic concerns about others with third parties; 
unlike humans, other apes do not share irreal versions of the world 
(versions of the world that are real simply because people agree they 
are real, even though they know they are not real  – like the value of 
Bitcoin); and, unlike humans, other apes do not seem to be capable 
of joint enterprise beyond grooming, hunting and going to war. This 
should not, however, cause us to compare non- humans unfavourably to 
humans: chimpanzees are good at being chimpanzees, and it is unrea-
sonable to expect them to be good humans, too. The fact that they can 
confound our expectations in even small ways is a comment on their 
versatility, not on our superiority.
What is special about human self- awareness?
It seems that, while other animals may have different levels of self- 
awareness, only we humans seem to be aware of our own selfness 
(Edwardes 2014), that we are both physical objects with our own 
agendas and cognitive systems with recursive recognition. So what? 
Only peacocks have those magnificent tails; but the only reason they 
have them is that peahens have preferentially mated with well- endowed 
peacocks. Is a sense of self a similar costly signal? ‘Mate with me, I can 
bear the costs of awareness of selfness and still survive.’ Surprisingly, the 
attributes that awareness of selfness brings, which are mostly costs for 
the individual, do seem to be seen as social advantages by other humans. 
The individual with awareness of selfness is ‘intelligent’, ‘enlightened’, 
‘wise’; their behaviour is ‘generous’, ‘social’ and, perhaps most tellingly, 
‘unselfish’. Lack of awareness of selfness makes the individual ‘ruthless’, 
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‘unsympathetic’ or, at the extreme, ‘sociopathic’. There are plenty of 
examples in the modern world of what happens when we give the 
selfness-unaware individuals unrestrained freedom: greed may be good 
for the individual, but the tragedy of the commons means that if too 
many are greedy then everybody loses. Not only is awareness of selfness 
considered a good thing to have, our society seems to be arranged around 
it – and when we forget that, our social systems break.
This seems to imply that human awareness of selfness has driven 
human social evolution; but we have to remember that selfness is an 
emergent feature of the sharing of social models – disadvantageous by 
itself, but piggy- backing on the advantages that sharing gives. By itself, 
and for the individual, awareness of selfness is just a concomitant dis-
advantage of sharing social models; but for the group it provides a reli-
able indicator of the individual’s capacity and willingness to share social 
models honestly – to cooperate in the tribe’s information network. And 
this, in turn, is an indicator of the individual’s capacity and willingness to 
cooperate in joint enterprise. Good citizens cooperate; and good citizens 
can be identified by their self- effacing willingness to cooperate, share 
and inform.
At the level of the individual, human awareness of selfness is a 
problem; but the things that cause it – joint enterprise and information- 
sharing – are just too good to give up. So the fact that it can signal the 
presence of the things that cause it converts it from a negative quality 
to a positive one. The peacock’s tail display is, in itself, a Bad Thing, as it 
makes it easier for predators to catch the peacock; but because it shows 
the individual can bear the costs of the tail and still thrive, it becomes a 
Good Thing. Similarly, awareness of selfness shows that the human indi-
vidual can bear the cost of their awareness and still thrive – and, add-
itionally, enhance the survival of others in the group and therefore the 
survival of the group itself.
Human self- awareness is special, and makes us humans the pecu-
liar animal we are; but it is not beyond explanation, nor is it in need of a 
special dispensation from normal evolutionary processes. We may be the 
only species in which the necessary prerequisites have come together, but 
that does not make it miraculous.
Does having an awareness of selfness mean there is a 
self to be aware of?
One final question we need to address in this chapter is whether awareness 
of selfness is awareness of the existence of a cognitive self, or an illusion 
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caused by the existence of the cognitive self. As we saw in Chapter 1, this 
is a serious argument currently being pursued in a range of disciplines; 
and, just as the SSMH presented here deconstructs self- awareness into 
physical self- awareness and awareness of selfness, we need to similarly 
deconstruct the question of the existence of self.
This is not as complex an endeavour as it seems. The existence of 
physical self- awareness is not really disputed: everyone accepts that 
there is a physically cohesive self – despite the fact that experiments 
on deceptive sensation (the rubber hand illusion (Rohde et al. 2011), 
visual illusions (Carbon 2014), phantom limb syndrome (Giummarra 
and Moseley 2011) and so on) do seem to indicate that this physical 
self- awareness can be fooled. The big problem, however, is not with 
physical self- awareness, it is with awareness of selfness:  if the cog-
nitive self is a deception, is it possible to be aware of something that 
does not, itself, exist? There are only three possible answers to this 
question:
1. An individual can be aware of their selfness because there is a self 
to have selfness.
2. An individual can be aware of their selfness even though there is no 
self; they are aware of the illusion that they have a self.
3. An individual cannot be aware of their selfness because being 
aware is itself the illusion.
The strange thing is that the choice of answer seems not to matter 
in terms of awareness of selfness. Whether or not my awareness or my 
selfness is real or imagined, human social systems  – which is the only 
place where my awareness of selfness has worth – continue to work. They 
rely on everyone accepting the selfhood of others, not necessarily their 
own selfhood. Just as the Catholic Church cannot be interpreted prop-
erly without acknowledging its belief in transubstantiation (the idea that 
the consecrated bread and wine of the communion service are, on some 
level of reality, really the body and blood of Christ), so human society 
cannot be fully interpreted without acknowledging the need for belief in 
the selfhood of others. The selfness of the self remains a by- product of 
that belief.
Yet awareness of selfness remains an important part of our social cal-
culus. To use another metaphor, now that we have Einsteinian mechanics 
we know that Newtonian mechanics are fundamentally flawed, an inad-
equate description of the laws of physics; but we also know that they are 
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considerably simpler to compute than Einsteinian mechanics, and, in the 
vast majority of cases, they are accurate enough. The logical thing to do is 
to use Einsteinian mechanics every time for accuracy; the sensible thing 
to do is to use whichever is accurate enough. Selfness may, indeed, be an 
illusion; but that does not help us when we are computing our social cal-
culus of who is doing what to whom.
  
52
3
The Modelled Self
‘… And I haven’t sent the two Messengers, either. They’re both gone 
to the town. Just look along the road, and tell me if you can see 
either of them.’
‘I see nobody on the road,’ said Alice.
‘I only wish I had such eyes,’ the King remarked in a fretful 
tone. ‘To be able to see Nobody! And at that distance, too! Why, it’s 
as much as I can do to see real people, by this light!’
(Lewis Carroll 1872, Chapter 7: ‘The Lion and the Unicorn’)
What is happening in this quote? Is the White King just playing with 
words, or does this dialogue represent an important aspect of self- 
awareness – at least, in language? The king asks Alice if she can see a 
specific thing (either of the two messengers); Alice’s reply, though, is 
ambiguous:  is she saying that she cannot see the specific thing (either 
messenger), or that she can see a generic thing that doesn’t actually exist 
(‘nobody’)? Either way, she has not answered the king’s question directly 
and clearly enough, prompting his counter- response about the capacity 
to see things that are not there.
And yet we tend to consider Alice’s contribution to the conversation 
as normal, and the king’s response abnormal. Practically and pragmatic-
ally, there is no difference in meaning between ‘I don’t see anybody’ and 
‘I see nobody’. In fact, it is only when the presence of absence and the 
absence of presence are different states that the king’s problem appears: ‘I 
don’t see any me’ and ‘I see no me’ can be the difference between having 
a self you cannot identify in the current context and not having an iden-
tifiable self at all. It is this difference that lies at the heart of the modern 
debate about selfhood.
So which approach is right? Is it difficult, or impossible, to see my 
self myself, or is there no self to see? It depends, as we saw in Chapter 1, 
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on which theory of self you start with. Is a self a collection of predictable 
responses that produce selfhood as an identifiably individual thing? Or 
is self a process of responding predictably that allows others to see you 
as an identifiably individual thing? And, if the second is true, does this 
mean that my self is an actual thing, a thing we can agree is real, or a 
convenient illusion?
As Chapter  2 made clear, having a self you can be aware of is 
problematic in evolutionary terms: it seems to reduce the fitness of the 
organism by allowing it to adopt some very un- Darwinian strategies. Yet 
not having a self does not fit well with the cultures we live in: even the 
most self- denying human cultures believe that the self can be called to 
account and punished. We may not actually have a self we can be aware 
of, but we still have to act as if we do! So, between these contradictions, 
is there a middle road that can explain both the problematic unfitness 
of being self- aware and the social insistence on continuous selves? The 
modelled self may give us just such a middle way.
How to make models of others
To discover how we make models of ourselves, we must start with our cap-
acity to make models of others. This is a capacity that lends itself well to 
an evolutionary explanation, and which seems to be widespread among 
our fellow primates and beyond. The individual who can anticipate the 
actions of their conspecifics, their predators and their prey will have 
an advantage over the individual who cannot, and they should there-
fore be better at surviving and thriving (Seyfarth and Cheney 2013). Of 
course, an advantage often comes with some countervailing disadvan-
tage; and, in this case, the capacity to make social models comes with 
the significant energy costs that the necessary enhancement of cognition 
requires. However, as long as the advantages of a capacity outweigh the 
disadvantages, that capacity will be selected for in evolutionary terms; 
and, as the capacity to anticipate the actions of others has become com-
monplace in many species, it clearly must be advantageous.
The advantages of social modelling in the predator– prey dyad are 
different from those between conspecifics. Between predator and prey 
there is an evolutionary war of strategy and counter- strategy to get an 
individual’s genes into the future. Usually, a single strategy and a single 
counter- strategy define the relationship, and both are emphasised and 
enhanced by natural selection over the generations. While it does not 
involve social modelling, an example of the strategy and counter- strategy 
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process is the golden poison arrow frog, Phyllobates terribilis, which is in 
an arms race with its only predator, the Liophis epinephelus snake. The 
frog has a skin neurotoxin that is so powerful that it can kill a human just 
through contact, which seems like a massive overkill (literally). However, 
over time, the snake (whose diet comprises largely golden poison arrow 
frogs) has developed a tolerance of the toxin. So the frogs with higher tox-
icity survive better than the less toxic, while the snakes better able to deal 
with the poison survive better than the less capable. This is Matt Ridley’s 
(1993) Red Queen problem in action:  in evolutionary terms, both the 
frog and the snake are running as fast as they can just to stay still.
The social modelling strategy, in contrast, gives humans an advan-
tage that is difficult for both our predators and our prey to counter: the 
advantage of group cooperation. Because social modelling allows 
humans to anticipate each other’s actions, both offensive action against 
prey and defensive action against predators can be coordinated. However, 
coordinated action against predators and prey is not an unusual cap-
acity in nature, and is not limited to socially clever species:  babbler 
finches coordinate mobbing effectively against predators (Zahavi and 
Zahavi 1997, 5– 6) and wolves coordinate the killing of a range of prey 
(Baan et al. 2014). Even eusocial insects like ants and bees show a high 
level of group cooperation in defending against threats to their nests 
(Whitehouse and Jaffe 1996). It does not take a high level of cognitive 
sophistication to produce the social cohesion needed for tactical defen-
sive or offensive cooperation.
Between conspecifics, though, the attack/ defence arms race 
needs a more sophisticated competitive process, because the bidding 
war between a single strategy and a single counter- strategy is less effi-
cient. For instance, the poison arrow frog has to have a tolerance to its 
own toxin, so its conspecifics will also have this tolerance:  the toxin is 
useless in a competition with another poison arrow frog. For competi-
tion between conspecifics, it is better to have a range of strategies and a 
capacity to switch to a new strategy if the first one doesn’t work. In this 
case, communicative strategies become more significant. For instance, 
one of these new strategies will be submission, a signal indicating that 
the losing party in a contest is giving up. As a general rule in conflicts 
between conspecifics, it is to neither party’s advantage to continue a fight 
beyond victory; so it is in the interests of the victor to recognise a sur-
render – and, therefore, in the interests of the vanquished to be able to 
signal surrender.
This is an example of what Thom Scott- Phillips (2015) describes as 
a code model of communication: there is a signal that is advantageous 
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for the sender to make and for the receiver to acknowledge, so the sender 
and receiver evolve toward each other in terms of signal and response. If 
the surrender is to work, though, the sender and receiver must both be 
able to model the likely reactions of the other party. It is important to the 
sender that this particular receiver will recognise and act on the signal, 
and it is important to the receiver that this particular sender is honest in 
their surrender. The reliability of the signal is founded on the intentions 
of the sender and receiver, so it becomes useful for both parties to be 
able to model each other’s motivation, and to have volitional control over 
when to signal and how to react to a signal. This is what Scott-Phillips 
describes as the ostensive– inferential model of communication, which 
‘involves the provision and interpretation of evidence for the meaning 
that the speaker intends to convey’ (2010, 95). Or, to put it another way, 
human communication is an immediate negotiation toward meaning 
between two people, not a slow, evolutionary negotiation of signal and 
response.
If a signal is volitional, however, it can be subverted. Richard 
Byrne (1995, 125– 6) tells of an adolescent baboon, Melton, who had 
played with an infant too roughly. The infant, naturally, screamed for its 
mother; and she, with several other adults, began to chase the hapless 
adolescent. However, instead of trying to outrun the adults, Melton 
stood up and began to scan the horizon  – a signal to other baboons 
that a predator has been spotted in the distance. The adults ceased 
chasing and also began scanning, looking for the threat that had cued 
Melton’s behaviour. Melton had distracted the adults from their pun-
ishment detail with a more serious – although non- existent – threat. 
His behaviour could be read as a deliberate subversion of the predator 
signal, and a deliberate deception of the adults; or it could be read as a 
transferred fear reaction, causing him to adopt a pose that had helped 
reduce his fear in the past. Either way, the predator warning had been 
subverted and the adults deceived.
Melton shows us that, in primates at least, the link between the 
mental state and the external signal produced by that mental state is 
more complicated than just a simple stimulus– response system:  the 
external signal is made only if the signaller decides (deliberately or auto-
matically) to make it. The external stimulus has to become an internal 
perception, and a judgement has to be made about its relevance. This 
judgement may be faulty, leading to a signal being made inappropriately, 
even if it is not under deliberate control; but, if the sender has deliberate 
control over producing the signal then an extra level of deception, inten-
tional deception, becomes possible.
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This intentional deception relies on the signaller understanding, 
on some level, the effect the signal will have on the recipient. The sig-
naller has to be able to model the recipient as a motivated object – not 
necessarily a being with its own agenda, but an object that is likely to 
respond to a signal in a reliable way. The signaller must also understand 
the advantage that the deception will give them over the recipient, and 
how to capitalise on that advantage. It requires the signaller to have a 
versatile understanding of the likely responses to the signal, and of the 
various ways to exploit those responses.
The ability to model others as motivated objects is not limited to 
humans, or even primates; it seems to be an ancient faculty, occurring in 
many different species (Stiles 2000). It certainly seems to be present in 
most mammals, and its level of sophistication in any species seems to be 
related to the level of socialisation in that species, not just cognitive cap-
acity (Stevens and King 2012; Borrego and Gaines 2016). Knowing how 
others in your social group are likely to react to you allows you to plan 
your day, avoiding enemies and staying close to friends. It also allows you 
to map your social environment, to understand who is on your side and 
who is against you. However, the modeller themself does not need to be 
attentionally present as an entity in their own modelling – they are the 
unacknowledged constant with which all relationships are formed, the 
invisible hub around which their social model revolves.
How to make models of relationships between others
Modelling others in relation to an unmodelled self requires a simple 
social arithmetic, in which friends count as positives and foes as 
negatives. In this first- level social modelling, the individual maintains 
a cognitive register of their relationships with other members of their 
group. It is a simple and direct mechanism whereby the emotion the 
individual feels toward another group member is their relationship with 
that group member; so this type of social modelling does not need to 
be attentional. We can describe this as one- argument Relationship- A 
modelling, because the modeller needs to identify another individual 
(the ‘argument’, A) and remember their emotional relationship to that 
individual.
Relationship- A modelling is not uncommon in nature, but it is 
not the only type of social modelling we see. A second, more complex, 
level is also present in primates and some other animals. This second- 
level social modelling works because it enhances the knowledge that 
an individual has about their group, allowing them to more effectively 
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navigate and manipulate the relationships in that group. It is sometimes 
equated with Machiavellian Intelligence (Whiten and Byrne 1988), 
although that is an extension of Relationship- A modelling in a different 
direction: the Machiavellian individual is able to use their relationships 
with others against those others. It is characterised by strategic alliances 
and vendettas, misdirection and misinformation, and a lack of vigilant 
sharing and other social rules for alpha suppression.
Second- level social modelling is quite different from first- level:  it 
involves the modelling of relationships between others, which we can 
describe as two- argument A- Relationship- B modelling. The modeller’s 
feelings toward each of the modelled others are not informative about 
the emotional relationship between those others; in fact, the modeller’s 
own feelings can interfere with effective modelling. So, to properly under-
stand an A- Relationship- B model, the modeller has to ignore their own 
emotional relationships with A and B. As well as a more complex social 
grammar, the modeller needs a more complex emotional grammar  – 
they need to understand their emotions as meta- references, where 
understanding is not the same as currently experiencing the emotions 
(Edwardes 2010, 98– 9).
A- Relationship- B modelling requires a considerably more 
sophisticated cognitive capacity than Relationship- A modelling:  the 
modeller has to model others, as before, but they also have to accurately 
model the relationships between those others. I  can like, or dislike, or 
fear Alf, and my emotion represents and dictates my relationship with 
him: what I feel directly affects my behaviour. However, the relationship 
between Alf and Beth is not the same as my relationship with either of 
them, so I cannot let my own feelings toward either of them influence 
my understanding of their relationship with each other. For instance, my 
relationship with Alf is bad, while my relationship with Beth is good; but 
I also know that the relationship between Alf and Beth is also good; so, 
if I wish to ally with Beth, I need to accommodate her relationship with 
Alf, which is contrary to my own relationship with Alf. This social cal-
culus may be employed by chimpanzees and bonobos as well as humans, 
and something like it has been observed in other primates (Whiten and 
van Schaik 2007), which makes the characterisation of non- human pri-
mates as unrepentant Machiavellians seem somewhat unfair. However, 
A- Relationship- B modelling is considerably less common in nature than 
the Relationship- A modelling of social arithmetic.
Does A- Relationship- B modelling also require a new type of self-
hood? Probably not. This would only be needed if the two- argument form 
of social calculus replaced the one- argument form of social arithmetic; 
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but why would it do so? The new social calculus just needs to interface 
with the already- effective old system, it does not need to replace it. This 
incremental approach corresponds with what we know about evolution 
(Futuyma 2015) and also with what we know about social calculus in the 
human brain: there seem to be at least two systems of social modelling 
at work, one to experience affective reactions, and one to model them 
(Lucas et al. 2015).
A- Relationship- B modelling has implications for ToM (Baron- 
Cohen 1995). This is the knowledge that others have their own minds 
with their own agendas, and, by adapting my actions to accommodate 
the agendas of others, I  am able to achieve my aims with less conflict 
than if I  ignore them. ToM also seems to allow the individual to plan 
their own relationships with others, based on the relationships between 
those others and the modeller’s own relationships with them; it therefore 
implies a level of conscious control over the modelling process itself. In 
contrast, the Machiavellian intelligence of Relationship- A modelling does 
not need the level of awareness that we usually associate with ToM – it 
is all about automatic modelling of what is happening with objects ‘out 
there’, beyond the edge of the self, in a selfhood- free zone. Machiavellian 
intelligence is not about accommodating the agendas of others, it is 
about using the relationships of others to advantage the unmodelled self.
The existence of ToM in human social modelling implies that there 
must be a merging of the individual’s Relationship- A modelling with 
their A- Relationship- B modelling. This allows the modelling individual 
to begin to treat the modelled others as subjects with their own agendas, 
and opens the way for enhanced cooperation and joint enterprise. These, 
in turn, create an environment where communicative cooperation 
becomes useful; and this pushes human social modelling to a new, third 
level, where we are sharing our models of others with those others.
Sharing models of others
To progress from a system of internal social modelling to externally 
communicated modelling, ToM has to become a conscious activity. We 
cannot share our internal models until we are aware that we are making 
them; and we cannot become aware that we are modelling other indi-
viduals until we can see them fully as individuals. The automatic mod-
elling of Machiavellian intelligence is insufficient to provide us with this 
awareness. However, we have only primitive methods, at present, to 
interrogate extinct species for signs of conscious social modelling (and 
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methods for detecting it in living species are not much better); so we 
cannot know with certainty when human ToM began. What we can do, 
though, is try to identify the mechanism that made social modelling a 
conscious activity, such that it could be communicated to others.
In fact, the processes of communication and awareness of social 
modelling are probably two halves of a single, ratcheting evolutionary 
effect. Early species of Homo are likely to have had primitive communi-
cation mechanisms based around vigilant sharing – see David Erdal and 
Andrew Whiten’s (1994) idea that everyone in a group makes sure that 
everyone else is not taking more than their fair share. This process is both 
an external expression of internal modelling and evidence to others that 
the vigilant individuals are using social modelling. It is not a direct, refer-
ential signal (although the sanctioning of the greedy would be), but it is 
inferentially communicative: other individuals become aware that social 
modelling is not a capacity available just to them, it is being used by those 
around them. Or, to put it another way, it is evidence that other individ-
uals in the group have intentional awareness of others. If the gains that 
this awareness of other- awareness gives to cooperative individuals are 
smaller than those it gives to Machiavellian individuals, then the species 
will tend to become more Machiavellian; and this seems to be the path 
that the patriarchal chimpanzees have taken. If, however, the net gain is 
the other way, the species will tend to develop a more informed social 
cooperation; and this seems to be the path taken by the matriarchal 
bonobos and early humans. Vigilant sharing does not automatically lead 
to sharing of social models, but it can be an important impetus in that 
direction.
Sharing models of others using A- Relationship- B constructs 
requires a complex interface between social cognition and signalling cog-
nition. Both signaller and receiver must maintain a modelled set of other 
individuals in their group, and a modelled set of their own relationships 
with those others; and they also have to keep an attentional tally of all the 
A- Relationship- B constructs in their group that are relevant to them. This 
is a very language- like system: objects (the individuals) are associated 
through relationships, producing propositional, or sentence- like, meta- 
knowledge of the social structure of the group. To exchange these models, 
individuals must negotiate to sound– meaning pairings, both as name- 
signs to represent members of the group and as representations of the 
relationships between the name-signs. It seems like a problem with many 
levels of complexity. If neither individual has sound– meaning pairings 
in their own internal social modelling, how are they both able to gen-
erate them? And, even if both individuals have already created their own 
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sound– meaning pairings, how do they merge them into a single system? 
Even if these two problems are solved, there remains a third: how does 
the single system adapt for new social group members, new relation-
ship types, new communicators and new conventions? The process of 
bringing social models into communication is not a natural given, and 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Fortunately, however we got here, there is evidence that modern 
humans do use language to exchange social models: we, unlike all other 
living primates, are natural social communicators – or gossips, as Robin 
Dunbar (1996) expresses it. A large part of language involves exchanging 
social information about shared acquaintances, and sometimes about 
individuals known to only one of the correspondents in a dialogue. At 
first glance, this social information exchange appears to be highly advan-
tageous to all parties: it creates an environment in which cheats find it 
difficult to prosper because their cheating can be shared by the cheated, 
and so become universally known by all the other group members; it 
allows the non- cheating group members to unite against the cheater and 
cooperate in sanctioning and excluding them; and it therefore rewards 
the virtuous and punishes transgressors. However, while this is a good 
description of how successful human groups organise themselves, it is 
also an insufficient evolutionary explanation of how we reached this 
position.
The problem with social communication, as Camilla Power (1998) 
shows, is that it is, itself, wide open to cheating. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
first, there is the sender’s dilemma: I know something you don’t know, 
which gives me an advantage over you; why should I  give away that 
information, and thus my advantage, to you? Second is the receiver’s 
dilemma:  if the sender has control over the information they give me, 
why should they give me true information? True information costs them 
and advantages me, while false information advantages them and costs 
me; so, if it is to their advantage to lie, why should I believe any volitional 
information they offer me?
The sender’s and receiver’s dilemmas are common to all volitional 
signalling; but there is one further dilemma for the receiver that is a 
product of the particular nature of social communication: the confirm-
ation dilemma. When a vervet monkey gives the leopard call, it is best 
for other vervets to act first and ask questions later; but what happens if 
the call is false? Cheney and Seyfarth (1990, 213– 15) provide a case in 
evidence involving Kitui, a low- ranking older male vervet. His age meant 
that he was heading down the ranks, and any new male joining the 
group was likely to push him down even lower. This stressful existence 
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may have made his signalling less reliable, as it did for Melton. Kitui was 
recorded giving a false leopard alarm call on three separate occasions; 
in each case there was no leopard, but there was an unaffiliated male 
vervet trying to join the group. Kitui’s call kept the new male in one tree, 
away from the main group in another tree. Unfortunately, Kitui did not 
understand that, for the deception to be fully effective, his own behav-
iour should correspond with his call; his failure to climb a tree himself 
while calling gave the game away, and the other vervets began ignoring 
his deceitful calls.
From this we can see that vervets’ responses to leopard calls are 
subject to confirmation after reaction: if they are not confirmed, then the 
call  – or, at least, the call– caller pairing  – loses its value and becomes 
meaningless. However, shared models of the relationships between 
others, unlike warning calls, are not immediately verifiable:  they are 
mostly internalised interpretations of observed events, and rely on evi-
dence that is usually in the past. They are also opinions, not facts, and 
they are heavily biased by the sender’s point of view. It is virtually impos-
sible to confirm the truth of shared social models; so why should the 
receiver pay any attention to them?
There are two possible solutions to these trustworthiness dilemmas. 
The first is that social communication is not about explicit meanings, it 
is about implicit meanings:  it is an attempt to engage the receiver in a 
social activity, in the same way that grooming does. The primary pur-
pose of sharing a social model is to build alliances: to identify whether 
the receiver has the same views, and therefore the same intra- group 
objectives, as the sender. The sender is only superficially offering their 
own view of a particular social relationship; more importantly, they are 
actually attempting to negotiate to an agreed social calculus surrounding 
that relationship. When a sender offers the model ‘Alf likes Beth’, they are 
inviting the receiver to participate in a negotiation toward meaning in 
which the sender, as well as the receiver, is open to revising their social 
calculus.
The second solution is that social communication does not need 
to be truthful to be valuable. When I offer my interpretation of a social 
relationship, I  have to make it consistent with the social calculus you 
already have, if it is to be believable; and the only model I have for your 
social calculus is my own social calculus. So when a sender offers the 
model ‘Alf likes Beth’, they are telling the receiver more about their own 
relationships with Alf and with Beth than about the actual relationship 
between Alf and Beth. Each individual message is like a piece of jigsaw; 
and the more pieces the receiver has, the better their understanding of 
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the sender’s worldview (or group- view, at least) and of the network of 
relationships surrounding the sender. Even if a sender deliberately tries 
to give false information, pre- acquired social communication means 
that almost everything can be cross- checked; it cannot be confirmed as 
true or false, but a message that does not fit properly into the jigsaw is 
probably false.
Both of these solutions are dialogic: they work because individual 
signals only have value as part of a continuing social exchange. The dia-
logue between individuals is not comprehensible in terms of individual 
messages, only in terms of the whole communicative experience. The 
message in an utterance no longer needs to stand or fall by its corres-
pondence with the real world. It represents only a single data point in 
a much larger dataset; and that dataset, in turn, relies on opinion and 
viewpoint, not existential truth.
Both solutions also benefit from a more complex form of social mod-
elling, in which the receiver is able to tag each received A- Relationship- B 
model with the identity of its sender. This gives an A- Relationship- B- by- 
C form, in which the truth in a shared social model is not absolute but 
nuanced by what the receiver knows about the sender. This modelling 
is therefore hierarchical: the identity C ‘governs’ the natures of A, B and 
the relationship between them – their natures are real only in terms of 
C’s utterance. When this new form of social modelling is shared with 
others as a ‘C- said- A- Relationship- B’ utterance, two things happen. First, 
the sender gains deniability over the truth of the utterance: the sender 
is not saying A- Relationship- B, they are only reporting C’s utterance. 
Second, the receiver can tag this new message in their social calculus 
with the identity of the new sender, creating an A- Relationship- B- by- C- 
by- D form (Edwardes 2014). Sharing social models does not just enrich 
the receiver’s social calculus, it also introduces a new level of sophistica-
tion to modelling, one that has the potential for recursive cognition – and 
recursive communication.
Shakespeare uses this sharing of social calculus to great effect 
in Much Ado about Nothing, in which Benedick and Beatrice change 
their views of each other because of two conversations that are staged 
by their friends so that they overhear them:  Benedick overhears that 
Beatrice ‘loves him with an enraged affection’, but will not admit it 
(Act 2, Scene 3); and Beatrice overhears ‘that Benedick loves Beatrice so 
entirely’, but Beatrice is ‘self- endeared’ (Act 3, Scene 1). Both decide to 
act upon these staged social calculus models, believing them to be true 
because they were overheard; and it is their resulting alliance that brings 
the play to a happy conclusion.
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Making models of my self
Once the gossip machine is up and running, communication itself 
begins to introduce new features to social modelling. Social communi-
cation relies on individuals having an awareness of the intentionality of 
others: communicable social modelling requires an understanding that 
others have minds, which means that minds are possessed by both the 
individuals being gossiped about and the individuals being gossiped to. 
The process of social modelling is, by definition, the capacity to model 
others, which can be managed without conscious attention; but the extra 
complexity involved in the communication of those models means that 
they have to become consciously managed. Additionally, while cognitive 
social modelling is completely about third- person models of other people, 
communication introduces an extra complication:  it is possible for the 
sender to offer their model of the receiver to the receiver. Talking to the 
receiver about the speaker’s model of the receiver brings to the attention 
of the speaker the receiver’s role as listener, and the particular interest 
of the listener in the model being shared. Thus, the model takes on a 
second- person significance for the sender. This new significance does not 
make the model different from that of any other third- person model, but 
it changes the pragmatics of the communication act. Informationally, 
you need to tell the listener honestly what they need to hear; but prag-
matically, you also need to present the information in a way that makes 
the listener want to hear it. Sharing models of an individual with that 
individual means that the model has to be subjectively comfortable as 
well as objectively accurate to the listener.
If this seems like a big task, consider what happens when the listener 
receives a model of themself. First, they have to be able to incorporate 
that model into their social calculus; and the only way they can do that is 
to treat the model like any other received third- person model: they have 
to model themself as a third- person entity in their own social modelling. 
Second, and more significantly, what the listener has received is some-
body else’s third- person model, which happens to co- identify with their 
own model of themself; except that, in the pre- communicative unshared 
state of social modelling, there was no need for a consciously available 
model of themself. So the received model is simultaneously the only con-
scious evidence that the individual has about themself, and a second- 
hand opinion. It is likely that, as the individual adds more third- person 
models to their self- model, they will begin to develop an awareness of 
themself as a first- person entity. However, this is an awareness of an 
amalgam of other people’s third- person models. We each end up with a 
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certainty that we have a self, but the self that we have is actually a model, 
and not a true awareness of a real self. We are back to the position of 
Metzinger, Wegner, Nørretranders and Hood (see Chapter 1), that there 
is no actual self behind the modelled self that we insist is us. So when we 
make a model of ourself, do we not see anybody, as Alice believes? Or do 
we see nobody, as Alice says?
This awareness of self, regardless of how inaccurate or irreal it may 
be, does generate an important new cognitive awareness: that there is a 
personal self to be had. Awareness of the modelled self, and awareness 
that it is a model, generate the awareness that I have selfness – a me- ness, 
a myself- ness and an I- ness.
Me, myself and I
As we saw in Chapter 1, Freud asserted that we all have three selves: the 
id, a largely subliminal self that enacts all the basic instincts of being 
human; the super- ego, the conscious self which enacts all the social and 
cultural activity of trying to be the best human we can be; and the ego, 
which enacts all the aware cognitive activity of being human, and which 
tries to choose the best path between the demands of the id and the 
aspirations of the super- ego. For Freud, none of these were modelled 
selves, they were all real; but, while the id clearly has no awareness of 
itself, the super- ego seems to be aware of itself as a social entity, while 
the ego is aware of all three selves. We now recognise that this image of 
the individual at war with itself is a useful metaphor for many psycho-
logical disorders, but it does not reflect the reality of the psychologically 
well- ordered person. It is little wonder that this definition of selfhood 
led Freudian psychologists to see psychological disorder everywhere.
Language, like Freud, gives us three views of our selfhood:  the 
subjective I, which instigates activity; the objective me, the recipient of 
activity; and the reflexive myself, the me as visualised by the I. This lin-
guistic representation also reflects how our self- modelling works:  the 
subjective I makes a model of the objective me to generate the reflexive 
myself. We may feel that, like Freud’s id, the subjective I provides a sub-
liminal basis for selfhood; but the linguistic view means we can also step 
outside the model to view all three as irreal, consciously represented 
models, with the objective me being a model made by a model, and the 
reflexive myself being a model of a model made by a model. As with all 
words in our language, the first- person pronouns me, myself and I are 
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metaphors for realities. Usually, the realities represented by words are 
external to the person generating the words; but in the case of first- 
person pronouns they appear to be internal realities. This, however, is 
just another feature of the selfhood illusion:  first- person pronouns are 
functionally external in that they are models of internal reality projected 
onto the real world. Modelling is always a cognitively internal activity, 
but its products are externalised; which is what allows us to see our 
models as models of something.
Our relationship with our pronouns is complex. For Émile 
Benveniste (1970 [1996]), there is an important attentional difference 
between the different persons:  the third person represents an object 
outside the communicative act, so is fundamentally different from the 
first and second persons, which are inside the communicative act; and 
the first person itself creates a subjectivity in language, allowing the 
speaker to simultaneously represent themself as the subject, or ego, of 
an utterance and the producer of it (Benveniste 1958 [1971]). It also 
seems that there is a significant difference in usage between me and 
myself, at least in terms of what is being modelled. Usages of me and 
myself in the constructs I love/ like/ dislike/ hate me/ myself seem to 
reflect the distance of the model from the self: me is, relative to myself, 
more loved and liked than disliked and hated by I, and more loved and 
liked in the present tense than in the past (Edwardes 2003). James 
Pennebaker (2011) shows that the way we use our pronouns (and other 
small function words) can also be a window onto our personality and 
intentions. For instance, how frequently we use first- person pronouns 
is an indicator of how formal we are being – in the terminology used 
here, how formal we want our relationship with our conversation- 
partner to be. In formal discourse, we model our own self more as a 
remote myself and less as a familiar I, and we model our conversation- 
partner as they rather than you. The whole conversational model has 
been moved a step back from intimacy by depersonalising the models 
of the speaker and listener. The role of pronouns in selfhood will be 
further explored in Chapter 6.
These are just some of the ways in which language is both the pro-
genitor of conscious selfness, and acts to define how we model our own 
selfness and the selfhood of others. Selfness exists because we began 
to share our cognitive models of others, and then had to deal with the 
cognitive complexity that sharing produced. Me, myself and I are the 
products of a highly cooperative communication strategy overlaid on a 
sophisticated pre- existing other- modelling capacity.
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Awareness of selfness: for humans only?
The fortuitous confluence of events that led to awareness of selfness in 
our species raises an important but often glossed- over question: why has 
it only happened to humans? The answers we can give to this question 
are helpful in defining us as a species, and in understanding the nature of 
our differences from other species. So what answers are we able to give?
It turns out that the view of language as a Great Leap Forward in 
evolutionary terms (Smith and Szathmáry 1999) may not be as justifi-
able as we once believed. Language is not the pot of gold at the end of the 
cognitive developmental rainbow; instead, like all species- specific traits, 
it opens up new ways of being by closing down other ways that still work 
effectively for other species. The cognitive developments that led to lan-
guage and awareness of selfness bring problems as well as solving them.
The first big disadvantage lies in cognitive development itself:  as 
discussed in Chapter 2, having a big brain is incredibly costly, consuming 
about 20% of the human energy budget (which means that every fifth 
doughnut goes straight to the brain and not to the hips, as some dietary 
pundits would have us believe). This disproportionate energy consump-
tion is not caused by complex or conscious thinking, however; our brain’s 
energy usage seems to remain the same whether we are awake or asleep, 
solving quadratic equations or daydreaming, modelling complex inter-
personal relationships or gazing at clouds. The energy consumption is 
not caused by how we think or what we are thinking about, it is simply a 
product of maintaining the big brain itself; it is the Red Queen, running 
as fast as she can just to stay still.
Yet the role that this big, expensive brain plays in our species 
remains opaque. Clearly there are some types of complex thinking that 
our species needs to do; but what are they? If we look at many other 
large- brained species (such as cetaceans, other apes or elephants) we 
find that, like us, they are highly social; so is the evolution of big brains 
associated with social living in large groups? Robin Dunbar (2010) 
thinks this is the case, and points to a correlation between brain size and 
group size, a correlation that seems to approximately work for most pri-
mates. However, the correlation breaks down when applied as a general 
evolutionary rule:  the most social animals on this planet are eusocial 
insects (ants, bees, wasps and termites), which can live in communities 
numbering tens of thousands; yet their individual brains are tiny. At the 
other extreme there are many species of octopi: clever, problem- solving 
animals with relatively large brains but no social life to speak of. Other 
than territorial aggression, the only same- species communicative act 
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in the life of an octopus is an act of coitus, which is followed by death 
for both sexes – within weeks for males and within months for females 
(Godfrey- Smith 2016, Chapter 8). So whether group size is proposed as 
the driver for brain size or brain size as the driver for group size, there 
seem to be significant examples in nature arguing against both positions. 
Additionally, while Dunbar predicts a human group size of 150 based 
on brain size, human joint enterprises can involve much larger groups 
without clearly demonstrating the group fission that Dunbar predicts. It 
seems that, somehow, humans have sidestepped the group- size limits, 
just as they seem to have circumvented the natural limits on brain size 
and communication complexity.
The products of the large brain are even harder to justify. We have 
already seen the communicative problems involved in a volitional com-
munication system like language: the sender’s problem of sharing infor-
mation that is actually most valuable to them when only they know it; 
and the receiver’s problem of trusting information that is most valuable 
to the sender when it is a lie. When a communication system becomes 
volitional, it should collapse into meaninglessness, not transform the 
species’ socio- cultural organisation.
These problems are insignificant, though, compared to the social-
isation problem: if bigger brains make for bigger groups, or vice versa, 
what is the fitness mechanism that favours bigger groups? Large groups 
face more challenges than just the socio- cognitive need to keep track of 
more individuals; there are the problems of environmental load- bearing, 
fission– fusion and shared enterprise, all of which also have to be over-
come. The environmental load- bearing problems are:  first, that larger 
groups will exhaust local resources much quicker than smaller groups, 
so they need to be more mobile than smaller groups; second, that larger 
groups will exhaust larger territories, so will have to move further to 
escape their own depredations; and third, that a species with a small 
number of large groups is more vulnerable than a species with a large 
number of small groups to epidemics that wipe out whole groups. The 
fission– fusion problems are:  when a group exceeds its maximum size 
and has to split, there have to be enough individuals in both new groups 
to ensure their survival; and when two small sub- optimal groups meet, 
they need to have strategies to help them join together to make a more 
optimal group. The shared enterprise problem is: the larger the group, 
the more enterprises there will be to be shared; but how are the indi-
vidual needs and skills matched efficiently? All of these aspects of the 
socialisation problem can be mitigated by effective communication; but 
that only weaves the communication problems into the socialisation 
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problem, making the co- evolution of large brains and large groups even 
more perplexing.
So if awareness of selfness relies on language, and language is a 
product of brain size and group size dynamics, and human brain size and 
group size are both difficult to explain using evolutionary calculus, then 
we should not be surprised if only humans have an awareness of selfness. 
If, in addition, we can show that an awareness of selfness is, itself, prob-
lematic in evolutionary terms, then the question changes from ‘why do 
only humans have awareness of selfness?’ to ‘why does any species have 
awareness of selfness?’ The answer to this may lie in the development of 
another product of language, this time from the non- personal meanings 
generated by negotiation: human culture.
Language, culture and the self
Human culture, like human communication, is simultaneously con-
tinuous with the rest of nature and quite distinct from the cultures of 
other species:  it has a different approach to what counts as informa-
tion – and, therefore, what counts as knowledge. Donald Brown (2004) 
describes human knowledge as consisting of two types of informa-
tion: etic facts, which are true1 by their nature but not necessarily con-
sciously appreciated (such as ‘a tapir usually has four legs; roasted tapir 
is good food’); and emic facts, which are true because we agree they are 
true (such as ‘the tapir is the national animal of Belize; it is wrong to 
kill and eat tapir because they are endangered’). Etic facts are common 
throughout nature and, if they enhance individual fitness, can become 
genetic facts (for example, the fact that snakes bite and can kill has 
been encoded into our genome, justifying a healthy anxiousness around 
snakelike objects). They should not be confused with mind- independent 
facts: etic facts are etic because they reflect the external world, but they 
are facts because they are ideas commonly shared among humans.
As well as becoming genetic facts, however, etic facts can also 
be conventionalised as cultural facts. For instance, a link has been 
established in chimpanzees between self- medication with rough leaves 
swallowed whole and the increased expulsion of gut worms. Desmodium 
leaves are used by the chimpanzee group at Gashaka, Nigeria, but other 
leaves are used by different groups elsewhere (Fowler et al. 2007). This 
behaviour is cultural: different chimpanzee groups have found similar, 
but not identical, solutions to the same problem. However, it is also a 
cultural solution based on etic facts; and, because it is based on such 
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facts, it actually works. Compare this to facts that have informed recent 
human medical culture: in the late 1800s, cigarette smoking was touted 
in Europe as a treatment for asthma, on the basis that inhaling smoke 
dried up the excessive mucus thought to cause asthma (Jackson 2010); 
mercury remained the main treatment for syphilis throughout the 1800s, 
until it was replaced by arsenic in 1910, and, finally, penicillin in 1943 
(Frith 2012); and, even today, the biggest threat to tigers across the world 
is the trade in animal parts for ‘medicine’ (Byard 2016). All of these are 
emic medical facts, based on local cultural beliefs that have no basis in 
etic facts, or which rely on coincidences of success as evidence.
Etic facts, therefore, are not the same as natural facts, and they 
can include cultural facts; what they all share in common is that they 
do not rely on a belief system to enforce them, which means they have 
to be intrinsically valuable to the knower. This is in contrast to emic 
facts, whose worth lies in the solidarity they create in the group:  they 
are extrinsically valuable to the knower because they help the knower 
navigate their society by conforming to its culture. A  culture based on 
etic facts is qualitatively different from an emic culture; but, because etic 
facts do not need to be genetically encoded, non- human cultures based 
on etic facts can, and do, exist. However, emic facts form the basis of most 
human cultures. Humans are outstandingly good at creating and enfor-
cing emic facts, basing them on agreement rather than evidence. This 
becomes unsurprising if we accept the proposition that human commu-
nication is itself based on emic facts:  our languages work not because 
there is a special ‘language mechanism’ inside each of us, but because we 
are able to negotiate toward meaning. This willingness may well be gen-
etic, but the negotiation itself requires the ability to consciously accept 
another person’s imaginings as valid on some level. As Lewis Carroll 
puts it:
‘But she must have a prize herself, you know,’ said the Mouse.
‘Of course,’ the Dodo replied very gravely. ‘What else have you 
got in your pocket?’ he went on, turning to Alice.
‘Only a thimble,’ said Alice sadly.
‘Hand it over here,’ said the Dodo.
Then they all crowded round her once more, while the Dodo 
solemnly presented the thimble, saying ‘We beg your acceptance of 
this elegant thimble’; and, when it had finished this short speech, 
they all cheered.
Alice thought the whole thing very absurd, but they all looked 
so grave that she did not dare to laugh; and, as she could not think 
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of anything to say, she simply bowed, and took the thimble, looking 
as solemn as she could.
(Lewis Carroll 1865, Chapter 3: 
‘A Caucus- Race and a Long Tale’)
Like language, exchanging social models also requires negotiation 
toward meaning: we each accept and use the unverified models of the 
social relationships of others when they are offered to us, even though 
we know them to be emic opinions and not etic facts. This acceptance 
of the opinions and beliefs of others about others unlocks all kinds of 
useful linguistic and modelling tricks and devices, such as referencing 
non- current events (temporality), referencing possible but not yet actual 
events (modality), and using shared imagination. It also has an effect on 
how we model ourselves. Social modelling gives me access to what other 
people think (or say they think) about me, allowing me to build a model 
of myself as a social being. This social self- model is an emic fact, a third- 
person representation of my self as an entity in my social calculus; but 
I can treat it as an etic model inasmuch as it represents an objective view 
of me as an other; it’s the best understanding of my self available to me.
While human culture is an outcome of human socialisation and 
language, it nonetheless generates yet another, and very different, self- 
model. With its emphasis on emic facts, human culture presents me with 
an ideal model of what an individual should be in the particular culture 
in which I  find myself. It is an aspirational self- model  – still external 
to (and different from) the Actual self (which remains unknowable by 
direct introspective methods), but also different from the third- person 
self- model provided by the sharing of social calculus (or social commu-
nication). The Cultural self is based on the emic social expectations of 
others rather than their mostly emic social knowledge – and, as I am a 
member of the same culture, they are probably expectations that I (my 
social self- model) have about myself.
This emphasis on emic facts in human culture creates a very odd 
inversion in the social strategies of our species. Like eusocial animals, 
we have societies with high levels of organisation, complexity, cooper-
ation, individual specialisation, task- sharing and self- sacrifice; but 
where the eusocial lifestyle involves a physical culture bound by genetic 
imperatives, human society is governed by symbolic culture. Eusocial 
societies work because of the high level of relatedness in a nest and the 
fact that there are few fertile females – usually only one per nest. The 
only way for the sterile nest members to get their genes into the future is 
to protect the queen, their mother, and her fertile offspring, their sisters 
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and brothers. This means that the range of cultures possible is severely 
limited, because they have to be based on etic realities, not emic beliefs. 
In contrast, the high levels of organisation, complexity, cooperation, indi-
vidual specialisation, task- sharing and self- sacrifice in human cultures 
are all generated emically, through group expectations and shared 
beliefs. The correspondences between the needs of eusocial and human 
societies help to explain why humans seem to have adopted a pseudo- 
eusocial social system;2 but, where reliance on etic facts makes the cul-
tural range available to eusocial animals extremely small, the human 
range of cultures, based on emic facts, is bewilderingly large: any set of 
shared beliefs can become the basis for a culture.
An outcome of relying on emic facts is that, whereas eusocial cul-
tural systems are stable and durable, human cultures are vulnerable to 
collapse and elimination when key beliefs are challenged. There is little 
durability in human cultures, which tend to last only hundreds of years 
rather than the millions of years for eusocial animals; but this lack of 
durability does have a surprising genetic effect. The constant turnover 
of cultures means that there is a process of succession:  cultures that 
place a greater reliance on etic facts have a survival advantage over 
more emic cultures. History has shown us that cultures with greater 
reliance on etic facts tend to win in any competition against cultures 
relying on emic facts (Diamond 2005). So any genes that favour reliance 
on etic over emic facts become more common in etic human cultures, 
and the greater survival rate of etic cultures spreads those genes across 
the species.
One example of this process is the spread of lactose tolerance. 
Ingram et  al. (2009) show that 13,000 years ago there was no sig-
nificant ability to digest cow’s milk in any adult human population. 
Children produce an enzyme, lactase, which lets them drink milk (from 
a range of mammals, not just other humans), but production of lac-
tase stopped at puberty. However, the domestication of cattle about 
12,500 years ago led to a rise in digestive tolerance of lactose, the indi-
gestible factor in cow milk:  genetic changes extended the production 
of lactase through puberty and beyond. The domestication of cattle 
happened piecemeal, as a series of local events; and the abandonment 
of hunting and gathering in favour of pastoralism occurred over a very 
few thousand years. We can therefore say that cattle domestication was 
a cultural event; but it enhanced group survival by providing a reliable 
and regular food source, so it was also an etic event. Lactose tolerance 
spread as an etic fact that favoured domestication, but it remains a cul-
tural event:  adult intolerance remains high in some Asian populations 
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where milk did not become a food staple; and, across the species, two 
thirds of adult humans are still lactose intolerant.
Unlike lactose tolerance, however, the ideal Cultural self is a com-
pletely emic fact: it has no existence outside the minds of the members of 
the culture. Yet it does have one important effect on the individual: being 
aspirational, the cultural self- model seems to have worth as a shortcut 
to social self- modelling. Instead of trying to cobble together a composite 
self- model from the opinions about me provided by others, I can simply 
try to conform to the self- model that others around me treat as a cul-
tural template for being an ideal human. A  series of children’s books, 
The Best Me I Can Be (Parker 2007), indicates that, far from being a poor 
alternative to social self- modelling, cultural self- modelling is a common 
view of how effective models of self are produced, and is commonly used 
around children. As we will find out in Chapter 4, cultural self- modelling 
may be an effective way to activate self- modelling in children before they 
develop the capacity for effective social self- modelling. The existence of 
fairy stories, moral tales and mythic systems in almost all human cultures 
indicates that sharing exemplars of cultural morality is common, while 
the recorded age of some of these stories indicates that they represent an 
ancient human tradition.
However, the emic nature of the cultural facts in these stories means 
that their worth is negotiable, unlike the etic social facts that social self- 
modelling provides. The cultural self- model is not a product of how I am 
seen or how I see myself; it reflects how I believe I should be. It does not 
provide accuracy, but it does provide acceptability.
One final feature of the cultural self- model should be highlighted: 
the reasons why self- modelling is a fit strategy today are different from 
the reasons why it was a fit strategy when it first appeared. Ernst Haeckel 
(1866) is famous for the statement that ‘ontogeny recapitulates phyl-
ogeny’, which encapsulates his belief that every human embryo goes 
through the same developmental forms that produced our species, from 
single- celled creatures through intermediate species- like forms up to 
modern humans. This idea, known as Recapitulation Theory, has been 
rejected since the middle of the twentieth century as a plausible genetic 
explanation (Blechschmidt 1977, 32). It also seems to be unworkable 
as an explanation for self- modelling. At the species level, cultural self- 
modelling only became possible because sharing social models led to 
social self- modelling; and this, in turn, established a generalised cog-
nitive potential to self- model. Human culture, with its emic belief in 
ideals, then created the shared ideal self, which the individual could 
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then own as a cultural self- model. In contrast, at the individual level, 
the human child initially seems to adopt the cultural self- model to define 
themselves, only later replacing it with their own personal self- model, 
which they build from their social calculus exchanges. Ontogenically, at 
the level of the individual, we seem to start with the generic ideal cul-
tural self- model because it is cognitively simpler – even though, phylo-
genically, at the level of the species, it is an emergent feature of social 
calculus and language.
The disadvantages of a modelled self: deficient self and 
self- deception
It seems to be a common belief that the capacity to accurately model 
yourself is a Good Thing. The self- modelling individual is able to map 
themself into their social calculus accurately and mindfully, allowing 
them to manipulate their group in ways that less enlightened individuals 
(perhaps those still relying on a cultural self- model rather than a social 
self- model) cannot manage. Indeed, human history is full of comments 
promoting and praising this level of self- awareness: the Oracle at Delphi 
had the maxim ‘Know thyself’ over its entrance; the fifth- century BCE 
philosopher Lao Tzu, the founder of Taoism, said ‘He who knows others 
is wise; he who knows himself is enlightened’; and Pythagoras said ‘No 
one is free who has not obtained the empire of himself’, to which Socrates 
added, ‘True wisdom comes when we know how little we know about 
life, ourselves, and the world around us’. In Hindu doctrine, knowing 
your eternal self, or atman, is the route to enlightenment; and in more 
modern times, Robert Burns said ‘O wad some Pow’r the giftie gie us, to 
see oursels as ithers see us!’; while Oscar Wilde advised against taking 
the cultural- self shortcut to self- knowledge, with: ‘Be yourself; everyone 
else is taken’.
Yet, as we have seen, the only conscious representation of our self 
that we have available is what we have cobbled together from the social 
and cultural models offered to us by others. When we model our self we 
are modelling ourself from the outside looking in; but our unmodelled 
selfhood is imposed on the world from the inside looking out. The self- 
knowledge that language allows us is not reflexive but reflective, cre-
ating an image of our self that is recognisable and acceptable to others, 
and which we can then use to define and refine our self- model. This 
externalised vision of our self is, therefore, not so much what we are but 
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what others believe and want us to be; it is a model of the socialised and 
enculturated self, a representation we advertise or aim for rather than 
actually are.
Social and cultural self- modelling means that we are constantly 
trying to meet expectations imposed on us by others: human socialisa-
tion requires us to see self- promotion and hubris as vices, while human 
culture promotes humility, self- effacement and modesty as virtues. We 
also cannot avoid comparing our own third- person modelled selfhood 
with the other third- person models in our social calculus, and with the 
ideal self that symbolic culture imposes on us – all of which means that 
we are always finding ourselves wanting. Indeed, the human cultural 
view, at least in the West, seems to be that everyone is incomplete and 
improvable: whatever we are, we could be better.
Several apparently unfit evolutionary strategies are generated by 
our self- modelling: conversational and social turn- taking, generosity to 
strangers, acquiescence to group norms and so on. These are all strategies 
that, in a Machiavellian society, disadvantage the individual by allowing 
others to exploit their naivety. However, these individually unfit strat-
egies are precisely what make us successful as a pseudo- eusocial species, 
as they encourage high levels of organisation, complexity, cooperation, 
individual specialisation, task- sharing and self- sacrifice.
Our self- models even allow us to deceive ourselves about the 
personal value of self- sacrifice – which remains, in all cases except very 
occasional kin- saving actions (Hamilton 1964), inexplicable in selfish 
gene terms (Dawkins 1989). Honoré de Balzac (1835 [1991], 125) iden-
tified one reason why this may be so, when his character Père Goriot said, 
‘Some day you will find out that there is far more happiness in another’s 
happiness than in your own’:  it seems that self- sacrifice has become so 
common that we may even get a genetically directed emotional reward 
from it. It is certainly encoded in our culture, where emic ‘evidence’ offers 
us rewards beyond the physical. At the end of Charles Dickens’ A Tale of 
Two Cities (1859 [2000]), Sidney Carton saves Charles Darnay from the 
guillotine by taking his place. His final utterance, ‘It is a far, far better 
thing that I do than I have ever done; it is a far, far better rest that I go to 
than I have ever known’, summarises the two great emic rewards for self- 
sacrifice: reputation and survival after death.
It seems, therefore, that awareness of selfness – like human- sized 
brains or human- sized groups or human language  – poses yet another 
evolutionary conundrum. How has a species become so unusual and 
apparently evolutionarily unfit without going extinct? And why, despite 
all these unfit aspects of our species, have we become so dominant on 
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this planet? These are questions that will be tackled in Chapter  5; but 
we will first take a step back from the evolutionary improbability of our 
species and look at how we turn small humans into adult humans. We 
will review the innate mechanisms that can be activated to make us con-
ventionally human, and the external mechanisms that we impose on 
trainee humans to ensure their assimilation into human societies. It is 
time for the nature– nurture debate.
Notes
 1. The word ‘fact’ is used for emic and etic facts because they are not true or false in a convention-
ally logical way. For instance, ‘elm trees are taller than oaks’ is a logical proposition, capable 
of being proved or disproved from evidence; ‘this bonsai tree is tall’ is an etic fact, if particular 
definitions of the words ‘tree’ and ‘tall’ are accepted; ‘tall trees are better’ is a value judgement, 
which is true if people agree it is true.
 2. Eusocial in its cooperation, but not eusocial in its reproduction.
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4
How Do We Become Selves?
‘I’m sure I didn’t mean – ’ Alice was beginning, but the Red Queen 
interrupted her impatiently.
‘That’s just what I complain of! You should have meant! What 
do you suppose is the use of a child without any meaning? Even 
a joke should have some meaning – and a child’s more important 
than a joke, I hope. You couldn’t deny that, even if you tried with 
both hands.’
‘I don’t deny things with my hands,’ Alice objected.
‘Nobody said you did,’ said the Red Queen. ‘I said you couldn’t 
if you tried.’
(Lewis Carroll 1865, Chapter 9: ‘Queen Alice’)
Human children are unusual: we are born helpless in ways that would 
ensure the extinction of a less social species. We also require phenomenal 
levels of support and input in the early years of our life, probably more 
than any other animal on the planet. And, of course, as adults, we have 
also evolved with the complementary capacity and willingness to meet 
the needs of our helpless children. Throughout nature, the division of a 
parent’s resources between itself and its offspring is the outcome of an 
evolutionary fitness competition. The parent– offspring conflict, a term 
first used by Robert Trivers (1974), determines whether a species does 
better by caring for its offspring after birth, or by abandoning them to their 
fate. If a species gets more copies of itself into the future by abandoning 
its offspring, fitness constraints mean that it will evolve to do so. Parental 
investment in each individual progeny will be small; but if this is to be an 
evolutionarily stable strategy for the species, reproduction has to become 
a numbers game. While each individual is a negligible resource cost to 
the parents, a new reproductive generation can only be brought about 
by producing young in large volumes. Survival to adulthood may be rare, 
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but population stability can be maintained if only a fraction of the many 
offspring survive to reproduce.
Humans are at the other end of the parent– offspring conflict 
continuum. In humans, the need for extended breastfeeding usually 
suppresses fertility (Chao 1987), so our species reproductive rate is unim-
pressive: a pre- industrial- age human female was capable of bringing per-
haps eight children to adulthood during her reproductive lifetime (White 
2013). Larger numbers of children have occasionally been recorded in 
industrial cultures  – Queen Victoria being a case in point  – but eight 
seems to be the limit for modern hunter- gatherers. This slow rate of 
reproduction is offset by an increased lifespan that includes, for females, 
a post- menopausal non- reproductive stage. The extra non- reproductive 
time allows mothers to raise the last of their own brood or to contribute 
to raising their daughters’ children.
This, however, is just one of the ways in which human mothers 
are advantaged in their reproduction; they also receive a significant 
contribution from their mates. Because the species reproduction rate is 
slow, it becomes valuable for males to defend and support their repro-
ductive successes rather than leaving things to fate. Reproductive success 
for human males is not really about reproduction opportunities, it is 
mostly about getting offspring to the point where they can begin their 
own reproduction. Human mothers are also supported in their repro-
ductive success by their pre- adult offspring, who learn their cultural 
and biological reproductive roles from the adults around them. This 
alloparenting (acting as a surrogate parent) by the previous generation, 
the current generation and the next allows human mothers to wean 
their infants relatively early (early, that is, compared to other long- lived 
mammals). However, the advantages for the parents of extended life and 
alloparenting are countered by altriciality (our young are born helpless 
and dependent) and an extended childhood (humans do not reach repro-
ductive maturity until about age 16, and do not reach cognitive maturity 
until about age 25  – Arain et  al. 2013). In the evolutionary battle for 
resources between parents and their offspring, human offspring seem to 
be winning hands- down.
If we compare human hunter- gatherer reproduction with chim-
panzee reproduction, however, we can see that we are an unusual, 
but not isolated, case. Death from age- related conditions happens at 
about 80 for human females, while for chimpanzee females it is about 
55. In that time, chimpanzees can bring about six young to adulthood, 
compared to the human eight; and, while evidence of alloparenting is 
indisputable in humans, there is also anecdotal evidence of chimpanzee 
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alloparenting by other adult females, although it is less frequent:  if 
weaned offspring are left motherless, then other mature females some-
times adopt them. Chimpanzee offspring are born only slightly more 
capable than human babies, but their period of helplessness is shorter; 
and chimpanzee childhood is also shorter, at about 11 years compared 
to the human 16. Evidence for the existence of a chimpanzee meno-
pause is patchy; it seems to occur only in ancient females, sometime 
after age 55, and is associated with generally failing health, unlike in 
humans (Thompson et al. 2007).
So we can say that humans are unusual in nature, but not extreme; 
and altriciality, alloparenting, late onset of fertility, long life and early 
menopause all contribute to the unusualness of our species. Sarah Hrdy 
(2009) has shown that the high level of human inter- female cooperation 
is made possible by extended childhood, during which the young female 
can build a network of alliances as well as learning her parenting skills. 
These alliances become valuable in later life because, unlike chimpanzees, 
human females maintain close contact with their family groups, while 
human males tend to move away into other groups. This matrilocal 
aspect of human nature (whereby females remain with their birth- group) 
contrasts with the patrilocal nature of chimpanzees (whereby it is males 
who remain with their birth- group):  there is no value for chimpanzee 
females in building relationships in early life, because they will be moving 
to other groups in adolescence. This picture is, however, complicated 
by power relationships. Bonobos, like chimpanzees, are patrilocal, but 
unlike chimpanzees they are matrifocal:  females dominate in bonobo 
groups. It is, therefore, important for a newly immigrated bonobo female 
to build relationships with the existing females in the group; and prac-
tising relationship- building in pre- adolescence can help.
Although they shared a common ancestor only six million years ago, 
humans, chimpanzees and bonobos organise their societies in different 
ways, and these differences seem to be related to the environmental 
niches they both live in and construct. We used to believe that the chim-
panzee was a good proxy for the common ancestor of all three species, 
but we now have evidence that, genetically (Prüfer et  al. 2012)  and 
physically (Diogo et  al. 2017), bonobos may resemble the common 
ancestor better than chimpanzees; in which case, the common ancestor 
species – and early humans – are likely to have been more matrifocal than 
we have so far believed. However, the existence of three very different 
social models in three very closely related species does show how social 
differences can, over a number of generations, have major effects on the 
behaviours and genome of a species.
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Power and Aiello (1997) have linked the social features of human 
reproduction with two genetically based human traits: concealed ovula-
tion and ostensive menstruation. They propose that the usual signal of 
‘fertility now’ (ostensive ovulation) used by most primates was replaced 
in humans by ‘fertility soon’ (ostensive menstruation). This encouraged 
males to mate- guard their females and led to longer- term male– female 
bond- building. It may also have been accompanied by synchronised 
female fertility (all females in a group come into oestrus at the same 
time; Power et al. 2013), which makes it difficult for a single alpha male 
to dominate breeding, and further encourages non- alphas to selectively 
mate- guard. Eventually, this led to a human culture in the Palaeolithic 
in which matrilocality created matrifocality and matrilineal inherit-
ance; and the most successful males were those who worked with, and 
accommodated, females  – not those who tried to dominate (Boehm 
1999). Human females called the reproductive shots, creating a symbolic 
culture that probably shared many features with Chris Knight’s (1991) 
model of a Palaeolithic matrilineal human culture.
The effect of altriciality, alloparenting, late fertility, long life and 
menopause in human evolution laid the foundations for a childhood 
in which learning and teaching are significant factors. Most species’ 
childhoods are a matter of supplementing their genetic capacities with 
osmotic learning from those around them (osmotic learning involves 
no direct teaching, so things can only be learned if they are noticed and 
attended- to by the learner). In contrast, human childhoods involve the 
constant presentation of new skills and challenges to the child, with 
active interventions by adults to ensure learning happens in a timely and 
appropriate way. How children learn is a vital topic for humans, and we 
are constantly reviewing our models and theories of how human babies 
become human adults; and particularly how human children develop 
language and selfhood.
The developing child: traditional approaches
Human childhood is unusual, because we enter it in an underdeveloped 
state, and because it is so long; but these two features do mean we are 
eminently trainable. Our underdeveloped brains are ready to be moulded 
by our experiences as well as by our genes; and our extended childhood 
gives us the time to pick up skills and culture in a credulous way, before 
the reproductive demands of adulthood impose their own realities (Sisk 
and Zehr 2005). Is the unusual nature of our childhood the reason why 
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we, and maybe no other species, are able to develop a sense of selfness, 
an ability to objectify our own existence? And, if selfness develops as we 
mature, then what kind of selves are we when we are born?
No scientist today would say that our mind at birth is a blank 
slate, as John Locke (1689 [1836])1 is supposed to have described it; 
we come into the world with an in- built set of behaviours that make 
us human babies and not chimpanzee or bonobo infants. It does seem, 
however, that those behaviours include the expectation of a long 
period of nurturing after birth, a service that adults around us are 
usually able and willing to supply. This nurturing means that, when 
we consider human childhood, we are looking at it from inside our 
own nurtured experiences; and these, in turn, were produced by the 
trilogy of our parents’ natural desire to nurture their offspring, the 
cultural expectations placed on our parents by their own nurtured 
childhood and the cultural self- models we are offered as we grow. 
Human childhood relies on the pre- existence of human adulthood, 
which is a product of human childhood; and this leads to a chicken- 
and- egg problem of how both ends of the fitness equation evolved 
simultaneously.
If we follow childhood through its stages, we can begin to under-
stand how human adults are made out of human children. Even here, 
however, where evidence is plentiful and current, the process of childhood 
has, until recently, remained largely theory- based and not information- 
based. The two best- known traditional theories of childhood came from 
people with very different ideologies: Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky. Both 
were born in 1896, but their observations on human childhood produced 
markedly different views on what it means to be a child, and, indeed, 
what it means to be a scientist who studies children.
Piaget was born in Switzerland to an academic family, and spent 
most of his life in France and Switzerland, working as a career academic. 
He lived to be 84 and, at his death, his theories formed the core of many 
educational methods in the West. In contrast, Vygotsky was born in Tsarist 
Russia, but lived most of his adult life in the Soviet Union. His academic 
career was, in its way, as promising as that of Piaget, but it was affected 
by two events. First was his contraction of tuberculosis (TB), probably 
during the German occupation of West Russia from 1915 to 1918; this 
meant his academic life was interrupted several times by prolonged 
bouts of illness, and TB caused his early death in 1934, aged 37. The 
second event was the Soviet revolution of 1917 to 1920, which meant 
that Vygotsky’s theories suffered from an unofficial embargo by the West 
on any product of communism. Contemporary Russian scientific texts 
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were, by default, considered unworthy of the effort of translation: they 
were seen as politically biased at best, and at worst mere propaganda.
Piaget’s ideas on education only became influential in the 1960s, 
when the efficacy of the late- Victorian educational model (based on 
rote- learning, memorisation, regular testing, punishments rather than 
rewards and convention over invention) finally began to face informed 
challenges. Piaget (1959) had recently published his own ideas on how 
children develop through childhood, including his educational proposals 
based on those ideas. He saw the development of the child as occurring 
in four stages:
• In the sensorimotor stage, from birth to age 2 years, children experi-
ence the world through movement and their senses, and they learn 
about object permanence. The language they use is basic:  they 
identify objects by naming, and use some simple object– action 
constructs that have no syntactic regularity.
• In the pre- operational stage, from ages 2 to 7, the child acquires 
semiosis (sign- meaning combinations) and attentional awareness. 
Initially, they can only take an egocentric viewpoint (‘I am the 
only self in the universe’), but during this period they develop 
the understanding that other viewpoints exist. Their language 
becomes more complex, allowing two- and three- argument forms, 
but it is still not fully conversational; the skills of turn- taking and 
building a dialogue through negotiation toward meaning are still 
underdeveloped.
• In the concrete operational stage, from ages 7 to 11, children begin 
to think logically about concrete events – things they know or feel 
to be real. At this stage, language is complex, analytical and conver-
sational; but it does not yet involve metacognition: there is little or 
no thinking about their own thinking.
• In the formal operational stage, after age 11, the child develops 
abstract reasoning. This permits full language and the develop-
ment of the interpersonal skills needed for adulthood.
In the 1960s and 1970s, several national educational systems across 
Europe began to use versions of the Piagetian approach. For instance, 
Finland adopted an unusual three- level model (pre- school to age seven, 
comprehensive school to age 16 and voluntary vocational school to age 
19), still in place today. It has no formal streaming based on skills or IQ; 
and it is now considered one of the best systems in the world. France 
and Germany have similar systems, although pre- school ends at age 6, 
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and schooling is divided into two age cohorts, up to 11 and beyond 11. 
Germany also has some skills- streaming beyond age 11. The UK and the 
USA maintained their old Victorian principles of bringing children into 
the state school system at age 5. They also test and stream pupils by IQ 
(rather than by skills) at age 10– 11, and (in the UK) encourage subject 
specialisation after age 14, and again after age 16. Both of these systems 
are also increasingly succumbing to an apparently Anglo- Saxon preoccu-
pation with testing and streaming:  in England, testing occurs at ages 
6– 7 and 10– 11 (SATS tests), 13– 14 (streaming tests), 15– 16 (GCSEs), 
16– 17 (AS- Levels) and 17– 18 (A- Levels). Other than Finland (and, pos-
sibly, Singapore), no Western national education system can be said to 
work consistently better than the others; the key factors in the success of 
a national system seem to be logistic (that is, money spent and the level 
of bureaucracy imposed) and not ideological.
In contrast with Piaget, Vygotsky’s work was not published in the 
West until the 1980s, and the publications have become an area of con-
troversy all of their own:  there are disputes about whether the works 
published in English reflect the original Soviet texts, and whether the 
Soviet texts reflect the original thinking of Vygotsky. His key work on 
childhood (1934 [1986]) is actually a collection of papers and writings 
put together by his students after his death; so, even if it remains true to 
Vygotsky’s vision, it is not something he intended to publish in that form. 
However, its English publication occurred at just the time that doubts 
were being expressed about the Piagetian approach, a timely coinci-
dence. Max Planck said that ‘science advances one funeral at a time’, and 
the death of Piaget in 1980 certainly removed the unquestioning aca-
demic seal of approval that seemed to have developed around his the-
ories. In the search for new paradigms, Vygotsky’s ideas seemed to offer 
a viable alternative, and they had what was seen as an added advantage 
in the 1980s: they came from a non- Western source.
Vygotsky’s theory divides childhood into two halves. He called the 
period up to age 2 the pre- linguistic stage, and everything after became 
the linguistic stage. This corresponds, in terms of developmental timing at 
least, with Piaget’s division between the sensorimotor stage and the pre- 
operational stage. But, while the sensorimotor and pre- linguistic stages 
in the two models are broadly comparable, Vygotsky’s single linguistic 
stage is considerably different from Piaget’s multi- stage model of the rest 
of childhood. Where Piaget saw learning as biologically incremental, 
Vygotsky saw it as culturally incremental:  he viewed what is learned 
after age two as socially driven, not developmentally driven. Vygotsky 
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described learning as happening in a Zone of Proximal Development 
(ZPD): each piece of learning dictated what could be learned next, and 
it was pointless trying to hurry or subvert the process by teaching ahead 
or outside of the ZPD. This process has been described as scaffolding, a 
term first used in 1976 to describe the more focussed activity of tutoring 
(Wood et al. 1976) but never actually used by Vygotsky.
Both Piaget and Vygotsky treat language learning up to age 2 
as driven by instinct, while after that age it is driven by the ego- free 
mechanisms of either genetic imperatives or social conditioning through 
cultural self- modelling. Neither seems to see a role for the child in their 
own learning: there is no place in either theory for the child to negotiate 
toward meaning. Yet, if language is involved in the process of creating a 
self (or selves), there has to be input from the child.
The developing child: modern approaches
More recent studies that have looked at the development of the self in 
childhood seem to support the idea that the child plays a role in building 
their own ego. Even before the age of 2 they are learning about interper-
sonal relationships and engaging with their world through their carers; 
but it is at around the age of 2 that ego- building, self- awareness and 
awareness of selfness begin to take off. One symptom of this has long 
been recognised as the terrible twos, when the child begins to assert their 
own agenda of wants; and it is unlikely to be a coincidence that this is 
also the time when they develop a communicative competency sufficient 
to express those wants. However, this does not tell us whether it is egotis-
tical desire driving the appearance of language, or language permitting 
egotistical desire. We can look at studies of childhood development to 
answer this.
In 1970, Walter Mischel wrote of experiments he had conducted on 
children’s capacity to defer immediate reward for future gains (Mischel 
and Ebbesen 1970). He offered children aged 41 months to 66 months 
the choice of a marshmallow now or two or more marshmallows (or 
cookies, or pretzels or other edible treats) after a period of waiting. The 
child was sometimes told the length of the waiting time, and sometimes 
just told there would be a wait. The experiments are now grouped under 
the title of The Marshmallow Test (Mischel 2014). Mischel found that 
the capacity to wait for a reward was a product of three things: what the 
child was encouraged to think about during the wait, the presence of 
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distracting objects and the visibility of the rewards. Varying the size of 
the delayed gratification or the period of delay did not seem to be par-
ticularly significant. However, a follow- up study 40  years later (Casey 
et al. 2011) found that the children who were able to delay gratification 
in the original tests tended to be more self- controlling and able to mod-
erate their emotions as adults.
Sarah Brewer and Alex Cutting (2001) carried out similar 
experiments in 2000 for the UK Channel 4 TV series, A Child’s World, 
but with a slightly different question in mind: how and when do children 
learn delayed gratification? They tested 2- year- olds and 4- year- olds to 
see what differences there were in their decision to delay gratification 
and their capacities to wait. The experiment was slightly different from 
Mischel’s in that they offered the children a piece of chocolate now or a 
bar of chocolate (six pieces) in ten minutes. They found that 2- year- olds 
were much more likely to opt for one piece now – although some went on 
to lobby for the whole bar as well as the single piece! By contrast, 4- year- 
olds were willing to wait, although they filled the time differently:  as 
Mischel had earlier found, the girls tended to distract themselves by 
singing or engaging in other activities, while the boys tended to distance 
themselves from temptation by moving the chocolate away, or moving 
away from the chocolate.
What do these experiments tell us about children? The first, and 
most important, point is that human children do not think in the same 
ways as adults. There are processes of cognitive change and learning 
going on throughout childhood, altering the child’s perceptions of self 
and time. The second point is that young children do not have an innate 
sense of time on which to build a concept of delayed gratification: this is 
something that develops, or is learned, with age. The third point is that 
humans are individuals, even as children, and personality traits can be 
relatively stable through a lifetime.
Another set of experiments on childhood social cognition are the 
Sally- Anne tests, originally designed by Baron- Cohen et  al. (1985) to 
identify children’s capacity to model what others are thinking. The chil-
dren were presented with a story (or sometimes took part in the story) 
scripted as follows:
There are two dolls, Sally and Anne, and two containers, a basket 
and a box. Sally puts a marble in the basket and leaves the room. 
Anne moves the marble from the basket to the box and leaves the 
room. Sally comes back for the marble. Where will she look for it, in 
the basket or in the box?
how Do wE bECoME sElvEs? 85
  
While typical 4- year- olds will say ‘in the basket’, correctly model-
ling that their knowledge is different from Sally’s, 2- year- olds and older 
autistic children will say ‘in the box’, modelling Sally’s knowledge as the 
same as their own. A second version of the test was used by Perner et al. 
(1987) to test the comparison between self- belief and other- belief at ages 
3– 4. They divided their subjects into two groups by age: 3– 3.5 years; and 
3.5– 4 years. The test used the direct knowledge of the data subjects them-
selves, rather than their models of what dolls knew, and it was scripted 
as follows:
The subject is shown a Smarties tube and asked what they think 
is inside the tube. They usually say ‘Smarties’, and they are then 
shown that the tube actually contains a pencil. The subject is then 
told that another child (whom they know and who is a similar 
age) will be coming in, and the subject is asked three things: what 
they remember being in the tube (a pencil); what they originally 
thought was in the tube (Smarties); and what they think the new 
child will think is in the tube.
The accuracy of all three responses was greater for the older 
age group, but the responses indicated something significant about 
children’s capacity to attribute false belief. For some of the younger 
group, there was a marked difficulty in expressing the idea that they 
themselves could be mistaken: they insisted that they originally thought 
the Smarties tube contained a pencil rather than Smarties. Not only did 
they have the expected difficulty in attributing their former false know-
ledge to another, they also had difficulty attributing it to their former 
self. It was as if an idealised cultural self- model, in the absence of an 
effective social self- model, were dictating the nature of both the present 
and past modelled selves. This difficulty was noticeably reduced for the 
older group.
The Sally- Anne and Smarties Tube experiments have been repeated 
many times and with many variations, but the results all point in the 
same direction. First, children below age 4 tend to have difficulties 
understanding that others may not have the same knowledge as they 
do: it is as if, for these children, there were a single gestalt mind in the 
universe, so if they know something then everyone knows it. Second, 
the idea that the knowledge of the self- now can be different from that 
of the self- then is also difficult for children under the age of 4; there is 
a ‘nowness’ to their knowledge that makes their self- image impervious 
to error. Third, there is a developmental or learning trajectory behind 
understanding false beliefs; typical children develop an understanding 
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around age 4, but false beliefs can remain problematic long after age 4 
for some individuals on the autistic spectrum.
All of these experiments are about the particular version of ToM 
that humans are able to develop: the capacity to model others not just 
as intentional beings but as beings with their own agendas and models. 
We are not born with a ToM, it is something we build through exposure 
to other people. Initially, we have limited needs and few wants, and if we 
survive it is through the provisioning of our needs by our carers. We have 
no use for an id with its own agenda; our agenda is met by those around us 
(and if it is not met, there is little we ourselves can do to remedy the situ-
ation). Around the age of 2, our innate sense of autonomy – the survival 
instinct, if you wish – begins to encounter resistance from our caregivers, 
causing us to learn how to push back. Our language skills begin to take 
off, our self- serving capacity to deceive begins to develop sophistication, 
and our other- modelling skills develop depth – we begin to understand 
other individuals better – and breadth – we begin to understand inter-
personal relationships. Unfortunately, the only effective tools we have 
available at the start of this journey are our emotions, hence the temper 
tantrums described as the terrible twos. When these don’t work, however, 
we begin to expand our alternative communication strategies (evidential 
persuasion, non- evidential nagging, stubbornness, acquiescence and so 
on), and our argumentation skills begin to take off. What is driving an 
increasing communicative engagement with the other humans around 
us is our ego- based desire for social inclusion through cooperation and 
language acquisition.
Simon Baron- Cohen (1995, Chapters 4– 5) takes the view that ToM 
is something that develops as we grow, not something we are born with. 
He proposes that children are born with two basic interpersonal detectors, 
which develop through the first 9 months of life as the first two steps on 
the path to a Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM). With the development 
of the first detector, the Intentionality Detector (ID), the child begins to 
model the desires and goals of others: if an object moves to avoid things 
or to achieve things, it has intention. Developing soon after the ID is the 
Eye Direction Detector (EDD), the ability to understand what another 
person is looking at and why they may be looking at it. It could also be 
described as an Attentionality Detector, discerning another’s desires and 
goals from what they are interested in. These two detectors each give 
what Baron- Cohen describes as dyadic representation:  the representa-
tion of another as an object with intentions. However, their real strength 
begins when, from 9 to 18 months, they combine together in what Baron- 
Cohen calls the Shared Attention Module (SAM): the SAM generates the 
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capacity to understand triadic relationships between the agent, their goal 
and the self as observer. The child becomes aware of the observational 
role they play in understanding the objects and intentions around them, 
but they also become aware that the other is an individual who may not 
share their intentions. SAM sets the stage for ToMM, allowing Baron- 
Cohen to say that ID, EDD and SAM make ToMM. The development of 
ToMM is slow, however, and it takes another 30 months (until age 4) to 
reach basic effectiveness.
ToM continues to develop throughout most of our lives (if we let 
it), mapping our relationships onto our social environment in increas-
ingly complex ways. As babies we have no need for a concept of ToM, and 
as infants we are interested only in subverting the agendas of others to 
meet our own needs. However, by age 4 we are beginning to understand 
the peculiarly human social aspects of ToM: if I accommodate the needs 
of others and work with them, then we can both gain; but if I continue 
to act selfishly when most others are being reciprocally accommodating, 
sanctions will be imposed on me to restrain or reform my selfish agenda. 
In terms of interpersonal social modelling, we become much more aware 
of the need to negotiate our enterprises – not just on an ad hoc basis but 
systematically throughout our life. In terms of self- modelling, we become 
aware that successful negotiation involves an honesty reliant on accurate 
models of both self and other, and that our cultural self- model is not 
really up to the task. An outcome of these new awarenesses is that our 
social calculus and social self- modelling become a complex, perpetually 
on cognitive relationship with the universe; we begin to comprehend the 
relationship between the other minds out there and our own mind.
The developing child: deception
Our capacity for deception also becomes more subtle from age 4 onward. 
We begin to understand that some of the nostrums we have been offered 
in early childhood concerning truthfulness are advisory rather than abso-
lute. We learn about opinion, that it is possible for someone to believe 
they are right when we believe otherwise; we learn about white lies, 
that sometimes the truth is neither productive nor appropriate; we learn 
about meta- realities, that some things can be believed in the absence of, 
or even despite, evidence to the contrary; we learn that we ourselves can 
believe these meta- realities, and that our local culture may require us to 
do so; and we learn that if you go by what is actually said then language 
is overwhelmingly deceptive, but if you negotiate toward meaning then 
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language becomes overwhelmingly honest. As Ursula Le Guin (1969) 
expresses it, ‘I talk about the gods, I  am an atheist. But I  am an artist 
too, and therefore a liar. Distrust everything I say. I am telling the truth. 
The only truth I  can understand or express is, logically defined, a lie. 
Psychologically defined, a symbol. Aesthetically defined, a metaphor.’
We negotiate toward meaning not just with every utterance we 
make; we are in a constant negotiation toward social meaning, which 
dictates the level of our acceptance into the social groups and mechanisms 
around us. Deception becomes less a matter of deceiving and more a 
matter of modelling meta- realities that differ from our own, so that we 
can share in them. Indeed, we may define our social limits on deception 
by the meta- realities that surround us. Santos et al. (2017) showed that 
heavy exposure of a child to what is known as ‘parenting by lying’ can 
result in an adult more willing to lie themselves.
Brewer and Cutting (2001, 73– 6) conducted a hand- hiding game 
experiment with children of different ages. The adult hides a coin in one 
hand and then offers the child the choice of two closed hands to guess 
where the coin is. Correct choice is a matter of chance; but things get 
interesting when a younger child of about age 2 is invited to offer the 
same choice to the adult. The child will offer two open hands, or one open 
hand (with or without the coin). Their logic appears to be: ‘I know where 
the coin is, so everyone must know where the coin is, and deception is 
impossible’. The child does not have full ToM, so the idea that there might 
be a knowledge of the universe different from their own is beyond them. 
There is no understanding that they own their own knowledge, so no 
concept of their own mind, or of self- modelling. Slightly older children 
(about age 3) have the rudiments of ToM and offer two closed hands; but 
they often try to misdirect by telling the adult the coin is in the wrong 
hand, or they shouldn’t look in the correct hand. Their art of deception 
may be inexperienced and ineffective, but they now understand that 
there is more than one mind in the universe. However, their approach 
to the task indicates that, for them, it is still a pastime with no competi-
tive element: there is no developed model of the self to ‘win’ or ‘lose’ the 
choice. Even at age 8, children often have particular body language that 
they use when they lie, giving away the fact they are lying: for example, 
they may fidget in a particular way, or refuse eye contact. Effective decep-
tion requires both an effective model of the person in front of you and an 
effective model of your self. Cultural self- modelling does not provide us 
with an etic enough model of the self to help us to lie effectively, and it is 
only as we approach puberty, having built an effective social- self- model, 
that we begin to lie well.
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Our social calculus becomes more sophisticated as we master decep-
tion and its detection, and therefore become more competent in our nego-
tiation toward meaning. The models we make of others come to include 
their intentions and beliefs, the model we make of ourself becomes more 
nuanced and less monolithic, and our knowledge of the relationships 
between our modelled self and others turns our social calculus into a net-
work of what- ifs. Our modelling becomes truly modal: it is no longer just 
a representation of what is likely to happen in an X- therefore- Y Darwinian 
logic. We now become able to model the impossible, Y- despite- never- X. 
Compared to that formulation, the unlikely – possibly X- therefore- Y and 
X- therefore- possibly Y – are simple to model.
By the time human children enter adolescence, they are usu-
ally accomplished modellers and competent liars. They can model the 
minds of others, not just as agentive beings but as intentional beings 
who can also model. They can model themselves as third persons  – 
and, therefore, as intentional beings. They can use language not just 
as a meaning- exchange system but as a meaning- making system; and 
they can share any meanings they wish to make by negotiating toward 
meaning. They can persuade by making use of other people’s what- ifs 
to skew the meanings being negotiated: they can flatter, cajole, frighten 
and inspire. They can understand the relative and contextual worth of 
truth, and use it appropriately. In short, the childhood exposure to lan-
guage has changed the child from Homo credulans to Homo sapiens. It is 
not the innate presence of language that makes us the apes we are; it is 
the continuous use of it in childhood that changes how we can think and 
work with other people: through the process of languaging, the innocent 
human child becomes the political adult.
Timescales for self in childhood
What does it feel like to be a human baby? If we are honest with our-
selves, then the answer has to be that we can never know. It is a state 
we have all lived through (we were all born and went through the same 
stages of helplessness); we can imagine how a baby must feel (we have 
all encountered the idea of babies, even if we have not met a real one); 
and we can even attribute our today- me feelings about being a baby to 
the modelled baby- me idea in our heads; but that is not remembering my 
baby- me, nor is it even feeling like a human baby. Babies are clearly sig-
nificantly aware of the world (unlike comatose people); yet no retrievable 
memories were laid down when we were babies, and there is no sense of 
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continuity between any imagining of our infancy and our current self- 
definition. How can a period in life when so much learning is happening 
leave no conscious trace of that learning in our brains and minds?
It is almost as if our life were compartmentalised into two different 
states. When we are self- unaware as babies, we can have no knowledge 
of what being self- aware feels like; and when we are self- aware as older 
humans, we can have no knowledge of what being self- unaware feels 
like. These mutually exclusive states of selfness are not just stages in our 
life- story, they also happen on a daily basis in the sleep– wake cycle. We 
now know that the brain is active throughout the sleep cycle, and we 
dream several times a night; but we only remember a dream if we are 
dreaming it when we wake up – and often not even then (Becchetti and 
Amadeo 2016). The human brain seems to be quite efficient at keeping 
our aware and unaware selves separated, but we are only just beginning 
to understand why this should be so.
The unconscious– conscious sleep– wake cycle is a big mystery that 
is not going to be solved here. We are only interested in what it can tell us 
about human infancy; and on that subject it is quite eloquent. It provides 
evidence that nobody is actually a cohesive, single self. We have no way 
of being sure whether our separate aware and unaware selves are mutu-
ally or independently cohesive – although remembered dreams indicate 
that either could be true. We may feel that we are a single self, but the 
inaccessibility of the one- third of our life that we spend asleep indicates 
that we may not be.
As well as the major division into conscious and unconscious 
selves, our conscious selfhood is also often seen as divisible. Sigmund 
Freud (1923 [2010]) split the holistic psyche into the unconscious id 
and a conscious selfhood; but he further split the conscious self into an 
ego and a super- ego. The ego is the self- as- actor, the self that gets things 
done, while the super- ego is the self- as- modeller, the self that plans and 
interprets. According to Freud, neither of these conscious selves truly 
exists when we are infants, although a rudimentary cognition that will 
develop into an ego is detectable. The ego forms in early childhood and 
begins exerting itself from about age 4 (Freud does not give a develop-
mental timescale, but the ego- affected self he describes fits with what 
we know about 4- year- olds). The super- ego is more difficult to pin down, 
but by age 11 we have effective models of our social environment and 
our possible roles in it; we also have a clear understanding that there are 
social expectations we must meet and social taboos we should not break.
Jerome Bruner divided our conscious selfhood into Episodic 
selves and a Narrative self. The Narrative self establishes and maintains 
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continuity, or narrative force, between our Episodic selves, our memories 
of who we were at different times in the past and our models of who we 
could be at different times in the future. The Narrative self is not a given 
at birth, it is the product of our social interactions in early life; and it only 
begins to create our life- narrative from our memories and plans when we 
own our experiences and treat our core modelled self as a conceptual self. 
This is not an automatic process. It requires social input to give the self 
context and purpose:
Narrative accrual is not foundational in the scientist’s sense. Yet 
narratives do accrue, and, as anthropologists insist, the accruals 
eventually create something variously called a ‘culture’ or a ‘history’ 
or, more loosely, a ‘tradition.’ Even our own homely accounts of 
happenings in our own lives are eventually converted into more or 
less coherent autobiographies centered around a Self acting more 
or less purposefully in a social world.
(Bruner 1991, 18)
The conceptual self that is created by this process is, at the time of 
creation, the core self; but it is also a now- self, and it changes through 
time. Past and future core selves can be narratively associated with the 
now- self, but they cannot be the now- self. Bruner (1990, 100– 2) describes 
the negotiation with others toward a conceptual self as being the product 
of a series of transactional selves, selves negotiated with those around 
us. He gives no developmental timescale for this process, but he does 
say that ‘Four- year- olds may not know much about the culture, but they 
know what’s canonical and are eager to provide a tale to account for what 
is not’ (1990, 82– 3). At age 5, humans are usually capable of cultural 
narrativisation, which means they are able, or almost able, to describe 
their own lives as a story, and create a conceptual self they can describe 
to others (Benson 1993).
As we have seen in previous chapters, other selves and theories 
of selfhood are available. However, despite the importance of the con-
tribution of childhood to an understanding of selfhood, discussion of 
timescales for the development of selfhood in childhood is sparse. This 
is, in part, because we are still learning the story of human childhood, 
so speculation about what cognition a child is capable of at a particular 
stage or age could be seen as premature. However, our understanding of 
our selfhood in childhood, alongside our understanding of our cognition 
in childhood, form the bases of our personal development and inform 
our self- modelling in adulthood.
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How to make a human adult (start with other human 
adults)
From this discussion, it would seem that the recipe for a human adult 
consists of five ingredients. First, we need a sense of other, an innate ability 
to model our relationships with others. This seems to be an ancient cap-
acity, something we inherited long ago from an unknown ancestor; and 
we know this is the case because we can see it at work in the relationships 
between many different species, including our fellow primates. However, 
as it is innate, we have no need to be explicitly aware of our modelling 
for it to work:  simple, affective mechanisms of liking and disliking are 
enough for this relationship modelling (Bault et al. 2017). Human chil-
dren seem to come into the world with this faculty already working.
The second ingredient we need is an awareness of other, explicit 
knowledge that others in the group have intentions. This is a product 
of Machiavellian intelligence, which we have already identified as a 
capacity present in many primates. Awareness of others as intentional 
beings leads on to ToM, and then to the ability to explicitly model the 
relationships between others. It may be that the journey from social 
arithmetic to social calculus had already been started by the Pan- Homo 
common ancestor; from the evidence, it seems that chimpanzees and 
bonobos have at least begun the journey (Call and Tomasello 2008). By 
age 2, though, human children are already beginning to show signs of 
social calculus in their relationships.
The third ingredient is where we seem to part company from the 
rest of nature: our need and willingness to share our cognitive models. 
This seems to have occurred long after the split with chimpanzees, but 
it may not be limited to just Homo sapiens; it could have evolved in early 
Homo, or even the australopithecines. It seems likely that it is one of sev-
eral cooperative strategies that form a continuum from Pan species to 
modern humans (Vanutelli et  al. 2016). The willingness to cooperate 
in information- sharing is constrained by the sender’s and receiver’s 
dilemmas, which only our group of species has overcome in a useful 
way. Modern human children are sharing social models by age 4, both 
by calling adult attention to their peers’ social violations (tattling) and in 
sharing stories about others (gossiping).
The fourth ingredient of the human adult recipe is an inevitable 
outcome of sharing social calculus:  a need to accommodate third- 
party models of ourself in our social calculus (as we saw in Chapter 3). 
Developmentally, this is a more gradual process than the first three: we 
begin to model ourselves as third- party objects at around age 4, but we 
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understand compassion (modelling others as equal to the self) at around 
age 6, and we develop emotional empathy (experiencing the emotions of 
others) during adolescence (Allemand et al. 2015). However, we do not 
develop a full adult awareness of our selfhood until our early twenties – 
and sometimes even later.
The final ingredient in making a human adult is a capacity to 
accommodate opinions as well as facts in our cognition and communi-
cation. Not everything we receive from others is a reference to the actual 
world  – a lot is a personalised version of that world; I  do not need to 
adopt your opinion of the world to understand what that opinion is, and 
why you hold it. The capacity to treat the same information in two ways 
simultaneously – as true for you but not necessarily for me – is another 
product of sharing social models, and relies on the capacity to take the 
viewpoint of another (Tormala 2016). By paying attention to both your 
and my viewpoints, I am able to negotiate toward meaning with you; and 
this negotiation can be based on persuasion (I try to make you change 
your viewpoint) or compromise (we both change our viewpoints) (La 
Rocca et al. 2014). This is a complex interpersonal task, and the fact that 
it is quite difficult for a significant minority of individuals (such as the 
17- in- 1,000 people on the autism spectrum – CDC 2018) indicates that, 
genetically, this capacity to effectively negotiate toward meaning must be 
quite recent and has not yet stabilised in the species.
These five ingredients rely on three cognitive tools we generated 
to handle aspects of our socialisation. The first of these is the simple 
syntax of A- Relationship- B modelling, the engine behind the cognition 
of social calculus; the second is negotiation toward meaning, a product 
of the sharing of social calculus models; and the third is complex lan-
guage grammar, the engine behind the cognition and communication 
of opinion, persuasion, compromise and deception. The first of these, 
simple syntax, may not be exclusive to the Homo clade, but it provided 
the base on which the other two tools could build. The second, negoti-
ation toward meaning, is likely to be exclusive to humans, but it is not 
necessarily limited to just Homo sapiens. The third, complex language 
grammar, may indeed be a species- specific strategy, at least in its more 
complex forms; but it is unlikely to be genetically instantiated  – and, 
because of its fast- changing nature, may never become so (Christiansen 
and Chater 2008).
Because the fourth and fifth ingredients (shared social calculus and 
opinion- accommodation) do not seem to be genetically driven, there is 
no need to search for genetic explanations for cooperative communica-
tion or complex language grammar. This does not mean that they have 
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no explanation – a willingness to be complicit in deception, in particular, 
needs more than a Just- So story to explain it as a fit survival strategy– but 
it does indicate that cultural explanations may prove to be sufficient.
As children, we are faced with a complex environment in which a 
reputation for cooperation is more important than the capacity to coerce; 
we need to know not just how we feel about others but how others feel 
about others, and how others feel about us. We cannot rely on introspec-
tion to define our self, we need to model how others define us; which 
means that we are not looking at our self in our social calculus, we are 
looking at models of our self, so we have to rely on what other people are 
telling us about us to decide who, and what, we are. To become human 
adults, we need other adults to provide input: Cogitant ut sum, ergo sum.
Note
 1. What Locke actually said was, ‘Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, 
void of all characters, without any ideas – How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by 
that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost 
endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, 
in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultim-
ately derives itself. Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about 
the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which 
supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of 
knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring’ (John Locke, 
1689 [1836], 51).
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Where Did Social Calculus 
Come From?
‘I couldn’t afford to learn it,’ said the Mock Turtle with a sigh. ‘I only 
took the regular course.’
‘What was that?’ inquired Alice.
‘Reeling and Writhing, of course, to begin with,’ the Mock 
Turtle replied; ‘and then the different branches of Arithmetic  – 
Ambition, Distraction, Uglification, and Derision.’
‘I never heard of “Uglification,” ’ Alice ventured to say. ‘What 
is it?’
The Gryphon lifted up both its paws in surprise. ‘Never heard 
of uglifying!’ it exclaimed. ‘You know what to beautify is, I suppose?’
‘Yes,’ said Alice doubtfully:  ‘it means  – to  – make – 
anything – prettier.’
‘Well, then,’ the Gryphon went on, ‘if you don’t know what to 
uglify is, you are a simpleton.’
(Lewis Carroll 1865, Chapter 9: ‘The Mock Turtle’s Story’)
So far in this book, much has been made of social calculus, the capacity 
to model the relationships between other members in a group. When this 
capacity is inside our heads and not out in the world, it is rather unre-
markable; it may even be a feature of cognition we share with apes and 
perhaps other social species. It does allow us to understand our social 
groups better, and maybe gain an edge over other individuals with less 
competence at social modelling; but it does not act as a significant marker 
of difference in either our individual or species lifestyles. However, when 
it is shared, social calculus becomes a powerful motor driving social and 
cultural cohesion and change. It provides the A- Relationship- B syntax 
that seems to form the basis of language grammar; it allows cliques 
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and cabals of like- minded individuals to form subgroups within the 
social group, and in that way it determines the systems of socialisation 
in the group; it establishes commonality and variation in the culture of 
the social group while helping that culture to become increasingly arbi-
trary (that is, governed less by genetically  and economically effective 
choices and more by contingency and fashion); and it allows opinion 
to be expressed and understood, and therefore lets a range of cognitive 
capacities (modality, imagination, story- telling, deception, modelled 
futures and pasts, and negotiation toward meaning) out of the Pandora’s 
box of the brain and into the world. Shared social calculus also provides 
the mechanism by which I can begin to understand that my self is a real 
objective thing for other people, just as their selves are real objective 
things for me; and I can therefore understand my self in the same way 
I  understand their selves:  my self modelled as a third person is a by- 
product of social calculus plus sharing.
Social calculus is, strictly speaking, computational and not arithmet-
ical; it behaves like an iterative nodal network with multiple connections 
between the nodes, rather than an arithmetical calculation with a single 
answer. Networks are notoriously difficult to represent arithmetically, 
but simple to build computationally. However, and completely coinci-
dentally, the Mock Turtle’s different branches of arithmetic do unexpect-
edly map to social calculus: Ambition is a product of being able to model 
my self as better than my current state, a natural comparison between 
my social and cultural self- models; Distraction maps to story- telling, 
or shared productive imagination; Uglification can be viewed as anti-
social deception, the downside of shared social calculus; and Derision 
is one way of sharing my models of others with those others. All these 
‘branches of arithmetic’ require a language- like communication system 
to work: story- telling, lying and sharing models are primary functions of 
human language; and self- modelling is only possible if others are sharing 
their models of me with me. Human language is driven by, and drives, 
the sharing of social calculus; and, even today, social gossip remains a 
significant feature of human language exchanges. However, if sharing 
social calculus is impossible without a language- like communication 
system, and self- modelling is impossible without shared social calculus, 
then my third- person social model of my self has to be a by- product of 
social calculus shared through language.
If knowledge of selfness relies on social calculus, then understanding 
how social calculus evolved becomes significant if we are to understand 
the origins of self. As we saw in Chapter  3, social cognition is not an 
automatic product of large brains: some cephalopod species like octopi 
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are highly encephalised, yet they have no society and therefore no need 
for social calculus. Social cognition is also not an automatic product of 
organised societies:  eusocial insect species live in nests numbering up 
to hundreds of thousands of individuals, with each individual having 
a defined social role; but these roles are genetically encoded, hence 
require no negotiation toward meaning to generate shared enterprise. 
The shared enterprise emerges from each individual carrying out a task 
that happens to coordinate with the tasks of other individuals. The indi-
viduals do not need to bargain their way through a complex social web of 
self- interests to work together, because they are sterile workers who rely 
on their queen to get their genes into the future. For eusocial insects, the 
division between means and ends is between the nest and the world, not 
the individual and the world.
Social networks, genes and brains
Because social calculus requires a particular type of cognition, it also 
requires a particular type of brain able to carry out that cognition. All 
cognition has an energy cost  – for instance, the large amount of the 
body’s energy that the brain uses (see Chapter 2) means that there must 
be an evolutionary explanation as to why bearing the cost of social cogni-
tion is a fit strategy for a species; and there must be species- specific gen-
etic mechanisms behind that strategy. In a currently non- extinct species 
we should be able to identify strategies of social calculus in the behav-
iour of that species; and, nowadays, we may even understand the genetic 
mechanisms affecting those strategies.
Using costly brainpower to navigate the complexities of social cal-
culus is only valuable to a species that lives in large groups of cooper-
ating individuals, all of whom retain control over their own reproductive 
agendas. This is something of a contradiction in evolutionary terms: indi-
vidual reproductive agendas, by default, generate competition rather 
than cooperation. If I have a choice between my reproductive agenda and 
yours, mine should always win – because, in the past, individuals who 
didn’t put their reproductive agenda first didn’t get their genes into the 
future. In the absence of other examples from the rest of nature, humans 
cooperatively sharing social calculus would seem to be an inexplicable 
contradiction. However, while we may be the only species that brings 
them together, cooperative sharing is not limited to just our species, and 
social calculus may not be exclusive to the Homo clade, either. Looking at 
how social knowledge and cooperation work in other socialised species 
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will give us a better understanding of how our particular habit of sharing 
social calculus may have evolved.
The birds (Avifauna) are a group of animals separated from us by 
over 300 million years of evolution; but we are increasingly becoming 
aware that some species are also highly intelligent (Gutiérrez- Ibáñez et al. 
2018). Some species of parrots (psittaciformes) and some crows (corvids) 
are also known for the size of their social networks, and they seem to have 
developed the necessary brainpower to handle those networks (Emery 
2016). Bird brains are organised differently from mammal brains:  our 
cerebrum is composed of a relatively thin folded layer of grey matter (the 
cortex, the part of the brain that does most of the planning, modelling 
and choosing) over the top of a network of white matter (which shuttles 
information between different areas of grey matter and other parts of the 
brain); in contrast, the bird brain has an area of grey matter (the pallium) 
which is more concentrated than the human cortex and which requires 
fewer and shorter white- matter connections. Where the human cortex is 
almost two- dimensional, like a wrinkled sheet of paper, the bird pallium 
is a three- dimensional mass. The organisation of the bird brain seems to 
lend itself well to both innate and learned behaviours, so much so that 
some species of bird can learn to mimic behaviours (such as calls and 
songs) that were originally generated by another species, allowing them 
to deceive individuals of that other species to their advantage (Flower 
et al. 2014).
In terms of cooperation, the avian brain supports a wide range 
of social behaviours:  solitary nesting, pair- bonded nesting, communal 
nesting, flocking, large breeding colonies, cooperative breeding, para-
sitism and male- dominated harems (Collias and Collias 1984). These 
different breeding strategies are supported by a range of different com-
munication strategies, such as territorial and mate- seeking displays and 
vocalisations, threats and alarm calls, and social integration signals 
(Bradbury and Vehrencamp 1998, 358– 63). Social integration signals 
are particularly interesting: there is evidence for individual identity calls 
in several bird species (Sewall et al. 2016), indicating that they do not 
just identify different individuals cognitively, they can signal those iden-
tities, too. There is currently no evidence that they share their social 
cognition models with each other, but they may maintain something 
approximating a cognitive social calculus system using labels that, if 
vocalised, could be recognised by the individuals labelled.
Genetically closer to home, mammals also have a wide range of 
socialisation strategies. Naked mole rats (Heterocephalus glaber) are an 
unusual mammal in that they have adopted a eusocial mode of existence. 
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A nest comprises about 80 individuals, but may house as many as 300. It 
contains a single queen, two or more fertile males, some larger soldier 
workers and many smaller tunneller workers. In addition, the workers 
are divided into frequent workers, who do more work but consume more 
resources, and infrequent workers, who do less work, consume fewer 
resources and may live longer. Individual workers can move between 
the different roles as needed, adopting the size and lifestyle appropriate 
for the new role. The queen has an unusually long gestation period 
for a rodent, and only produces one litter a year in the wild. However, 
the size of the litter (sometimes more than 20 pups) means that the 
single queen produces about the same number of offspring as would be 
produced if the nest reproduced in a more conventionally rodent- like 
way (Roellig et al. 2011).
Naked mole rats have a complex communication system that we do 
not fully understand; but, just as for the eusocial ants whom naked mole 
rats most resemble in terms of their subterranean lifestyle, smell is a key 
communicative tool. Faeces are particularly important:  they are either 
smeared on or eaten to generate a shared nest scent; and pups are fed 
with a softened form of faeces known as faecal pap. As well as olfactory 
signalling, naked mole rats vocalise extensively, as Jarvis and Sherman 
(2002) show:
Vocalizations include food recruitment calls, high- pitched con-
tact and aggressive chirps, a mating call, toilet- assembly call, 
and vocalizations specific to pups, such as squawks when pups 
are stepped on and caecotroph- solicitation chirps. Many calls are 
associated with alarm … If a small maintenance worker encounters 
a foreign object in a tunnel, it usually ‘taps’ or ‘sneezes,’ which 
recruits other small workers from nearby. However, if the worker 
encounters a snake or a member of a foreign colony, it rushes off 
toward the nest ‘screaming’. This mobilizes large- bodied defenders, 
who begin chirping and running to the site … There, they threaten 
the intruder with open mouths and snapping teeth and make either 
grunting sounds (predators) or hisses and aggressive trills (foreign 
colonies).
(Jarvis and Sherman 2002, 5).
Naked mole rats are unusual mammals in several other ways: they 
require much less oxygen than other mammals; they seem to be highly 
resistant to cancers; they can live for up to 32 years – and, unlike other 
mammal species, the fertile queens often live longer than non- fertiles 
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(Bens et al. 2018); their basic food sources are tubers they find in their 
tunnelling activity; and they ‘farm’ the tuber by eating it from the inside 
out, so ensuring it continues to grow while it is being consumed (the 
outer skin of the tuber is where most growth occurs). However, the sur-
prising feature of their social system is that, unlike other social mammals, 
they do not seem to need social calculus: individuality is suppressed, as it 
is for other eusocial species, and there is little evidence of individual per-
sonality or cognitive modelling of other individuals. Each individual has 
its role and performs it as and when needed, working not as an individual 
but as an element of a super- organism.
Meerkats (Suricata suricatta, a type of mongoose) have a social 
system closer to the pseudo- eusociality of humans than the full eusoci-
ality of naked mole rats; but it is still a social network dominated by alpha 
breeders. While each individual does seem to have its own agenda, and 
personality does play a small role in their society, individual agendas 
and non- alpha reproduction in a group are suppressed by the current 
alpha male and female. This is accomplished partly by bullying, which 
suppresses fertility chemically, and partly by consuming the offspring of 
non- alphas.
This does still leave the sub- alpha individual with three routes to 
fertility. The first route is to replace the alpha male or female and become 
a gang leader. Take- over fights are rare, although not unknown; but alpha 
meerkats are not guarded by the group in the same way as alpha naked 
mole rats, so natural attrition is relatively frequent. Only individuals who 
have migrated into the gang from outside will be accepted as new alphas, 
however, so meerkats have to leave their birth- gang and seek out a new 
gang if they are to have a chance of becoming an alpha using this route. 
The second route is to leave the birth- gang and found your own gang. 
It is a risky strategy in that new groups have to compete for territory 
with larger, older groups; but, if successful, the reproductive rewards for 
the new alphas are immediate. The third route is to encounter a fertile 
and receptive member of the other sex while out foraging; alphas are 
often amenable to extending the genetic pool of their offspring behind 
their partner’s back, and subordinates seldom forego an opportunity to 
attempt furtive reproduction.
Meerkats, however, do not seem to be very effective at social cal-
culus. They do seem able to differentiate between calls made by different 
individuals (Townsend et al. 2012), but there is no evidence they under-
stand a call as authored by a particular individual (Tibbetts et al. 2008). 
This may be because they don’t seem to recognise other gang- members 
visually; instead, they rely on a group scent, generated by repetitive 
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scent- marking exchanges, to identify gang- mates. If an individual who 
has become separated from their gang makes their way back after a 
week or so, acceptance back into the gang is far from automatic. Unless 
some lingering group scent is detected on the prodigal meerkat, they will 
be treated as a stranger. Female meerkats are not able to reliably iden-
tify even their own offspring. Occasionally, a beta female who has been 
impregnated by a lone male will give birth and then attempt to sneak her 
pups into the ‘royal’ crèche. If the alpha female detects them, they will 
be eaten; but this happens seldom enough to make the sneak adoption 
tactic viable.
Meerkat foraging and feeding are lone activities: unlike humans and 
eusocial animals, they do not indulge in joint provisioning enterprises. 
Meerkat pups are fed in a crèche for about two months, first with their 
mother’s milk and later by carer provisioning; and during the latter part 
of their childhood they learn their foraging skills, both from personal 
practice and from carer teaching. Their success in foraging practice 
at this point in their life dictates their future fitness and likelihood of 
reaching alpha status (Thornton 2008). Adults who are unable to forage 
efficiently will have poorer condition and less time to undertake furtive 
reproduction, as well as being unlikely to achieve alpha status. Meerkats, 
like humans and unlike naked mole rats, therefore appear to have a 
pseudo- eusocial society; but, unlike humans, their pseudo- eusociality 
seems to be based on suppression of (or, at least, lack of recognition of) 
individuality and not on cooperation and joint enterprise. This aspect of 
their behaviour makes meerkat social networking more like that of naked 
mole rats than that of humans.
Although meerkats don’t seem to need it, complex social cognition 
in the mammalian clade is not limited to humans, or even to primates. For 
instance, bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) live in pods of up to 15 
individuals; and these pods often come together to make larger fission– 
fusion groups of up to a thousand individuals. The groups separate again 
into pods after a short period (hours rather than days), but individuals 
may not necessarily leave the group in the same pod with which they 
arrived. We still do not fully understand the details of this fission– fusion 
social system, but it does seem to involve a flexible and hierarchical view 
of social group membership, as well as individual and changeable asso-
ciation preferences. Like other social mammals, dolphins have large and 
complex brains. In fact, if brain size and complexity are correlated with 
intelligence, then the large and complex brains of dolphins make them 
the second- most (possibly the most) intelligent species on the planet 
(Foer 2015).
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Bottlenose dolphins use a range of communicative behaviours. They 
seem to use click communication to synchronise activity and to establish 
and maintain alliances (Connor et al. 2006); they use gentle physical con-
tact for the same purpose; and, in the same way as most primates, they 
recruit each other’s attention toward salient events and objects – and joint 
attention is a key ingredient of social cognition (Pack and Herman 2006). 
Their vocal communication is complex and seems capable of carrying 
organised and complex meanings (although we currently have no real 
evidence that it does so). They may have the capacity to use grammatical 
utterances in the same way as humans (Herman and Uyeyama 1999), and 
there is even a controversial suggestion that their vocalisations seem to have 
the same sound structure as human words and sentences (Ryabov 2016), 
although this may be more a coincidence than evidence of language- like 
communication. They also seem to have definable and differentiated group 
cultures, which they maintain even when the culture becomes maladaptive 
(Whitehead et al. 2004). This is a behaviour to be expected in emic belief- 
based systems but not in etic definition- based systems.
Bottlenose dolphins, like humans, seem to have the capacity to recog-
nise and label other individuals. Cook et al. (2004) showed that dolphin sig-
nature whistles are used frequently by individuals to identify themselves to 
other members of a pod; and King et al. (2013) showed that other dolphins 
use slightly modified versions of an individual’s signature whistle to indicate 
they recognise the individual. Because of the fission– fusion society, it seems 
likely that identification and recognition of individuals extends beyond the 
ad hoc grouping of the pod: bottlenose dolphins seem to maintain at least 
a Relationship- A form of social modelling; and their capacity for complex 
social alliances (Connor 2007) indicates they could be maintaining an A- 
Relationship- B social calculus. What we can say with certainty is that the 
communication of signature whistles indicates that a facility for shared 
social calculus is a distinct possibility for these animals.
However, all cetaceans differ from humans in one important 
respect: without an equivalent of manual proficiency, making and using 
complex tools is impossible. Dolphins do conduct joint enterprises for 
hunting; they turn- take when consuming prey that they have worked 
together to corral and trap; males work together to impress or coerce 
females; pods work together to protect their young from sharks or to hunt 
and kill sharks; but there is only one good instance recorded of tool use. 
Dolphins in Shark Bay, Australia, have been recorded using sponges to 
protect their rostra while foraging for buried prey (Patterson and Mann 
2011). It is a rather basic example of tool use: the tool does not enhance 
the foraging itself, but only makes it less uncomfortable; and the tool 
whErE DiD soCial CalCulus CoME froM? 103
  
does not need to be modified for use. There is no evidence of tool cur-
ation  – but the sponge is often worn away in the foraging activity, so 
there is often nothing to curate. We can say that this tool- use is cultural 
because, based on current observations, it is limited to a single group; but 
we cannot yet say whether it is an emic or etic activity.
What do all these examples of social cognition tell us about our own 
social calculus? The birds tell us that social cognition is not limited to 
just primates or even just mammals; it seems to be a common response 
to social living for a non- eusocial species. Naked mole rats tell us that 
eusociality is not limited to the insect clade, but it always seems to rely on 
a suppression of individual agendas; this makes social calculus pointless 
for a fully eusocial species. Meerkats show us that there is more than 
one way to be pseudo- eusocial: humans seem to rely on eusocial levels 
of cooperation and joint enterprise while retaining non- eusocial levels 
of individualism; meerkats reverse this equation, with disindividuation 
approaching eusocial levels while their cooperative behaviour is limited. 
Bottlenose dolphins tell us that complex social modelling does not rely 
on tool use, tool- making or other technological ability. We cannot know 
whether dolphins are sharing social calculus models, so we cannot know 
whether they have social self- models; but shared signature whistles and 
communicative complexity indicate that it is possible we are not the only 
self- modelling species on the planet; and, if that is the case, we can say 
that self- modelling may be necessary for human culture to exist, but it is 
not exclusive to humans.
Different species have taken different routes to socialisation, 
and the social modelling they use is accordingly varied. For humans, 
social calculus is the key to understanding the relationships around us; 
but social calculus is only one of many ways of handling relationships 
with conspecifics. Social calculus gives us the ability to model a net-
work of complex social relationships; but it is cognitively costly and 
not necessarily the most efficient method for managing social organisa-
tion: eusocial animals don’t need it, and it is not a necessary requirement 
or product of pseudo- eusociality. As an unlikely outcome of what must be 
an evolutionary process, it needs a convincing evolutionary origins story.
Machiavellianism
The story of social modelling does not start with genus Homo, or even 
with our precursor clade, genus Australopithecus. We need to start with 
an unknown ancestor, the first species in the human lineage capable 
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of Machiavellian intelligence. This is a trait we share with our closest 
relatives, so the proposed unknown ancestor is likely to be quite ancient, 
a precursor of chimpanzees and bonobos as well as humans. As a proxy 
for this creature we can look at modern chimpanzees and bonobos, but 
we need to remain aware that a modern animal is not a precursor animal, 
or even necessarily the best exemplar for a precursor animal.
Chimpanzees and bonobos seem to be the current Machiavellian 
masters; but what does that mean? In the hypothesis set out in this book, 
it means that they are capable of modelling the Relationship- A associ-
ations around them: they maintain cognitive models of the members of 
the social group in which they live, and the relationships they have with 
those others in the group. It is now 40 years since Premack and Woodruff 
(1978) addressed the question of whether chimpanzees have ToM, and 
they proposed a series of skills that could be tested to provide evidence 
for or against its presence. Could chimpanzees understand that other 
individuals had different knowledge and beliefs? Could they understand 
the difference between knowing something and guessing something? 
Could they differentiate lies from truths? Could they separate ‘pretend’ 
from ‘real’? And finally, do chimpanzees have self- knowledge? Premack 
and Woodruff recognised that some of these are skills that even humans 
possess only erratically; and self- knowledge is, as we have seen so far, 
a slippery concept that may involve neither a known self nor a self to 
be known.
Nevertheless, a lot has been discovered about chimpanzee 
awareness since Premack and Woodruff’s study, providing both direct 
and indirect answers to their questions. In terms of cognitive similarity, 
Call and Tomasello (1999) showed that chimpanzees have no problems 
understanding that other individuals have beliefs about third parties, but 
they have difficulty understanding that those beliefs can be false:  they 
cannot fully comprehend that another individual does not automatically 
know what they themself know. In this respect they are like human 2- 
year- olds, who have similar problems understanding what others know; 
but they are unlike human 4- year- olds, who are usually adept at attrib-
uting false belief appropriately.
Mercader et al. (2007) provided evidence that chimpanzees make 
stone tools for specific purposes, as our ancestors did; and the cognitive 
skills for physical modelling that allowed us to enter the human stone 
age are present in chimpanzees, too. Bianchi et al. (2013) compared the 
brain development of chimpanzees with that of humans and found that 
we follow a similar developmental path:  not only do the two types of 
brain develop to the same schedule, they seem to have a similar capacity 
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for plasticity, which is vital for learned processes like social calculus. 
However, while the schedule may be the same, the timescale is not; and 
longer timescales mean that human brains develop more than chim-
panzee brains.
In terms of social communication, Slocombe and Zuberbühler 
(2005) looked at chimpanzee food grunts (produced when a chimpanzee 
is eating), and they identified subtle variations that seem to indicate to 
others the type of food being eaten; these calls are, therefore, function-
ally referential, informing listening chimpanzees about food sources that 
others have found and what they should be looking for themselves. In 
another study, Davila- Ross et al. (2011) looked at laughter, and showed 
that chimpanzees’ replicated laughter  – laughing at others’ laughter  – 
is different from their spontaneous laughter; they seem to differentiate 
between being amused and being entertained. Roberts and Roberts 
(2016) looked at the different communicative roles of grooming, gesture 
and vocalisation for chimpanzees in terms of social proximity. They found 
that there seems to be a hierarchy of signals, with grooming reserved for 
simultaneous social and physical proximity, gesture being used mainly 
for physical proximity, and vocalisation (especially synchronised calls) 
being used for social proximity. This resembles the way humans use the 
different communication channels of grooming, gesture and vocalisation.
In terms of social awareness, Carpenter and Tomasello (1995) 
conducted imitative learning tasks with human children, chimpanzees 
raised in a human environment (commonly described as enculturated 
animals) and chimpanzees raised by other chimpanzees (wild animals). 
They found that the enculturated chimpanzees behaved more like human 
children than their conspecifics. They concluded that ‘a human- like socio-
cultural environment is an essential component in the development of 
human- like social- cognitive and joint attentional skills for chimpanzees, 
and perhaps for human beings as well’ – or, to put it another way, what 
separates humans and chimpanzees is not our different cultural capaci-
ties, but our early exposure to human culture. Human socialisation is 
different from chimpanzee socialisation in that we have an evolutionary 
use for human culture; but that does not mean we are the only species 
able to operate successfully within human culture.
Call et  al. (2004) showed that chimpanzees can differentiate 
between humans who are able but unwilling to give them food and those 
who are willing but unable to do so: they persist in begging longer with 
the unable than with the unwilling. Lonsdorf et al. (2004) showed that, 
like humans, chimpanzee priorities are gendered:  females tend to pay 
greater attention to self- and other- supporting activities like feeding, 
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while males place a higher value on socialisation; the psychosocial gender 
differences are not highly marked, but they do seem to be common to 
both species. Webb et  al. (2017) showed that, in terms of consolation 
after conflict, different chimpanzees, like humans, have different person-
alities: some individuals console much more readily than others, and the 
‘maxi- consolers’ also seem to be more social.
Brosnan et  al. (2010) discovered another interesting comparison 
between chimpanzees and humans. We are both aware of inequity 
of reward, and we both react to it; however, chimpanzees react less 
extremely than humans, seeming to treat inequity as disappointing 
but expected. Humans seem to have a complex moral sense of fairness 
and egalitarianism, although with a wide range of individual variation 
(Artinger et al. 2014).
All of these comparisons add up to a conclusion that there is a 
genetic distance between genus Pan and genus Homo, but it is not as 
great as we used to believe: we are beginning to understand that, cog-
nitively, we share more with the species genetically closest to us than we 
once thought. Call and Tomasello (2008) have now reviewed the idea 
that chimpanzees have ToM, and concluded that it all depends on the 
accepted definition of ToM:
In a broad construal of the phrase ‘theory of mind’, then, the 
answer to Premack and Woodruff’s pregnant question of 30 years 
ago is a definite yes, chimpanzees do have a theory of mind. But 
chimpanzees probably do not understand others in terms of a fully 
human- like belief– desire psychology in which they appreciate that 
others have mental representations of the world that drive their 
actions even when those do not correspond to reality. And so in a 
more narrow definition of theory of mind as an understanding of 
false beliefs, the answer to Premack and Woodruff’s question might 
be no, they do not.
(Call and Tomasello 2008, 191)
Despite the fact that the study of both primates and ToM are rapidly 
evolving fields, this quote still holds true today. Does this mean, however, 
that chimpanzees are just a short step away from humanlike selfhood? 
Or does chimpanzee Machiavellianism provide a formidable barrier to 
self- modelling?
As far as we know, the social arithmetic of Machiavellian intel-
ligence is the dominant type of social modelling used by our closest 
relatives; and it seems likely that an evolutionary race toward 
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Machiavellian intelligence is what started our own evolutionary devel-
opment toward social calculus in the first place. An individual with a 
more sophisticated social modelling would be able to manipulate less 
sophisticated individuals to gain a reproductive advantage; and when 
the manipulation itself becomes sophisticated enough, we can label it 
Machiavellian. This raises the question as to why humans, who clearly 
use sophisticated social calculus communicatively as well as cognitively, 
seem to be less Machiavellian than chimpanzees and bonobos. We are a 
species accomplished in confabulation, so we clearly have the capacity 
to plot, dissemble and deceive. It seems, however, that we have taken 
Machiavellian intelligence in a new direction, allowing us to treat con-
fabulation in a nuanced and sophisticated way. The lie the receiver knows 
to be a lie is treated as an acceptable fiction, and the capacity to generate 
acceptable fictions (story- telling) is seen in human society as a valuable 
skill. The ability to conceal other truths within the lies is seen as an even 
more valuable skill, so the capacity to read a message on multiple levels 
becomes correspondingly useful. However, this multi- level communica-
tion also means that meaning in human language is seldom simple or 
direct.
The tragedy of the commons
The social manipulation that Machiavellian intelligence makes possible 
poses a problem for communication systems that rely on simple and direct 
signals:  if an individual has conscious control over a signal, then they 
can use it to lie. And, because signals in a non- language environment are 
usually simple and direct, to lie is to attempt to deceive. If the lie works, 
then the signal begins to lose meaning, as we saw in Chapter 3 with Kitui 
the vervet; and if the lie works often enough, then the signal becomes 
meaningless. This is the tragedy of the commons, originally proposed 
by Garrett Hardin (1968): a shared resource not subject to sanction, as 
is often the case with signalling, can be monopolised or subverted, thus 
advantaging the few – or the one – by disadvantaging the many.
Nature has its own way of preventing the tragedy of the commons 
in signalling:  the involuntary signal. If a signal can only be made 
when the context is right, and if there is no voluntary control over 
the signal, then it cannot be used deceptively. It is a simple solution 
common throughout nature  – and we do not need to search beyond 
modern humans for examples of difficult- to- fake involuntary signals. 
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Darwin himself (1897) noted the role that involuntary emotional 
expressions play in human social exchange, and how we share many 
of these involuntary signals with other species. However, Darwin was 
also interested in the wide range of involuntary signals that seem to be 
produced only by humans. These include: weeping (other animals get 
watery eyes, but they do not seem to relate external events back to the 
self or indulge in the self- absorbed process of treating future possible 
difficulties as current problems – and then getting upset about them); 
sulkiness (other animals express their current hormonal emotion, but 
only humans express their intellectual distaste at the current state of a 
relationship); a guilty expression (only humans seem to be concerned 
about any ill- effect their actions have had on conspecifics); and 
blushing (an unintended indicator to others of current unease or social 
discomfort). All these are signals that are difficult for us to suppress, 
and which inform others about our current cognitive mood. They are 
honest signs of our current psychological state.
However, involuntary signalling is not how human language works. 
Instead, we have three mechanisms to mitigate the effects of the tragedy 
of the commons in language:
1. We use other- identification (naming) to tag signals with their 
source. This transfers unreliability in the signal from the 
current signaller onto the original signaller; for example, in an 
A- Relationship- B- by- C signal, it is the original signaller’s (C’s) 
 reputation for reliability that is at risk, not that of the current 
signaller.
2. We sanction deceptive individuals to make deception unprofitable; 
and this sanctioning of the deceiver is carried out by the group, not 
just the deceived.
3. We use the versatility of multi- level signalling to encode decep-
tion on one level, while offering useful information on a different 
level. Linguistic truth is not an all- or- nothing representation of the 
world, it is nuanced.
All these mitigators rely on the availability of a language- like com-
munication system: the first relies on signal complexity, the second on 
reputation- sharing, and the third on complex semanticity. Behind them 
all is a social contract of trust: as signal- receiver, we provisionally trust 
the signal and the signaller. If, however, we detect deliberate and anti-
social deception, then we are ready and willing to sanction the signaller, 
even if the deception is aimed at another individual. The willingness 
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to trust is usually referred to as altruism, and the willingness to punish 
any deception (not just personal deception) has become known as altru-
istic punishment. Between them, these signal responses make antisocial 
deception costly for the deceiver.
Altruism
For decades after Darwin published On the Origin of the Species, many 
people believed it to be a treatise on ‘nature, red in tooth and claw’.1 
This understanding was emphasised by Herbert Spencer’s view that 
Darwinian biology could be summarised by the phrase ‘survival of 
the fittest’ (Spencer 1864, 444), rather than Darwin’s own  – more 
 moderate  – phrase, ‘descent with modification’ (Darwin 1859 [2001], 
123) (although Darwin later adopted Spencer’s phrase). Unfortunately, 
‘survival of the fittest’ was a somewhat inaccurate and emotive phrase 
that generated all kinds of religious proto- scientific attempts to show that 
Darwin was wrong (for example, Løvtrup 1987), or that humans were a 
special case in nature, or that humans had nothing to do with nature. And 
all of these attempts to discredit Darwinism were based on an obvious 
truism: human activity is not usually dominated by self- serving emotions, 
because humans cooperate in complex and mutually supportive ways. 
We now know that this high level of cooperation without personal gain, 
or altruism, does not disprove Darwinian evolution or distance humans 
from the rest of nature; it merely shows that Spencer’s dictum tells only 
part of the story.
Using just the bare bones of evolutionary theory, human cooper-
ation is indeed difficult to justify. In any species where descent with 
modification dictates which traits are passed to the next generation, 
Machiavellian intelligence would seem to be the pinnacle of social 
organisation. The individual who does not exploit the ignorance and 
weaknesses of their conspecifics will nonetheless have their own ignor-
ance and weaknesses exploited by others. Nice guys finish last and, more 
importantly, get fewer of their genes into the future. Over time, genes 
that enhance Machiavellian intelligence become more commonplace in 
the population, and the modifications produced by descent become more 
Machiavellian and less naively cooperative.
The reverse seems to have happened with humans. If our lineage 
had started out as Machiavellian as chimpanzees are now, then we must 
somehow have reined in our self- interest and enhanced our cooperative-
ness. There is now some evidence (Diogo et al. 2017) that the modern 
 
 
 
thE origins of sElf110
  
chimpanzee is not a good proxy for the common ancestor, and that both 
chimpanzees and humans diverged from a common ancestor that had 
more in common with bonobos. Of course, chimpanzees are not com-
pletely Machiavellian and we are not completely cooperative, and individ-
uals of both species vary quite widely in their socialisation; the possibility 
for a species to move up or down the cooperative scale certainly exists. 
Yet, somehow, the strategies that worked for chimpanzee ancestors did 
not work for our ancestors. There are many possible causes for this: envir-
onment, socialisation, diet, group size and reproductive strategies are all 
possibilities, and it is likely that becoming human involved more than 
one of them. Even technology could be implicated:  Dessalles (2014) 
points out that, once we had the capacity to make sharp stones that could 
be thrown, the reign of an alpha could easily be cut short by a good or 
lucky throw. To stay in control, you need allies, not dominance. With 
humans, we have to revise our ideas of what counts as ‘fittest’: altruism 
is as important as, or perhaps more important than, nature- red- in- tooth- 
and- claw competition.
Altruism does not disprove evolution, but it does require an evolu-
tionary explanation. Richard Dawkins’ Selfish Gene theory (1989) tells 
us that, at the level of individual strands of DNA, the capacity to repli-
cate must generate competition between strands for the raw materials of 
replication. When the strands combine to make a single- celled organism, 
there are two levels of competition: individual genes, or versions of genes, 
are in competition not just for themselves, they are competing in terms 
of their contribution to the organism. Those that improve the surviving 
and thriving of their organism are likely to replicate at a faster rate than 
those that do not. John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry (1995) have 
extended this ‘levels of competition’ model all the way up to inter- societal 
conflict; but they also show that cooperation is, at times, more effective at 
getting genes into the future.
So what causes altruism? We have already encountered some of 
the mechanisms in Chapter 2, in relation to sharing information. William 
Hamilton’s kin- selection theory (1964) was the first to describe an evo-
lutionarily coherent cause for altruistic behaviour: an individual should 
be willing to forego an advantage if two siblings or children gain equal or 
greater advantage; or if four grandchildren or children of siblings gain 
equal or greater advantage; and so on. Kin- selection theory says that 
your child or sibling has half your genes, so their survival is worth the 
same to you as half of your own survival; so if dying will save three or 
more children or siblings, it’s worthwhile. Kin- selection theory provides 
a bleak but realistic explanation for altruistic behaviour, although it only 
works between related individuals.
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Hamilton (1964) also proposed that kin selection would favour 
the appearance of visible signs of relatedness, such as pelt markings or 
colours, or distinctive scents. These signs would identify close relatives, 
allowing a cheap shortcut around the costly alternative of cognitively 
maintaining a family tree. Dawkins (1989, 89– 90) labelled this ‘green- 
beard altruism’, but he dismissed it as unlikely: how probable is it that 
a single gene would both enhance altruism and provide a clear signal 
of relatedness? Not very, was his conclusion. However, the two genetic 
effects can be decoupled quite easily, so they do not require a single gen-
etic change or even a single gene to be involved. Recognition of relatives 
serves many functions, not least in preventing incest. There is clearly a 
disadvantage in incestuous reproduction (Lumsden and Wilson 1980), 
and individuals who are able to recognise, and avoid reproduction with, 
close relatives will have more successful offspring than those who do not. 
The green beard can therefore already be in place before kin- selection 
altruism evolves; and it helps us to see how altruism can be both paro-
chial and generous.
The second coherent solution was reciprocal altruism, as proposed 
by Robert Trivers (1971). This says that, if favours are offered to other 
individuals to form long- term relationships, then each favour raises the 
worth of the giving individual to the receiving individual. If the favour 
is returned at a later time, then the two individuals enter a virtuous 
cycle where they each continually raise their worth to each other, chan-
ging engagement to friendship, and friendship to alliance. If the favour 
is not returned, then the worth of the receiver to the giver is reduced, 
and no further favours are likely to be offered. Unlike kin selection, 
reciprocal altruism is not expressible as a simple mathematical formula; 
but that may be to its advantage. Kin selection assumes a knowable 
future, which makes it unrealistic; reciprocal altruism involves specu-
lation about alternative futures, which is much closer to what humans 
actually do. However, neither of them captures the indirect reciprocity 
that we humans rely on as a foundational feature of our culture:  we 
help each other because we can, not because we expect a return on our 
investment.
Two further solutions have attempted to address this. The first is 
indirect reciprocity, the idea that we do good deeds to enhance our repu-
tation (Nowak and Sigmund 2005); reputation acts as a general group 
‘currency’, meaning that favours may be returned indirectly by others 
in the group, not directly by the original receiver. Indirect reciprocity, 
however, merely transfers the mystery from altruism to reputation. It 
does not explain why maintaining, and acting on, a cognitive register of 
reputations should become a stable evolutionary strategy (although it 
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clearly did: without it, the honest sharing of social models becomes vir-
tually impossible).
The second solution is costly signalling (Zahavi and Zahavi 1997), 
which holds that every favour offered carries the signal that the giver can 
do these favours without compromising their own fitness; favours are not 
currency, they are ostentatious gift- giving. Marcel Mauss (1950) found 
that this was a common feature of pre- Columbian cultures in North- West 
America, and ostentatious generosity remains a tool of social elites in 
modern capitalist economies. Costly signalling was originally proposed 
as a mechanism to explain the evolution of ostentatious displays like the 
peacock’s tail, a problem of evolutionary fitness that perplexed Darwin; 
but it was soon realised that it also explains a lot about the extremes of 
human altruism. In costly signalling we have a theory that models human 
behaviour, and which solves the problem of how altruism can occur 
without pre- existing cooperation: costly signalling promotes cooperative 
behaviour, reciprocal altruism and reputation- building without relying 
on any of them to pre- exist. It also explains how altruism could have 
emerged out of self- serving behaviour. However, costly signalling does 
not explain how the human attitude to non- cooperation evolved:  our 
complex moral sense of fairness and egalitarianism acts as a back- stop to 
arrest back- sliding non- cooperative behaviours. It does not always work 
(as illustrated by the election of Adolf Hitler in 1933, and continuing 
popular support for many corrupt politicians around the world), but it 
does inevitably impose itself as social moral outrage builds in a group 
against an individual’s excesses. It may take generations before a suf-
ficient ‘head of steam’ builds, but humans do seem willing to address 
social inequalities in ways that no other species does. We punish our 
social transgressors in an organised fashion, labelling the transgressions 
in ways that would be incomprehensible to other species:  hypocrisy, 
bullying, greed, treachery, sociopathy … the list goes on. This willing-
ness to punish transgressors is a key step in the development of a willing-
ness to share social models.
Altruistic punishment and free- riders
Taking revenge against the perpetrator of an act that disadvantaged you 
is known in the study of altruism as punishment. Chimpanzees have been 
seen to take personal revenge for actions that directly disadvantaged 
them (Jensen et  al. 2007), so punishment of individuals by wronged 
individuals is not a novel feature of being human. However, humans 
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also work together to punish miscreants, even where only some of the 
group have been disadvantaged; this is something that chimpanzees do 
not do (Riedl et al. 2012). Yet even this level of altruistic punishment is 
not sufficient for our species: we take things one step further and punish 
those who do not themselves cooperate in punishing miscreants. We 
even have the pejorative term, freeloader, for non- cooperators in both 
joint enterprises and joint punishment (although a more neutral term, 
free- rider, is used in academic literature). It seems that humans are not 
just altruistic, we are also enforcers of altruism: we take a moral stance 
not only against those who flout the social compact but also against 
those who attempt to avoid their socially imposed duty to sanction the 
flouters.
An example of this sanctioning of free- riders occurred in Britain 
at the start of the 1914– 18 conflict: some women began pinning white 
feathers to the jackets of men who were not in uniform, to shame them 
into joining up. This was before conscription imposed a legal duty to 
enlist, and it caused many men who were needed on the home front to 
‘run away to war’. However misguided, the white feather encapsulated 
the view that those not directly punishing the enemy were somehow 
social free- riders, and therefore deserved to be punished themselves.
So how does a species become so willing to punish both non- 
cooperators and free- riders? Several computer simulations have been 
produced since the turn of the century, showing how altruistic pun-
ishment could arise as a species- wide capacity. Avilés (2002) showed 
that free- riding is a risky business, and only works if it remains below 
a critical threshold. She found that, when it is rare, it becomes more 
common; but, as it reduces the capacity of the group to compete with 
other groups, it cannot exceed a critical threshold without causing 
the group to collapse. This reduces the reproductive success of the 
free- riders, limiting their genetic access to the future. Free- riding only 
works as a parasitic strategy, and it relies on the majority of others not 
adopting it.
Fehr and Gächter (2002) showed that altruistic punishment is 
not just conducive to cooperation, it is necessary if cooperation is not 
to be overrun by cheats and free- riders. In support of this, Gardner 
and West (2004) showed that kin selection works against non- partisan 
 cooperation, and relatedness may actually get in the way of effective 
altruistic punishment. Instead, altruistically punishing relies on 
 cooperation at the group level to remain a stable strategy; at the group 
level, the costs of punishing are shared and therefore individual costs 
are reduced, which favours group- level cooperation over individual 
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altruistic punishers. Boyd  et  al. (2010) showed that this sharing of 
costs means that punishment can proliferate in a cooperating group; 
and Fowler (2005) found that, in a mixed population of contributors, 
defectors and nonparticipants, the appearance of altruistic punishers led 
to their dominating the population. Additionally, he found that punish-
ment does not work unless the net payoff for the population is positive.
However, all these simulations can only show what should logically 
happen. What is the situation in the actual world? Riehl and Frederickson 
(2016) looked at the evidence from a range of cooperative animals and 
noticed that cheating and punishment are both uncommon. Instead, 
they found that uncooperative animals are usually not cheating to gain 
advantage, but just to survive: they do not cooperate because they do not 
have the spare resources to cooperate. However, failure to cooperate in 
a cooperative species is likely to disadvantage the non- cooperator even 
further:
Contrary to what is typically assumed, not cooperating is rarely an 
adaptive strategy for social animals; when cooperation generates 
direct or inclusive fitness benefits, a failure to cooperate lowers an 
animal’s lifetime fitness. In these societies, cheating is not select-
ively favoured in the first place and non- cooperative phenotypes 
may be maintained only in mutation- selection balance. If cheaters 
are therefore rare, they are unlikely to impose much selection for 
punishment. These results are consistent with recent theory, which 
has increasingly shown that punishment— even in humans— 
can be evolutionarily stable only under limited circumstances, 
and that cooperation is unlikely to evolve when cheating is truly 
advantageous.
(Riehl and Frederickson 2016, 9)
In this situation, punishment of cheats is overkill and has 
disadvantages for the group. Where altruistic punishment does exist, it is 
usually punishment for a positive action, not for negative inaction. Riehl 
and Frederickson propose that altruistic punishment of active cheats, 
non- cooperators and free- riders evolves separately in each case, and that 
the evolution of punishment probably precedes the evolution of cooper-
ation. The occurrence of all three in a single species is, therefore, quite 
unusual. Yet, somehow, humans have moved from vengeful individual 
punishment to organised altruistic punishment of cheats (using a sense 
of fairness), of non- cooperators (using social morality) and of free- riders 
(using cultural prescription).
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From altruistic punishment to social model- sharing
The path from vengeful to altruistic punishers likely involved many small 
steps, most of which we have no hope of recreating or understanding. 
However, three known steps do stand out, and between them they tell a 
cohesive – albeit not comprehensive – story of our route toward enforced 
cooperation.
The first of these steps is vigilant sharing, as proposed by Erdal 
and Whiten (1994). Looking for an evolutionary explanation for human 
cooperation, they proposed that the first step, the shift from vengeful 
individual punishment to organised altruistic punishment of cheats, was 
a product of counter- dominance (‘nobody should get more than me’); if 
enough me’s felt that you were hogging a resource, then they would gang 
up on you to restore the balance. The Darwinian pursuit of self- interest 
by everyone, accompanied by the shifting alliances of Machiavellianism, 
means that no individual can hope to preserve exclusive access to a 
resource, so sharing becomes the sensible default position. If I  don’t 
share, the others gang up on me and I lose the resource I was trying to 
dominate, and perhaps more; if I  share but keep a fair proportion for 
myself, the others will have enough reason to leave me alone with my 
portion. Nothing un- Darwinian needs to be invoked for this to be a stable 
scenario: being fair is being fit; so survival of the fittest collocates with 
survival of the fairest, and a sense of fairness therefore becomes part of 
our genome.
The second step, punishment of non- cooperators, was originally set 
out as reverse dominance by Boehm (1993), ironically in a paper that 
Erdal and Whiten were responding to in their 1994 paper. In a response to 
Erdal and Whiten’s vigilant- sharing model (see Erdal and Whiten 1994, 
replies), Boehm makes a distinction between earlier foraging groups, for 
whom vigilant sharing would be necessary to preserve group cohesion, 
and later large- game hunting groups, where cooperation in the hunt 
created a new level of socialisation. Boehm expanded on reverse domin-
ance in 1999, arguing that it does not represent the removal of hierarch-
ical tendencies, but is instead the equalisation of hierarchy: everyone is 
kept at the same level by group- enforced sanctions. If the sanctioning 
mechanism breaks down then hierarchy will reappear. This makes it a 
social mechanism and gives it more reach than vigilant sharing. Imagine 
a group that share vigilantly, thus ensuring any windfalls in their foraging 
efforts help everyone; now imagine an individual who never forages as 
long, or as effectively, as the others. This individual is not a complete 
cheat, attempting to subvert the shared enterprise; they are a partial 
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non- cooperator, attempting to use the shared enterprise for personal 
advantage. But how can they be policed by vigilant sharing alone? They 
are sharing, and forcing others to share with them; just less of the former 
and more of the latter.
In large- game hunting, the individuals who hold back are 
more obvious, and the disadvantage for the rest of the group is more 
stark: large- game hunting is dangerous. Reverse dominance can be used 
to police this non- cooperative behaviour because it is not about being 
left behind in the share- out, it is about being socially moral in the shared 
enterprise. With reverse dominance, the individual’s agenda ceases to be 
the primary source of their fitness; instead, the cohesion and cooperation 
of the group – first the hunting group and later the social group – make 
commitment to the group agenda the key fitness indicator for the indi-
vidual. The reproductive success of the individual relies, in large part, on 
the success of the group’s shared enterprises.
The third step in our route toward enforced cooperation is the stran-
gest of all: self- sacrifice. How can self- sacrifice ever be a viable and evo-
lutionarily stable strategy? Surely the self- sacrificers are removing their 
genes from the future, so how does a genetic tendency to self- sacrifice 
get off the ground? The 10 million military casualties in World War I and 
the 27 million in World War II (more than 1% of the world population at 
the time) show that self- sacrifice is not the vanishingly rare phenomenon 
that evolutionary calculus indicates it should be.
Self- sacrifice represents the extreme end of altruism, the max-
imal version of the small, everyday sacrifices (giving resources, time and 
knowledge to strangers without expectation of a quid pro quo) that are 
not just frequent, they are a commonplace expectation in our human 
social systems. Like everyday altruism, self- sacrifice is unexpected in 
evolutionary terms; but it is not unknown, and it is common in eusocial 
species. Anyone who has witnessed a conflict between two ant colonies 
will know the suicidal tenacity that individual ants display in defence of 
their nests. However, the reason that individual ants are willing to sacri-
fice their lives is because it is not their life that gets their genes into the 
future, it is that of their queen; this is not the case for Homo sapiens, who 
are usually individually fertile.
We have only recently begun to look at the human psychology 
of self- sacrifice as non- aberrant behaviour, and what we are finding is 
that sociality, morality and culture provide an overlay to human genetic 
imperatives; it is almost as if we had a dispassionate self, allowing us to 
treat our Actual self as an insignificant factor in being a self. Huebner 
and Hauser (2011) look at self- sacrifice in terms of a variant of the 
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trolley problem, a hypothetical dilemma that requires a subject to choose 
between inaction, which will kill five people, and action, which will kill 
one person. The basic problem is that a runaway trolley (tram) is going 
to kill five people who are on the track, unless it is diverted; but if it is 
diverted, it will kill one person on the alternative track. The dilemma is, 
should you divert the trolley? There are variants of this problem, and 
the one Huebner and Hauser are interested in involves a choice between 
inaction (five anonymous people die), self- preserving action (one 
anonymous person dies) or self- sacrifice (the subject dies by throwing 
themself in front of the trolley, thus stopping it). They looked at a folk- 
morality scenario (the choice that people believe others should make) 
and a self- sacrifice scenario (the choice an individual should make when 
their own life is part of the equation). In the folk- morality scenario, 18.7 
per cent believed inaction was best, 43 per cent judged that the lone 
stranger should die, and 38.3 per cent thought the choosing individual 
should sacrifice themself. In the self- sacrifice scenario, 18.2 per cent 
chose inaction, 48 per cent chose the lone stranger, and 33.7 per cent 
chose to sacrifice themself.
The response to a hypothetical case may not be a good indicator of 
what would happen in a real case, and the difference between hypothesis 
and reality is probably much greater in the self- sacrifice scenario than 
in the folk- morality scenario. So the responses do not really inform us 
about self- sacrifice itself; but they do indicate the moral stance we take 
about self- sacrifice: a third of the population may not actually be willing 
to sacrifice themselves to save strangers, but they do seem to have a dis-
passionate self that believes they should be willing to do so.
A similar study by Sachdeva et al. (2015) looked at a variation of 
the trolley problem, in which the trolley is stopped by either throwing a 
person off a bridge over the track, or throwing yourself off. It offers the 
same choice between inaction, self- preserving action and self- sacrifice. 
The study was cross- cultural, pitching US students against Indian and 
Iranian students; and it found that people from the USA were more likely 
than the other nationalities to see self- sacrifice as preferable to other- 
sacrifice – which does not indicate the people in the US are braver, only 
that they think they should be seen to be so. However, unlike Huebner 
and Hauser, Sachdeva et al. found that subjects were more likely to sac-
rifice themselves rather than the other when the problem was expressed 
from a first- person perspective; and, contrary to the logic of kin- selection 
theory, self- sacrifice was much more popular than relative sacrifice.
Atran and Ginges (2012) looked at the role of religion in the def-
inition of self and self- sacrifice. They found that religious adherence 
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seems to enhance the worth of fellow adherents, and therefore increases 
the likelihood of self- sacrifice to support the in- group. However, it also 
decreases the worth of (dehumanises) out- group individuals, and it 
increases mistrust and conflict. Atran and Ginges observe that ‘moralizing 
gods emerged over the last few millennia, enabling large- scale cooper-
ation, and sociopolitical conquest even without war’; but if the timescale 
is only millennia, then religious self- sacrifice has not had enough time to 
become fixed in the genome, and it must therefore be working with pre- 
existing self- sacrificial tendencies. Their conclusion is apposite: the role 
of religion in self- sacrifice needs to be studied further and clarified; but 
they do not themselves provide much further clarification on what is a 
topic of vital interest in the modern world.
Dugas et  al. (2016) looked at an internal measure of self- worth 
rather than an external hypothetical, or group- defined, measure of self- 
worth: a person’s sense of significance, as measured by the Meaning in 
Life Questionnaire (Steger et  al. 2006).2 In six separate experiments, 
they found that individuals were more willing to self- sacrifice when 
their sense of significance was low, and that self- sacrifice was seen as a 
way to increase sense of significance. They also found that self- sacrifice 
increased a sense of significance more than pleasurable experiences did.
Prinz (2006) shows that there is an important link between human 
moral judgements and emotion:  humans seem to be genetically pro-
grammed to feel bad when they are violating the cultural norms of their 
society. Humans are not constrained to behave in a selfless way just by 
their need for socialisation; over time, the constraint has, itself, become 
genetically fixed in the species. Being bad (opposing the cultural norms 
with which we are faced) makes us feel bad  – as most toddlers under-
stand. This means that, genetically, it is very difficult for most humans to 
be dispassionate over moral matters; which is odd, as the cultural norms 
are not themselves genetically programmed. Everett (2016) makes the 
argument that the range of human cultures is remarkably wide – so wide 
that human culture is of a different order to that of other animals; this 
means that the possibility of any particular cultural norm becoming gen-
etically fixed in the species is vanishingly small. However, as Prinz shows, 
the will to abide by whatever rules a culture imposes on an individual 
does seem to be innate; which means that, if a culture encourages self- 
sacrifice, then the individuals in that culture will feel impelled to con-
form and to self- sacrifice; but if it does not, they will not.
What these studies tell us is that self- sacrifice seems to be an emic 
reaction to expectations enshrined in the cultural self- model – the ideal 
self we are expected by others to strive to be. Whether it is adherence 
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to cultural morality, as Huebner and Hauser and Sachdeva et al. argue, 
being demonstrably devout, as Atran and Ginges propose, or proving 
your worth to the group, as Dugas et al. say, the dispassionate self seems 
to make etic self- preservation negotiable for humans.
So where did social calculus come from?
We have covered a lot of ground in this chapter, in terms of genetic 
biology, evolutionary time and human evolution itself; but have we got 
any closer to the origins of social calculus? It depends on what we see as 
significant in human social calculus: if we are only interested in the cogni-
tive capacity to model others in our group and the relationships between 
them, then a lot of this chapter may have been a waste of time. We started 
by finding that social calculus as cognition may not be limited to humans, 
and ‘before us’ could have been sufficient explanation for how and when 
social calculus evolved. However, it is the sharing of social calculus that 
makes us interesting as a species, and that story takes a lot more telling. 
From Machiavellian intelligence, through vigilant sharing and reverse 
dominance, and on to self- sacrifice, we are beginning to understand the 
path we took to our particularly human recipe of pseudo- eusociality. It is 
like a jigsaw in which all the corners have been found, and we’re getting 
a lot of the edges in place. We may not yet see all of what it means to be 
human, but we have framed the picture; and we are completing more of 
the puzzle and revealing more of the story every day.
Notes
 1. Taken from Alfred Lord Tennyson’s poem, In Memoriam A. H. H., canto 56. Published 1850, 
nine years before Darwin’s On the Origin of Species.
 2. See www.michaelfsteger.com/ ?page_ id=13 for a copy of the questionnaire.
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The Language of Self
‘Come, there’s no use in crying like that!’ said Alice to herself, 
rather sharply; ‘I advise you to leave off this minute!’ She generally 
gave herself very good advice (though she very seldom followed 
it), and sometimes she scolded herself so severely as to bring tears 
into her eyes; and once she remembered trying to box her own ears 
for having cheated herself in a game of croquet she was playing 
against herself, for this curious child was very fond of pretending to 
be two people. ‘But it’s no use now,’ thought poor Alice, ‘to pretend 
to be two people! Why, there’s hardly enough of me left to make one 
respectable person!’
(Lewis Carroll 1865, Chapter 1: ‘Down the Rabbit- Hole’)
In 1871, Charles Darwin published The Descent of Man, and Selection in 
Relation to Sex, the second book of his evolutionary duology. In this book, 
he set out to show that humans, with all their cultural accoutrements, 
descended from ape ancestors. He took the view that we should expect 
no great novelty in human cultural tools – including language, despite 
its apparent difference from other communication systems in nature. 
Darwin proposed a series of routes from natural sound- making to mean-
ingful language- making: imitation, both of the sounds of other animals 
and of things, and by replication of physical actions (such as waving), 
but using the tongue and mouth; emotional sounds; and the sounds of 
work and play (Darwin 1874). Jespersen (1922, 114– 17) later dismissed 
these as insufficient explanations, and they have become known as the 
bow- wow, ding- dong, ta- ta, pooh- pooh, yo- he- ho and la- la theories of 
language origins. They all remain possible routes to language, but none 
has yet been evidenced beyond the level of hypothesis.
Charles Hockett (1960) made the first modern attempt to iden-
tify what made human language different from other communication 
 
thE languagE of sElf 121
  
systems, and he devised a set of 13 (later 16) design features of communi-
cation. The first 13 features were:
• A vocal- auditory channel, or speaking and listening (1); broadcast 
transmission and directional reception (2); and transitoriness or 
rapid fading (3):  we now recognise that these are useful but not 
necessary for language, or for any communication system.
• Interchangeability (4): we can receive as well as transmit.
• Total feedback (5); and specialisation (6):  speakers can control 
their speech because language is communicative and intentional.
• Semanticity (7); and arbitrariness (8): sounds have meanings, but 
the sound– meaning correspondence is arbitrary.
• Discreteness (9):  small differences in sound can represent big 
differences in meaning, and vice versa.
• Displacement (10): speech can refer to non- present events, treating 
the irreal as real.
• Productivity (11): language allows the creation of novel utterances 
to represent new ideas.
• Traditional transmission (12):  language is a negotiated conven-
tion; language and culture are intertwined.
• Duality of patterning (13):  meaningful messages are made up 
of several distinct meaningful units (words and morphemes), 
which themselves are made up of distinct but meaningless units 
(phonemes).
The last three design features were added by Hockett in 1963:
• Prevarication (14): language can be used to deceive.
• Reflexiveness (15): language can be used to talk about language.
• Learnability (16): language is teachable and learnable.
Of these, Hockett initially believed that displacement, productivity, 
traditional transmission and duality of pattern were exclusive to language. 
He later added prevarication, reflexiveness and learnability to this exclu-
sive list, but then removed displacement, traditional transmission and 
prevarication. Unfortunately, this attempt to identify the specialness of 
language as a communication system relies on a belief that there is a spe-
cialness to be identified; this remains to be proved and, indeed, may not 
be the case. Of the four design features Hockett initially reserved to lan-
guage, we now know that honeybee communication uses displacement 
(von Frisch 1973), although not productivity, traditional transmission or 
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duality of patterning; but many primates are now known to have local 
cultures within their species, and they use traditional transmission to 
pass on their cultural memes (Horner et al. 2006). Looking at the other 
two original ‘exclusive to humans’ features, chimpanzees who have been 
taught to communicate with humans using a hybrid gesture system have 
shown spontaneous productivity in their signals (Savage- Rumbaugh and 
Lewin 1994), while prairie dogs (Slobodchikoff 2002)  and marmosets 
(Pomberger et  al. 2018)  have been found to use duality of patterning. 
Dolphin communication may use all four – at this stage we do not have 
enough evidence to know, but the indicators are positive (Herman and 
Uyeyama 1999). Of the final three additions, prevarication (decep-
tion) is common throughout nature (for example, Kirkpatrick 2011), 
and osmotic learning is common in mammals (Crockford et  al. 2004). 
This leaves reflexiveness, the status of which is unknowable because it 
is ill- defined – we cannot even say whether our own capacity to use lan-
guage to talk about language is truly reflexive or just a subset of model-
ling: when we appear to be using language to talk about language, are we 
really referring to language, or are we just making a model of language 
that we can talk about? The belief in grammar as a fixed rule system 
behind our utterances – among some linguists, at least – indicates this 
may well be so.
Wacewicz and Żywiczyński (2014) indicate that Hockett’s 
problems with his design features stem from his treatment of language 
as an identifiable ‘thing’, with the design features as components or 
subsystems of the ‘thing’. This misses the point that language, like any 
communication system, is a cognitive tool for achieving objectives, and 
it only remains an effective system while it continues to achieve those 
objectives. Just as a description of a screwdriver tells you nothing about 
the vital role of screws in woodworking, so a reductive description 
of language ignores its most important function:  it is a way of doing 
things, and the things that get done are more important than how they 
are done.
Daniel Everett (2017) adds a 17th entry to Hockett’s list – or, per-
haps, it would be fairer to say that Everett’s single characteristic underlies 
the other 16. Everett calls this characteristic:
‘underdeterminacy’  – saying less than what is intended to be 
communicated and leaving the unspoken assumptions to be figured 
out by the hearer in some way. Underdeterminacy has always been 
part of language.
(Everett 2017, 3)
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Underdeterminacy is a term he borrowed from Pragmatics (for 
example, Carston 2002, Chapter 1), but he uses it to make the case that 
language is not about what is said, but about what is meant. Any story 
about the origins of language has to accommodate the fact that language 
communication is not a series of unconnected utterances, but a series of 
ongoing relationships between people; and, as the relationships develop, 
they become more interpersonal and contextual – and the communica-
tion in the relationship becomes more underdetermined. Memory does 
not just remember the past; it informs the present and directs the future.
What does this tell us about the role of self in language? So far in 
this book, the case has been made that awareness of self is not a neces-
sary outcome of large or complex brains; and it is not even a necessary 
outcome of complex social cognition. It is, however, a necessary outcome 
of the communication of complex social cognition. We don’t have a need 
for self- awareness until we are sharing models of other people’s selves, 
and only then when others are sharing their models of our own self 
with us. If my self- awareness emerges from my capacity to make a third- 
person model of myself, and my only need for a capacity to self- model 
is to incorporate your models of me into my social calculus, and you are 
only able to present your models of me to me because we share social 
calculus, then we would expect that the mechanism through which we 
share social calculus – a communication system that can reliably transmit 
the complexity of social calculus – will be replete with indicators of that 
complexity.
It is reasonable to assume, in the absence of a communication 
system specialised for social calculus, that we share social calculus 
through language. This is not to say that the sole function of language is 
the sharing of social calculus, or even that this was the original function 
of the precursor to language. The sharing of interpersonal information 
does require both cognitive complexity and a signalling system that can 
be segmented, differentiated and hierarchical; so social calculus certainly 
appears to be a strong contender for the origin of complex human lan-
guage; but that claim is not made here. All we are looking for here is evi-
dence of a close relationship between social calculus and language: the 
link between social calculus and language needs to be evident in the way 
the two of them work together.
So is there a relationship between language and the self- and other- 
modelling of social calculus? Alice’s conversation with herself indicates 
that there does seem to be. She shows a willingness to see herself as 
both speaker and listener in her monologue (‘I advise you to leave off 
this minute!’); she models herself as both a cultural she to advise and 
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a social herself to be advised; she further distances these two selves by 
giving the advised Social self the self- will to ignore the advising Cultural 
self, and the advising self the right of punishment over the self- willed 
advised self. Alice’s relationship with her models of her selves is simultan-
eously intensely human and – in the form expressed by Carroll – deeply 
strange. Her final utterance (‘there’s hardly enough of me left to make 
one respectable person!’) reflects the dilemma of self- modelling:  the 
modelled Cultural self is not a real self, but it is the best approximation 
we have to the respectable self we hope others believe us to be.
Pronominalisation and selfhood
One of the biggest effects of social modelling on language is likely to be the 
existence and nature of pronouns – the words that represent the speaker, 
the listener and anyone and anything else referenced. Dictionaries tell 
us that pronouns are substitutes for nouns and have very general refer-
ence  – they are not direct references to things or people, they refer to 
the communicative roles undertaken by things and people. But as we 
saw in Chapter 3, they are not merely a simplification of how we name 
things: they act as ad hoc labels in a discourse, allowing the interlocutors 
to reduce the utterance load at the cost of increased cognitive load. For 
instance, when we hear ‘you shouldn’t do that’, we engage in a fast com-
parison of the possible members of the group you, their current activity, 
the cultural expectation about that activity, and the intention of the 
speaker themself. Our reaction will be different depending on whether 
we are likely to be in or out of the group you, whether we feel our current 
action is or is not culturally acceptable, and whether we accept or reject 
the approbation of the speaker. The two pronouns you and that indi-
cate people and actions only indirectly, and their underdeterminacy 
means that the utterance is not just context- specific, it is also listener- 
specific: different listeners hearing the same utterance will have different 
objects in mind as you and that, and thus react to the utterance differently.
This situation is further complicated by the fact that pronouns are 
not a stable class across languages. If we look at the French version of 
the utterance, we find an immediate difference. Both ‘tu ne devrais pas 
faire ça’ and ‘vous ne devriez pas faire ça’ are valid translations, but they 
do not mean the same thing:  where English ‘you’ can refer to a single 
listener or several, French divides the pronoun into singular and plural 
forms. In Spanish, a different problem arises: ‘no deberías hacer eso’ and 
‘no deberíais hacer eso’ both retain the singular– plural distinction, but 
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the word for ‘you’ has disappeared. It is only indicated by the ending 
of the verb ‘should’. Spanish is called a pro- drop language because the 
pronouns are not obligatory, and are usually used only for emphasis (‘tú 
no deberías hacer eso’, ‘you [as a particular individual] shouldn’t do that’). 
However, as an example of underdeterminacy developing out of famil-
iarity, the construct ‘shouldn’t do that’ is also a fully acceptable English 
form. The term ‘pro- drop’ does not so much define a language as a way 
of using the language.
These two examples explore only a fraction of the differences 
between second- person reference in English, French and Spanish; and 
other languages add further complications to pronominal reference. 
Japanese is considered by some linguists to lack full pronouns, using 
noun phrases instead. For instance, a man often refers to himself in the 
first person using the word boku, which actually means male servant. 
This removes reference to the speaker from the utterance, turning it into 
a third- person reference:  ‘The servant is sorry’ rather than ‘I am sorry’. 
Watashi is used by both genders, and means something like ‘the pri-
vate self’. This referencing of the self in the third person is not unknown 
in English, and it is often done using the person’s name. For instance, 
Donald Trump’s first- ever tweet in 2009 was ‘Be sure to tune in and 
watch Donald Trump on Late Night with David Letterman as he presents 
the Top Ten List tonight!’ We even have a word, illeism, to describe self- 
referencing by name; but we tend to view it as either childish (under- 4s 
commonly refer to themselves by name) or as narcissistic and somehow 
dishonest. In Japanese, it is seen as polite self- effacement.
Malay is another language in which full pronouns seem to be 
absent, and others are referred to by their social role. A Malay- speaker 
has no need for I or you, because they always have a role they can use. For 
instance, when speaking with a grandparent, the grandparent is nenda to 
both speaker and listener, and the grandchild is cucunda. Pirahã, the lan-
guage documented by Daniel Everett, ‘has the simplest pronoun inven-
tory known, and evidence suggests that its entire pronominal inventory 
may have been borrowed’ (Everett 2005, 622). Everett describes it as 
having only three pronouns, for the three persons, and no differenti-
ation between singular or plural. The pronouns act as prefixes to verbs, 
although they can be used as stand- alone emphatics, too.
To be more accurate when talking about pronouns, therefore, we 
should refer not to pronouns but to a process of pronominalisation, which 
can be defined as reference using communicative roles rather than names 
or titles. The fact that a language has a mechanism for pronominalisation 
is more important than how that mechanism works. Nonetheless, I will 
 
 
 
thE origins of sElf126
  
attempt here to describe pronominalisation through the lens of English. 
It is not a perfect representation, but it is one that all readers of this 
version of the text should be able to understand.
Where names come from
Before we start on pronominal replacements for naming, we should per-
haps consider how naming itself developed. It seems natural that we all 
treat ourselves as named individuals, and that somehow our name acts 
as a proxy for our self in our dealings with others; but that is all evidence 
after the fact of naming. The truth is that, in important ways, our name 
is not our own. Most importantly, it is not generated by us but given to us 
by others. This may not be the case with dolphins, which seem to create 
their own signature whistles to identify themselves to others. When a 
dolphin uses another’s signature whistle to attract their attention, they 
use a variant of the whistle  – thereby identifying the call as a you ref-
erence rather than an I reference. We cannot know for certain whether 
this is what is really going on inside the dolphin’s head, but it does seem 
likely that the variations in the signature whistle are there to indicate 
to other dolphins whether the whistle is self- referring or other- referring 
(King et al. 2013).
Dolphins, unlike humans, seem to generate their own name- 
labels:  they have the advantage of being born with functional vocal 
equipment, and usually they have generated their own signature whistle 
within two months or less of their birth (Tyack 1997). They are also pre-
cocious at visual self- recognition, passing the Gallup mirror test at age 
7 months (Morrison and Reiss 2018). In contrast, human infants are born 
with underdeveloped vocal equipment, and the neurological systems 
controlling vocalisation are rudimentary. By 9  months, they recognise 
and respond to the name given to them by the adults around them, but it 
is not until around 18 months that they use it back to the adults (Holinger 
2012). Human infants only become recognisably self- aware, and able to 
pass the self- recognition mirror test, at around 18 months.
Humans do the exact opposite of dolphins. We do not develop 
our own name; we expect our parents, or the people caring for us, to 
label us soon after we are born. Recently, the apparatus of the state has 
also insisted that this name be registered promptly after birth, further 
emphasising the role of others in naming a human person. This registra-
tion requirement remains the case, despite the fact that the state itself 
now relies on exclusive alpha- numeric combinations, and not our names, 
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to label us  – and, of course, these alpha- numeric state labels are also 
given to us and not chosen by us.
Having been given a name by those around us, we then continue 
to receive different names throughout our lives. Some are role- specific, 
such as grandparent and grandchild; some are arbitrary labels, like pris-
oner KJ4609; and some are comments on our appearance or nature; 
but they all share the fact that they are given rather than self- selected. 
Our own attempts to re- label ourselves usually only work if they create 
a believable new persona for a new audience. For some people, this 
name- change is a vital part of their self- definition (and may be seen as 
social recognition of society’s definitional error); but in these cases, the 
old name is abandoned as a legitimate label for the individual. Authors, 
in contrast, often choose pseudonyms to distance their everyday self 
from their authorial self: the Reverend Charles Dodgson wrote as Lewis 
Carroll to preserve the gravitas required by his religious and mathemat-
ical work. Sometimes authors choose a pseudonym to differentiate their 
authorial selves: J.K. Rowling also writes detective books, but as Robert 
Galbraith. Actors may adopt new names for enduring characterisations 
they create, such as Barry Humphries’s alter ego Dame Edna Everage. 
Self- selected pseudonyms are also used extensively in selfish deception, 
which may be why discovered pseudonyms can generate a visceral shock 
reaction. However, most of the famous criminal pseudonyms are given by 
the media, not self- selected. Even the words ‘pseudonym’ or ‘alias’ show 
our approach to self- selected names: they are not real names, they are 
other names.
The human reliance on others to name us may be unique in nature. 
If selfness comes out of recognition of models of my self offered by others, 
then the capacity to recognise my self in their offered models is vital; 
and early acceptance of the social label agreed by others as referring to 
me – my name – becomes a vital part of self- recognition. Naming itself 
is not unique in nature, but nominalisation is such a fundamental part 
of human socialisation and communication that we need to be named 
at birth; we cannot wait for human individuals to offer their own names.
The internalisation of a group of sounds that others use to identify 
us, and the understanding that this group of sounds represents us, leaves 
us open to the idea that our name may be an effective proxy for us as an 
individual; it can be used to represent all aspects of our self. However, 
naming is also arbitrary: a name is not a unique way to represent an indi-
vidual, as we can have many contextual names. This, in turn, allows us to 
accept alternative labels, both for us and for others, in terms of our roles 
in group activities – and these include our roles in communicative acts. 
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We accept general labels (you, they) as referring to us via our relation-
ship with the speaker; and, as speaker, we offer a general label (me) to 
represent ourself- as- speaker.
The origin of they
Pronominalisation allows us to identify the three roles of speaker, lis-
tener and talked- about when we make an utterance; so pronouns only 
have a role in language when it is about sharing social models, social 
calculus or the relationships between people and objects. When social 
calculus is cognitive and uncommunicated, stable internal labels (or 
unshared nicknames) work perfectly well in modelling the individuals 
involved; and communication that is not about social relationships does 
not require the sender and receiver of the communication to be identified 
inside the communication. The only role for pronominalisation in non- 
social communication is to indicate that a previously referenced thing is 
still the object of interest; pronominalisation in this form is gestural, ver-
bally pointing to the object of interest, and may well have come directly 
out of a hybrid sound- and- gesture communication system (for example, 
McNeill 2012). The language- out- of- gesture debate is complex and still 
ongoing; but it is peripheral to the discussion here, so we can safely 
ignore it without taking sides. We can instead appeal to other reasons 
why the first instance of pronominalisation is likely to have been the third 
person (in English, he, she, it and the singular and plural they).
The first of these reasons is that third- person pronominal reference 
does not rely on communication, but can be completely cognitive. The 
simple, linear social calculus model of A- Relationship- B is sufficient to 
understand the emotions involved in that single pairing; but if I am to 
build a cognitive model of A as an individual, I have to bring together all 
the cognitive models of A that I have in my calculus, as in the example set 
out in Table 6.1.
The emergence of relationship modelling in the primate clade 
does not require a new neural architecture. Social calculus is, essen-
tially, a networked database with modelled individuals as nodes and 
relationships as links; and we already know that vertebrate brains work 
as neural networks (O’Connell and Hofmann 2012). This means that the 
Homo clade already had the cognitive architecture to hold social calculus 
as a network of nodes and links, rather than as lists. This makes adding 
or deleting nodes, and establishing, redefining and removing links, easy 
to do without disturbing the rest of the network. However, maintaining 
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a large neural network of relationships would be costly in terms of cog-
nition, so we cannot assume that it was equally available to all members 
of the Homo clade, or that it is equally available to all modern human 
individuals. There may even have been minimum levels of size and com-
plexity that brains had to reach before they became able to handle social 
calculus.
Social calculus works both ways:  it allows me to understand the 
relationships between individuals, and it allows me to understand an 
individual through their relationships with others and with me. However, 
the more I  need to understand A  as the container of a complex set of 
relationships, the more I need a shortcut for the concept ‘A’ (a nickname), 
and the more I need to group others into relational hierarchies around 
A.  I  can shortcut my list of A’s relationships with others by grouping 
those others in terms of their holistic relationship with A; and I can then 
modify my personal list of single- argument Relationship- A relationships 
with others by grouping them in terms of my relationship with A and A’s 
relationship with them. To express this linguistically, I can represent A as 
a third- person cipher (he, she, it or they singular), and a group of individ-
uals sharing a relationship with A becomes a third- person aggregate (they 
plural). Figure  6.1 shows how this could be represented. This process 
can be repeated for every person with whom I have a single- argument 
Relationship- A relationship, making the third- person cipher and aggre-
gate representations into reusable non- specific placeholder terms.
Because this process is cognitive and not necessarily communica-
tive, it can precede communicated language; and there does seem to be a 
precursor for this kind of social calculus in the socio- cognitive modelling 
of the chacma baboons we met in Chapter 2 (Cheney and Seyfarth 2007). 
Table 6.1 List of my social calculus relationships between A and others
A- Relationship(good)- B
A- Relationship(neutral)- C
A- Relationship(poor)- D
A- Relationship(good)- E
A- Relationship(poor)- F
A- Relationship(good)- G
A- Relationship(neutral)- H
A- Relationship(good)- I
A- Relationship(poor)- J
A- Relationship(neutral)- K
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These baboons live in a stable social hierarchy of individuals within fam-
ilies, giving deference to those above them to avoid confrontation, and 
expecting deference from those below them. The hierarchy is linear, 
because hierarchy between families takes precedence over hierarchy 
between individuals; and, by itself, it requires only simple Relationship- 
A modelling. However, baboons also learn from interactions between 
others in their group. They can remotely identify callers from their calls, 
and they pay more attention when, for instance, a threat bark from a 
subordinate is followed by a fear bark from a dominant. The hierarchy 
of families overlaying the individual hierarchy is also significant: after a 
confrontation, reconciliation with another member of the antagonist’s 
family counts as a reconciliation with the antagonist. It seems, therefore, 
that chacma baboons cognitively maintain a network of relationships 
between others, albeit filtered through Relationship- A modelling. 
However, there is no indication that they communicate this network to 
each other.
The second reason why third- person pronominals are likely to have 
preceded other pronominals is that this form of reference is not based 
on the roles of speaker and listener. The first and second person, when 
used communicatively in a discourse, are in constant flux, depending on 
who is speaking (because my me is your you and vice versa). But a third- 
person reference can remain constant throughout a discourse, regardless 
The SELF can predict a
Poor Relationship with
these individuals
(the friends of my
enemy are my enemies)
The SELF can predict a
Good Relationship with
these individuals
(the enemies of my
enemy are my friends)
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Fig 6.1 Suggested cognitive structure for the self’s model of the social 
calculus relationships
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of who is speaking: my Alf is the same Alf as your Alf, so my he is the 
same as your he while it refers to Alf. Third- person pronouns are meta- 
referential: they refer to a name or label that has been used previously 
in the discourse, and that name or label in turn refers to a real person or 
thing. So, once the name or label has been linked to a pronoun in a con-
versation, that link remains valid until replaced by a new link.
This also applies to cognition:  once a mental place- marker has 
been created to represent an individual, it can continue to be used in that 
role. In its basic form, this is nominalisation, as each individual is likely 
to be represented by a unique label. But in the social calculus form A- 
Relationship- B, both A and B are meta- referential: they are placeholders 
that can be filled by any nominalised label, which in turn refers to a cog-
nitive model of a real person or thing. This, once again, indicates that 
the cognitive modelling of third- person pronominals can precede its 
communicative usage. This is impossible for first- and second- person 
pronominals, because they are markers of the communicative act; they 
identify who is talking and who is being talked to, and have no cognitive 
meaning outside of communication.
The third reason why the third person is likely to have been the 
first instance of pronominalisation is that it is object- referring. While it 
is called ‘third person’, it is also ‘first thing’: where I and you are neces-
sarily communicative, and therefore have an animate and active role in 
the communication, the third  person is only a thing referred to – and, in 
the third person, people can be treated as inanimate things. The capacity 
to blur the distinction between animate and inanimate is enshrined in 
different ways in different languages. While languages like English pre-
serve some form of animate/ inanimate distinction (pronouns he, she, it), 
other languages like French do not (pronouns he, she). In the Basque lan-
guage, Euskera, in contrast, the proximity of the object or person is para-
mount (pronouns are represented by it [close], it [far] and it [between 
near and far]); like French, there is no animate/ inanimate distinction, 
but where French treats everything as animate, Euskera treats everyone 
and everything the same.
In cognition, distinguishing between animate, intentional beings 
and inanimate, passive objects would seem to be a useful capacity. 
Intentions, however, are only identifiable in terms of outcomes; and 
‘passive’ is an outcome that can be attributed to both animate and inani-
mate objects. Additionally, inanimate objects do not even need to be per-
sistent, they can be transient events with outcomes; and the nature of 
those outcomes can even challenge their inanimacy. A  lightning flash 
is just an event, but it can fell trees and kill people, which indicates an 
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apparent intention behind the event, and a possible being behind the 
intention. Identifying intention as a marker of animacy, and effect as a 
marker of intention, leads us to fallaciously reverse- link effect with inten-
tionality, and intentionality with animacy. Third- person pronominalisa-
tion, like many cognitive capacities, comes with costs as well as benefits.
They is, therefore, a cognitive event, the origin of which may pre-
cede the Homo lineage, and which may be ancient in the primate clade. 
Its role in coordinating sets of social calculus pairings makes it cog-
nitively valuable without communication:  it contains all the features 
required for communicative pronominalisation without needing to be 
communicated  – unlike the first- and second- person forms. It seems 
that, in terms of evolution, we may have long mislabelled our terms 
here:  the first-person form to be used by humans was actually the 
third- person form.
The origin of you and me
Social calculus uses third- person pronominalisation to provide meta- 
reference without any need to communicate it. In contrast, first- and 
second- person pronominalisation do not have any function before we 
begin communicating our social calculus (Edwardes 2014). They are 
not a basic feature of social calculus, but they do simplify the exchange 
of social calculus models that include the receiver, you, or the sender, 
me. They also allow the sender and receiver to recognise the privileged 
nature of two particular aspects of social calculus:  the they that is the 
current receiver of my signal, and the they that is the receiver of your 
signal.
For they, the cognitive concept was needed before, and therefore 
generated before, the communicative representation; but the commu-
nicative representation of you was needed before its cognitive concept 
became useful or necessary. Yet it is impossible for a communicative 
representation to exist without its cognitive concept; so what pre- existing 
cognitive concept was available to be pressed into service as the cogni-
tive concept you? The only clear candidate seems to be the cognitive con-
cept of they: you is a special case of they, a meta- meta- reference derived 
from the meta- referential value of they. The extra meta- level allows the 
internal short- form reference to an individual to include the communica-
tive role of that individual; they is a cognitive reference to a named other, 
or group of others; and you is a cognitive reference to a named other, or 
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group of others, which is the object of a communicative act. You is just a 
privileged form of they.
So when, after we began communicating our social calculus, 
did you appear as a communicable representation? If we see you as a 
privileged form of they, then the answer has to be: quite soon after social 
calculus began to be shared, and very soon after the first sharing of an A- 
Relationship- B construct in which the receiver of the construct is either 
A  or B.  When sharing information about third- person others, the rela-
tionship construct is not intimate to either the sender or receiver; it is 
information about things happening ‘out there’. But a relationship con-
struct that includes the receiver is only ‘out there’ for the sender – for the 
receiver, it is intimate and therefore privileged.
This leaves the problem of me, which is at the heart of this book. 
Just as you is a privileged form of they, so too is me: it is a meta- meta- 
reference derived from the meta- referential value of they. In this case, 
however, the extra meta- level allows the communicative short- form 
reference to be recognised as an internal cognitive representation of 
the individual themself; unlike you, what is being recognised is not 
a pre- existing element in the individual’s social calculus. When social 
calculus is just cognitive, the individual has no need for a model of 
me; the self is the unchanging and undefined centre of the calculus, 
the base on which the calculus is built. It is only when I am presented 
with someone else’s model of me that I need to acknowledge that there 
is a me to be modelled. This means that my cognitive model of me is 
not a product of perspicacious introspection, it is an amalgam of other 
people’s models of my self, a third- person representation of third- 
person representations which should not represent me in any sensible 
way, but which somehow do.
As the appearance of you and me must have been nearly simultan-
eous, the question of which came first is difficult to answer. The order of 
events works either way, because the shared you needs to be recognised 
by the receiver as me, and the shared me needs to be recognised by the 
receiver as you. Whichever came first, the appearance of the second from 
the first would have happened very quickly, and quite soon after social cal-
culus constructs were being exchanged. It is possible (and probably best) 
to treat the exchange of social calculus constructs and the beginnings of 
you and me as simultaneous. However, the cognitive consequences of the 
concepts of you and me are interrelated but different; and the effects, par-
ticularly in the case of me, are wide- ranging in defining our species, our 
self and our selfness.
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As we saw in Chapter  3, human cognition distinguishes between 
two types of human knowledge: etic facts, which are definitionally true 
but of which we are not necessarily consciously aware; and emic facts, 
which are true because we agree they are true (Brown 2004). Shared 
social calculus models are, themselves, emic facts, and their communica-
tion generates the emic facts of you and me. However, the emic fact of me 
relies on an internalised representation of someone else’s model of me; 
it is not me in any self- aware way, it is my awareness of your awareness 
of my selfhood. This makes it my third- person representation of my self, 
just another they model I can put into future what- if scenarios – including 
scenarios where my physical self does not survive. Yet the capacity to 
model my self into the future, and the capacity to model a future in which 
my model of my self no longer exists, somehow mitigates the very natural 
and visceral dislike of self- extinction. The ability to project my emic me 
into the future beyond my death is a very strange thing to be able to do. 
How can I cognitively visualise a world where I have no cognitive exist-
ence? And what is the evolutionary advantage of being able to do so? 
Recognition of the emic me may actually be a two- edged sword for the 
individual, in that the capacity for social self- modelling damps down our 
primate Machiavellian self- interest.
Self- modelling works backward in time, too:  the emic fact of me 
allows me to relate my current model of me to my memories of me, cre-
ating the impression of a continuous self that exists through time. I can 
also receive modelled memories and other stories from other people 
about times and places in which I have never existed; and I can relate my 
current model of me to those stories. I can be with Harold at Hastings as 
he takes one in the eye (an event that probably never happened, and cer-
tainly not in my experience); I can be on the steps with Sidney Carton as 
he does a far, far better thing than he has ever done; I can even be with 
our early ancestors as they evolved into modern humans. The emic me is 
more than just a placeholder for a cognitive model of the self, but it is less 
than recognition of the self itself: more than I think, but less than I am.
This dual deception of the emic me (that the modelled self explains 
the self, and that the modelled self is the self) gives us a more nuanced 
understanding of self- sacrifice. As we saw in Chapter 5, there is a ten-
dency to dispassionately see the self in our models of self- sacrifice as syn-
onymous with the self that is sacrificed; but this is not the case. It is easy 
to sacrifice the emic me because it ‘lives on’ (or at least has purported cog-
nitive existence) after death, and ‘existed’ before birth; it has a timeless 
quality that death cannot affect. In this cognitive environment, self- 
sacrifice becomes more than acceptable; it can even be a sought- after, 
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or valued, quality. We do not need to go as far as Martin Luther King Jr 
when he said, ‘if a man has not discovered something that he will die for, 
he isn’t fit to live’, but we probably do recognise a personal mental line 
beyond which death is preferable to living. Yet we also do not recognise 
the crossing of this mental line in others, treating suicide (especially in 
the West) as a foolish or bad choice (which, in evolutionary terms, but 
not in self- modelling terms, it is).
Here we are faced with a conflict between the two different emic 
me’s, the social self- model and the cultural self- model: for the Social self, 
the emic me, it is the costs and benefits to the is self- model that need to 
be assessed; for the Cultural self, it is the costs and benefits to the should 
be self- model that matter. These can be very different things; and there 
is always the etic subliminal evolutionary drive toward self- survival to 
be taken into account, too. In self- sacrifice, the social self- model and cul-
tural self- model seem to be working together against the evolutionary 
drive; in suicide, the social self- model is, by itself, against the cultural 
self- model and the evolutionary drive (at least, that is the case in cultures 
where suicide is morally frowned- upon). However, while the outcome of 
this three- way conflict is not easy to predict, the social self- model wins 
enough times to make suicide a recognisably human phenomenon.
The origin of possession and the possessive
Pronominalisation in many languages also gives us the power to extend 
our umbrella of selfhood to include non- self objects:  things that are 
beyond the limits of my self can nonetheless become my things. The way 
this is done varies between languages; there are many different ways of 
possessing in the world’s languages, both in terms of what is possessed 
and how the possession is expressed.
For instance, several languages differentiate between alienable 
objects (things that can be possessed by others, like John’s dog) and inali-
enable objects (things that can be possessed only by the individual, like 
John’s dream). Some languages differentiate between inherent possession 
(parts of a whole, like John’s finger) and non- inherent possession (where 
the two things remain equal and separate objects, like John’s dog). 
Some languages treat some things as unpossessable, and some treat the 
possession of places as different from other forms of possession by using 
a special locative possessive.
In English, we do not officially differentiate between alienable and 
non- alienable, or inherent and non- inherent, but there is nonetheless 
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some differentiation. We can use the of form of possession with inalien-
able but not alienable possessions:  the dreams of John feels acceptable 
(although it has two very different meanings), but the dog of John does 
not (although that dog of John’s is acceptable). There is also some dif-
ferentiation between non- inherent and inherent possession:  John’s dog 
requires the possessive form (’s, as in Alf’s nose), but the family’s dog can 
be reduced to the family dog, possibly because the dog is an inherent 
part of the family in a wider sense. This double- noun formation is very 
common in English (for example, history test, business contract, fly spray, 
bicycle wheel), and it is unlikely that inherent possession can be invoked 
to explain all double- noun forms; but it does help with some.
English does not seem to have any restriction on what can be 
possessed, treating even the ultimate supernatural entity as a personal 
possession (‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’ – Psalm 22:1, 
Holy Bible, New International Version). However, we do have an example 
of a special locative possession form:  the ellipsis in I’m going to John’s 
indicates a place possessed in some way by John, such as ‘house’ or 
‘home’. The way possession is marked in different languages is also vari-
able. English uses:  prepositions (of and for particularly, but not exclu-
sively); a possessive form (’s); double nouns; or noun phrases (such as 
the dog owned by John or the dog John has). Japanese uses a participle no 
following a noun phrase to indicate the noun is a possessor (Jon no inu, 
John’s dog, for instance); Latin uses a genitive case- ending on a noun 
to indicate it is a possessor (for example, Pax Romanorum, the Roman 
peace); and languages in the South American Cariban group use a case- 
form to indicate the possessed thing rather than the possessing thing. 
To date, however, no language has been identified that does not indicate 
possession in at least one way.
Possession may be ubiquitous because it is just a particular form of 
A- Relationship- B social calculus:  it is an unequal relationship between 
a person and a thing, where the person has a dominance relationship 
over that thing. It possibly comes directly from a social calculus construct 
that marks a dominance– submission relationship between two people, 
but replaces the submissive person with a thing. This possessive exten-
sion of the A- Relationship- B form is one of many ways the form can be 
elaborated: it can express other relationships between things and people, 
or relationships between things and other things. The relationships 
themselves can also be replaced by actions (existential actions of being, 
material actions of affecting, relational actions of representing, behav-
ioural actions of performing, verbal actions of describing, and mental 
actions of ideating) or other links (cultural links like marriage, economic 
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links like debt, service links like employment, social links like group 
membership, and so on). The expression of possessive relationships is 
one of many ways in which the simple sentential communicated form of 
A- Relationship- B can be pressed into new uses: out of this A- Relationship- 
B social calculus construct can come all the simple grammar we use in 
modern language.
One common way of expressing possession is to use a pronominal 
to replace a noun phrase (mine / ours / yours / his / hers / theirs). Just 
as the basic pronominals all trace back to the cognitive meta- referent of 
they, so the possessive pronominals trace back to the use of they in an 
A- Relationship- B construct, where the relationship is one of possession. 
Social calculus involves sets of paired relationships between known 
individuals, and the use of they allows individuals and groups to be 
represented by a generic placeholder; possession is just another type 
of paired relationship, and the same meta- referent pronominal proper-
ties apply. So just as the three persons in a communicative act can be 
represented singularly or plurally by pronominals, so possession can be 
expressed in all three persons in singular and plural forms.
Possession seems likely to be one of the earliest ways in which the 
exchange of social calculus was broadened to include other communic-
able information; and the famous Blombos crayon (Henshilwood et al. 
2002) looks like an early exemplar of possessive messages – perhaps the 
earliest known. A simple cross- hatching on a piece of soft ochre, probably 
used as a crayon to create red pigment, indicates a relationship between 
the crayon and at least one human. We cannot know what the cross- 
hatching means, but we can say with confidence that it is an indicator 
that, about 75,000 years ago, this particular piece of stone was important 
enough to be personalised for identification.
Possession is, however, more than just an extension of the human 
way of seeing the world; its role in communication changes the world. 
Where first- person possession is expressed (for example, ‘my rock’), it 
poses a challenge to the worldview of others. It is an assertion about 
reality, but it is only as real as others allow it to be. Possession plunges us 
into Karl Popper’s Three Worlds (1967, Chapter 4), which constructs the 
human view of knowledge on three levels: what continues to exist even 
in the absence of humans, such as rock, constitutes World 1 (actuality); 
that which exists only inside human heads, such as my, is World 2 (vir-
tuality); and that which has actual existence without humans but has 
meaning only because of humans, such as crayon, is World 3 (reality).1 
It is difficult to represent these three worlds using words, because every 
word is a negotiation toward meaning – it exists in World 2 and can only 
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represent Worlds 1 and 3, not exist in them. The word rock represents 
an actual rock without being one, and the word crayon represents the 
idea that a particular rock can be described by role as well as by sub-
stance. The word my is an assertion of possession in World 2, but it 
represents different things in Worlds 1 and 3:  in World 1 it represents 
actual, physical possession, and in World 3 it represents agreed, or legal, 
possession. These three meanings together form our understanding of 
what constitutes ‘good’ possession:  it is asserted, actual and agreed. 
Without actual possession, it is merely desire, and without agreement it 
is usurpation; but if all three are present, then our World 2 virtual con-
cept of possession has changed our World 3 real model of how World 1, 
the actual world, works and is ordered. Language may not have changed 
the actual world, but it has changed our concept of the world, and there-
fore our relationship to it.
The origin of recursion and reflexivity
In Chapter 3, we looked very briefly at the topic of recursion in terms of 
the sharing of the A- Relationship- B constructs we have been offered by 
others. By attributing the whole construct to the original author, we are 
able to pass on what may be deceptive information without risking our 
own reputation. This construct, ‘C said A- Relationship- B’ is hierarchical 
in that the basic construct is contained within a larger construct, [[A- 
Relationship- B] by- C]; and it is recursive in that it can be further nested 
as [[[A- Relationship- B] by- C] by D]. In English, this makes a sentence 
like ‘Del said that Gemma told him that Alf likes Beth’. In theory, the by- 
x form can be added into the construct an unlimited number of times, 
but in practice human minds can usually only handle five or six levels 
of nesting (Dunbar 2004, Chapter 3). The by- x form is not the only type 
of recursion possible in language; but, like self- modelling and first- and 
second- person pronominalisation, it is probably an early one.
Why should recursion be so significant in terms of language origins? 
The answer lies in the recent history of linguistic research. For 60 years, 
linguistics has been strongly influenced by the theories of one man, Noam 
Chomsky. His theoretical viewpoint, that language is a specialised cogni-
tive computational system (1995b), has been extremely influential and 
has affected linguistic theory profoundly. It has also encouraged three 
generations of researchers to adopt four counterintuitive views about 
language: first, that language is for thought, not communication; second, 
that language cognition is just for language – it is a specialised system 
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that is not used for other types of thought; third, that we must, if we 
are to communicate using language, all have the same language engine 
(Universal Grammar) in our heads; and fourth, that the language engine 
is exclusively human – no other animals have anything like it (Chomsky 
2007). This position has become known as generativism, from the idea 
that the engine, Universal Grammar, generates all our language capaci-
ties and all human languages.
The literature in support of the generativist position is impressive 
(Chomsky himself has written, or been involved in writing, over 60 lin-
guistics books). But evidence in the last 20 years from psychology (such 
as Adornetti and Ferretti 2014), neurology (Arbib 2005), physiology 
(Evans and Levinson 2009), biology (Bickerton 2014), archaeology 
(Hoffmann et al. 2018), linguistics (Beckner et al. 2009), animal studies 
(Segerdahl et  al. 2005), child studies (Ibbotson and Tomasello 2009), 
evolutionary theory (Wacewicz 2016)  and complexity theory (Kirby 
et al. 2008) – even economics (Alonso- Cortés 2006, Chapter 4) – is not 
providing the necessary support for the idea of a genetically specialised 
and species- exclusive language engine.
The situation is complicated by the fact that not all generativists 
believe the same things about language, and Chomsky himself has 
altered his position several times. Most drastically, in 1995 (1995a) 
he abandoned his previous theoretical suite of Principles & Parameters 
and Government & Binding (for example, Chomsky 1982)  to concen-
trate on a reduced package involving just two principles:  MOVE and 
MERGE. He has now largely dropped MOVE as a separate principle, 
concentrating on the single feature of MERGE as the cognitive cap-
acity that separates humans from the rest of nature, and language from 
other communication systems (Hauser et al. 2002). Another name for 
MERGE is recursion.
For Chomsky, MERGE is a human- only capacity, the result of 
a mutation in a single individual sometime between 200,000 and 
60,000 years ago (Berwick and Chomsky 2016, Chapter 3). This muta-
tion revolutionised the individual’s life, giving them a reproductive 
advantage that passed down through the generations, out- competing 
unmutated versions of the affected gene because the cognitive cap-
acity of MERGE provided so many fitness advantages. How a cognitive 
capacity creates a reproductive advantage has not been fully explored; 
and how the gene managed to replace the entire unmutated stock of 
genes has not been examined in a systematic way. Even the wide date 
range raises some questions. We now know that the single migration 
out of Africa by Homo sapiens 60,000 years ago was probably preceded 
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by an earlier migration about 120,000 years ago (Bae et  al. 2017), a 
date supported by recent discoveries about Homo sapiens in China (Liu 
et  al. 2015)  and Australia (Clarkson et  al. 2017). We also now know 
that modern Homo sapiens was present in Morocco 300,000 years 
ago (Hublin et al. 2017) and had spread to Omo Kibish in Ethiopia by 
195,000 years ago (Sisk and Shea 2008), a distance of over 5,000 km. 
So, if the new mutation had occurred after 200,000 years ago, it 
would have needed to spread horizontally into existing populations 
by interbreeding, as well as vertically down the generations. It would 
also have needed to coexist with the genetic heritage of other species 
of humans:  we now know that there were signs of interbreeding 
between Homo sapiens and both Homo neanderthalensis (Green et  al. 
2010) and Homo denisova (Reich et al. 2010). In Europe, on average, 
our genome is up to 4 per cent Neanderthal; and in Asia, the human 
genome includes about 0.2 per cent of Denisovan genetic material as 
well as the Neanderthal content. African humans have no Neanderthal 
or Denisovan genetic material, while the Melanesian genome is up to 
8  per  cent Denisovan and Neanderthal combined (Bustamante and 
Henn 2010).
This leaves a problem for the generative model of language 
origins. If Chomsky is right that MERGE is the result of a mutation, then 
he must be wrong about the timing: the mutation must have happened 
early enough in the history of Homo sapiens to ensure it reached 
Australia 65,000 years ago, because interbreeding between outsiders 
and Australian Aboriginal humans was slight- to- non- existent for all 
but the most recent 300 years. It would also be a better explanation if 
the mutation happened before 200,000 years ago, to give it a chance 
to spread through the whole Homo sapiens population before Homo 
sapiens started spreading through the world. If, however, the timing 
is adjusted, then there is the problem of how this mutation changed 
the fitness profile of the species. If it had a major effect on fitness (as 
the generativists claim for cognitive recursion), then it should spread 
quickly, and evidence of what that fitness change did to humans 
should be evident in the archaeological record; but the technological 
and social record from archaeology gives no clue as to any cognitive 
changes before about 100,000 years ago. If it had only a minor effect, 
then why should it spread quickly through the population? The success 
of any mutation is measured in terms of relative numbers of offspring, 
so if it is to spread quickly both vertically through selective inheritance, 
and horizontally through interbreeding, it has to be quite remarkable 
in its effects.
thE languagE of sElf 141
  
There are three ways out of this problem. The first is to treat 
MERGE (recursion) as non- genetic: it could be a cognitive trick that some 
humans mastered and then shared; this trick could spread culturally – 
and, therefore, much more quickly than if it were a mutation. This, how-
ever, still leaves the questions of why and how this cognitive trick was 
first recognised, why it proved so useful, and how it was shared without 
recursive language already existing. The second way out of the problem 
is to treat MERGE as an ancient genetic capacity that happened to be 
communicatively useful when language appeared, but which was avail-
able and useful in cognition long before language appeared. However, 
the question here is: what purpose did recursion in cognition serve? No 
cognitive cost could survive for long without a countervailing fitness 
benefit. The third solution is to treat MERGE as a communicative poten-
tial already cognitively present in hierarchical social calculus, a potential 
that was realised only when that calculus was shared. This is the solution 
offered here: the ability to cognitively model individuals within groups 
while separately identifying the individual and the group is potentially 
hierarchical; so when the communication of social calculus actually 
begins, the recursive tools are already in place. While shared social cal-
culus models are initially linear, they soon require the ability to share one 
person’s model of another person’s model of a relationship, indicating 
the ownership of the information in the model at each level. This sharing 
of information sources is hierarchical and, within a limited definition of 
the term, recursive.
Robin Dunbar describes these nested tagged models as ‘a hier-
archically organised series of belief- states’ (2004, 45); and he goes on 
to show that, while the capacity to nest individuals and groups within 
groups seems to extend to at least seven levels without diminution in 
understanding, the nesting of relationship models becomes ineffective 
and highly error- prone beyond five levels of nesting. Recursion is not, as 
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1836 [1999], 91) says (and Chomsky is fond 
of quoting), ‘infinite employment of finite means’,2 it is constrained by 
the capacities of the human brain, which are not as amazing or unusual 
as we often pretend. Caballero et  al. (2018) raise an important issue 
about infinitely recursive iteration: cognition is about decision points. 
At some time in the process, the formulation of an idea must result in 
a formed idea; and this cannot happen without a stop- marker on the 
iterative recursion formulating the idea. Decision- making does seem 
to rely on iterative processing, and a large number of those iterative 
processes are recursive; but that does not make them infinite, or even 
possibly infinite.
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One aspect of recursion that is not often explored using MERGE 
is reflexivity, the capacity to refer an activity back on itself so that the 
instigator of the action is also the receiver. In the notation used here, 
this would be an A1- Relationship- A2 construct, a recognition that a they 
has the same ability to model themself as I do. To express reflexivity in 
English pronouns, we use possessive+self (myself, ourself, ourselves, 
yourself, yourselves) or, in the third- person, object+self (himself, herself, 
itself, themself, themselves). This differentiation of form is neither explic-
able nor fixed  – some dialects allow meself or hisself or theyselves, but 
never weselves, youself, youselves or sheself. They do all, however, reflect 
the fact that A2 is a model of A1 made by A1 – which is itself a model. This 
is clearer in the semantically complex utterance {name 1}- {has a good 
relationship with}- {name 1} (John loves John). This reflexivity is used 
to indicate disapproval of the relationship, or surprise that it is possible 
for anyone to love John; but it is done by intimating that John actually 
loves John’s model of himself, and this is a wrong thing for John to do. 
In practice, of course, when I utter John loves John, I am really saying ‘my 
model of John loves my model of John’s model of John’. I  leave you to 
work out what is happening in ‘John loves that he loves himself’; but the 
fact that you are able to extract meaningful information from these six 
words about my intentions, John’s intentions and my relationship with 
John shows how the sharing of social models, accompanied by recursion, 
creates a powerful information machine.
Self out of language, language out of self?
This chapter has approached selfhood as a communicative issue, and 
particularly as a language event. If the story of self this book proposes is 
close to what actually happened in our prehistory, then the human cap-
acity for language is heavily implicated; and an understanding of what 
language is becomes necessary. However, we are immediately faced with 
a definitional problem: what type of communication counts as language? 
This question is not as easy to answer as it should be. For some linguists, 
language is how only humans communicate; so, by definition, it is a 
human- only capacity. For generativists, the key ingredient is recursion; 
so any human communication system that cannot be used recursively 
does not count as language. For other linguists, language happens when-
ever communication is sufficiently complex; so any communicative act 
could count as language if it is complex enough, whether it is performed 
by humans or by another species.
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In this chapter, the term ‘language’ has been used cavalierly, 
with no particular definition attached. This is deliberate, because 
what counts as language is something of a red herring in the search 
for selfhood. To begin exchanging social calculus models, there must 
have been a pre- existing communication system that allowed mean-
ingfully differentiated segments of a signal to be brought together to 
make a meta- signal. Fortunately, recent evidence shows that this might 
be an ancient capacity: marmosets, which are in a lineage with which 
we shared a common ancestor 40 million years ago, appear capable of 
vocalisations that ‘do not consist of one discrete call pattern but are built 
of many sequentially uttered units, like human speech’ (Pomberger 
et al. 2018). While marmosets are unlikely to have a capacity for social 
calculus, a call pattern built of sequential units is all that is needed to 
share social calculus models. Whether we class the exchange of social 
calculus models as sufficiently linguistic to be called language is imma-
terial to the fact that all the cognitive resources we needed to share 
social calculus models were probably already present before Homo 
sapiens appeared.
However, a knowledge of selfhood is not needed to communicate 
social calculus models. Indeed, if a capacity to model the self as a third 
person, a dispassionate self, allows in the capacity for self- sacrifice, it can 
be argued that self- modelling, by itself, makes an individual less fit than an 
individual who does not self- model. Only if self- modelling is a secondary 
outcome of something that increases fitness should it become common 
in a species. Could sharing social models enhance individual fitness suf-
ficiently to counteract the negative effect of self- sacrifice? The answer 
probably lies in the increased levels of trust that the sharing of models 
engenders, and the enhanced knowledge of how the individual’s group 
works; but that is not an issue that needs to be pursued here, for we have 
discovered a viable path from self- serving, self- free Machiavellianism to 
selfless, self- modelling selfhood.
The journey on from selfhood is of interest in terms of language 
itself. Sharing second- hand models requires recursion to enter the 
equation, and this allows human communication to become increas-
ingly complex. This is significant for generativists, because it crosses the 
Rubicon they believe exists between pre- language communication, or 
proto- language, and full language. However, whether what happened 
before communicative recursion counts as language or not is a matter 
of opinion. We can define language in whichever way we wish, to fit our 
theory of how humans communicate; it makes no difference to the nature 
of the communicative act itself. For selfhood, we needed an effective, 
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segmented and differentiated communication system already in place; 
and we needed a cognitive capacity for social calculus. From selfhood, 
we gained a complex and iterative communication system that any lin-
guist would be happy to label language.
Notes
 1. The terms Actuality, Reality and Virtuality are my own terms for Popper’s Three Worlds.
 2. What von Humboldt actually said was:  ‘Sie muss daher von endlichen Mitteln einen 
unendlichen Gebrauch machen’. So a more literal translation would be: ‘It must therefore from 
limited resources generate unlimited usage’. This is sufficiently different from ‘infinite employ-
ment of finite means’ to argue that von Humboldt and Chomsky may not be talking about the 
same thing.
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7
Metaphors of Self
‘I’m afraid he’ll catch cold with lying on the damp grass,’ said Alice, 
who was a very thoughtful little girl.
‘He’s dreaming now,’ said Tweedledee: ‘and what do you think 
he’s dreaming about?’
Alice said ‘Nobody can guess that.’
‘Why, about you!’ Tweedledee exclaimed, clapping his hands 
triumphantly. ‘And if he left off dreaming about you, where do you 
suppose you’d be?’
‘Where I am now, of course,’ said Alice.
‘Not you!’ Tweedledee retorted contemptuously. ‘You’d be 
nowhere. Why, you’re only a sort of thing in his dream!’
‘If that there King was to wake,’ added Tweedledum, ‘you’d go 
out – bang! – just like a candle!’
(Lewis Carroll 1872, Chapter 4: 
‘Tweedledum and Tweedledee’)
Dreaming is not an exclusively human capacity. There is some evi-
dence that dogs dream (Walker 1983, 194– 236); and, based on body 
movement during sleep, it seems reasonable to believe that dreaming is 
common in the mammalian clade. There is currently no way of knowing 
what dogs dream about and, apart from recollection after waking, we 
have no way of interrogating our own dreams. Conscious recollection 
of unconscious dreams is notoriously unreliable:  normally, when we 
wake, our dream goes out – bang! – just like a candle. If we have any 
recollections at all, they are vague, disjointed and counterintuitive. We 
cannot know if this is because dreams themselves are vague, disjointed 
and counterintuitive, or if this is the way our conscious self represents 
our dreaming self to us.
This chapter looks at some of the ways we represent our self to our-
selves, a reflexive trick that is only expressible, and may only be possible, 
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through language. In Chapter 3, we saw that the modelled self can be 
viewed as a product of the sharing of social calculus through language. 
So, if language really is the source of awareness of self in humans, then 
there should be some significant indicators of this within language; and 
if sharing social calculus is a major cause of language, it should have 
left some positively megalithic features on the language landscape. 
Fortunately for the modelling hypothesis, the signs are there, and they 
are indeed significant.
Metaphor, as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) argue, is 
fundamental to language. It is at the heart of linguistic productivity, 
allowing us to increase the range of meanings in our languages to cover 
almost every descriptive need we may have. It also allows us to extend 
our language significantly in terms of grammatical complexity, and even 
offers an increased range of sounds and gestures we can use to represent 
our languages. We are able to linguistically model from how language is 
done now to how it could be done, and then incorporate how it could be 
done into how it is done. Metaphor puts all our conceptual meaning on 
a constantly moving conveyor belt, from the possible to the probable to 
the agreed. For this reason, Lakoff and Johnson label their view of meta-
phor ‘conceptual metaphor’, to differentiate it from the older and much 
more limited definition, ‘rhetorical metaphor’. Where rhetorical meta-
phor involves the conscious and deliberate selection of a metaphorical 
relationship, conceptual metaphor is a product of an intuitive negotiation 
toward meaning. For this reason, the term ‘metaphor’ refers here to con-
ceptual metaphor.
For instance, if we look at a quotation from Winston Churchill, ‘If 
you’re going through hell, keep going’, a rhetorical approach might con-
sider the use of the word ‘hell’, a place of suffering, to represent a dif-
ficult period in life. This, though, leaves us with a somewhat circular 
definition, and no clear route into meaning: hell as a place, if it is actu-
ally a place, is unknowable to the living; we can only understand it in 
metaphorical terms, as a place where all the suffering we can imagine 
happens. Rhetorically, the metaphor devolves to [a place or time of great 
suffering → hell = a place and time of great suffering], which is not a very 
productive metaphor. A conceptual approach would take the view that 
the utterance’s key metaphor is LIFE IS A JOURNEY. This is supported 
by concomitant metaphors like SUFFERING IS A  JOURNEY and THE 
DESTINATION IS NOT THE ROUTE. It is also supported by semantic 
metaphors like GOING THROUGH IS EXPERIENCING and KEEPING 
GOING IS CONTINUING; and by the referential metaphor that THE YOU 
IN YOU’RE DOES NOT NECESSARILY REFER TO THE LISTENER. All 
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of these are cognitive concepts we use to negotiate toward Churchill’s 
intended meaning.
One of the strangest features of metaphor is that the receiver is 
willing to go along with the sender’s novel metaphors, negotiating with 
them toward a shared meaning. If I say ‘it’s a bullying wind today’, your 
first reaction is probably to interpret the activity of the wind in terms of 
your knowledge of bullying. You do not seek clarification (at least, not 
often), even if this is a novel utterance for you; and you do not dismiss the 
utterance as meaningless just because it is novel. The metaphor allows 
us to access the unknown through the known: exactly what the sender 
means by ‘bullying wind’ may be opaque to us, but we are aware of how 
humans can bully, and the effect it has on their victims. The wind is not a 
person, but (as we saw in Chapter 6) we can exchange people and objects 
in our social calculus, treating people as passive and inanimate, and 
objects as animate and intentional – equivalences that are, themselves, 
metaphorical.
It seems that, in many ways, metaphor is deceptive:  it works by 
associating an unknown thing with a known thing, but the association 
is usually partial and seldom synonymous. A difficult period in life is not 
a journey through hell, and a bullying wind does not pick its victims. 
Yet, in both cases, the speaker or writer has conveyed more than just 
their intended meaning, and has revealed something about themselves. 
Churchill has given us an insight into his clinical depression, and the 
weather commentator has told us how they anthropomorphise today’s 
weather. To open our mouths is to reveal our self – or, at least, our model 
of our self.
This chapter explores five conceptual metaphors defining self-
hood: THE MODEL IS THE ACTUAL; THE GROUP IS AN ENTITY; SELF IS 
OTHER; I AM ME; and ONE AMONG EQUALS. Some of these precede the 
communication of social models and some of them follow from it. There 
are many other metaphors involved in our definition of selfhood; but, 
together, these five metaphors form a basic toolkit for social modelling 
and self- awareness.
THE MODEL IS THE ACTUAL
This is perhaps the earliest of the selfhood conceptual metaphors to 
take root in human cognition; indeed, it is possible that the necessary 
cognitive mechanisms to establish this metaphor were part of our sub-
liminal cognition before the apes and old- world monkeys went off on 
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their different evolutionary paths 25 million years ago. It is certainly 
needed when social calculus becomes a conscious activity, because 
understanding the relationships between others means understanding 
the emotions between individuals; and the only way this can happen is if 
I am able to represent, or model, those emotions without actually experi-
encing them myself.
The subliminal mechanisms that enable the metaphor do not 
produce the metaphor by themselves, however:  the modelled A- 
Relationship- B only becomes a metaphor for the actual relationship 
between two individuals when we become aware of our social model-
ling and start to use it in our conscious planning. In terms of Popper’s 
three worlds, social calculus is like language:  they both require the 
individual to be aware that they are using them; and they both exist in 
World 2, virtuality, and can only represent in Worlds 1 and 3, actuality 
and reality. I have no way of accessing the actual relationship between 
the two individuals  – I  can only use the virtual (World 2)  model of 
the relationship in my social calculus to stand in for the actual (World 
1)  relationship. But, because it is the only representation I  have, it 
more than represents, it becomes my view of the relationship in both 
the actual World 1 and my real World 3.  My model, no matter how 
ineffective, must be treated by me as if it were both the actual and the 
real relationship.
By treating the metaphor, THE MODEL IS THE ACTUAL, as a valid 
equivalence, I have made it an active component of my conscious cogni-
tion: I know that my models of A and B are not the actual people A and 
B, and I  know my model of the relationship between them is not the 
actual relationship between them – everything is contingent and modal. 
However, the model, if it is to be of any use to me, has to be treated 
as a true representation of the actual relationship between A  and B; 
and, when I begin sharing my social calculus, it is my virtual model that 
I share.
This means that, for the receiver, too, there must be recognition 
that what I am sharing is a World 2 virtual viewpoint – an opinion rather 
than a fact. Because language and social calculus both exist in World 2 
and only map onto Worlds 1 and 3, language and social calculus form a 
synchronised system of communication where both are semantically and 
semiotically collocated: social calculus imposes its structure on language, 
and the structure is what gives language the capacity to communicate 
social calculus. THE MODEL IS THE ACTUAL is not just a convenient cog-
nitive methodology, it is at the heart of sharing social calculus through 
language.
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THE GROUP IS AN ENTITY
We have already met this metaphor in another guise in Chapter  6, as 
part of the discussion of the origin of they. If I am to understand indi-
vidual A as an intentional entity, then I need to be able to understand 
the relationships of other individuals with A in terms of their grouping 
around A; in other words, I need to be able to treat those groups of others 
around A  as if they were entities themselves. My social calculus must 
become hierarchical, recognising both individuals within groups and 
groups within groups. Like THE MODEL IS THE ACTUAL, the metaphor 
THE GROUP IS AN ENTITY was at work subliminally long before Homo 
sapiens appeared on the planet.
For the metaphor THE GROUP IS AN ENTITY to become a cognitive 
reality, the concept of group has to be part of an individual’s daily experi-
ence. This does not mean that being part of a group relies on recogni-
tion of the concept group: it is not necessary, for instance, that eusocial 
insects have any concept of group to work together in what appears to 
be a highly organised way. In fact, the genetic joint enterprise algorithm 
can be remarkably simple:  it only has to promote serial cooperation 
between pairs of individuals for an apparently highly organised society 
to emerge. It can even produce the illusion of hierarchy and centralised 
organisation; this is partly because, as humans, we use our own pseudo- 
eusocial models as metaphors to explain full eusociality, so we see con-
scious cooperation where there is none; but it is also because eusocial 
joint enterprise encourages individual specialisation, which we can then 
interpret as a grouping mechanism (Lehmann et al. 2008).
However, the concept of group does not come from the whole 
tribe surrounding the individual; it comes from the recognition of 
subgroups within a group. My recognition of the subgroups surrounding 
individual A  (based on my models of individual A’s common relation-
ship with the individuals in the subgroup) allows me to group my own 
relationships with others, and to start building productive coalitions with 
other like- minded individuals; in this way, conscious recognition of ad 
hoc subgroups in the group emerge from the modelling of individual 
cooperations. This aggregation of individuals into a subgroup, and the 
subsequent treatment of the subgroup as a unit, is what creates the meta-
phor THE GROUP IS AN ENTITY.
This remains a useful subliminal cognitive tool until we begin 
sharing our social calculus: the sharing of A- Relationship- B uses the same 
form whether A or B represents an individual or a group – although the 
joint nature of the group means that the contextually specific meaning 
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of the cognitive shortcut they (that is, what it refers to in a particular dis-
course) also has to be negotiated between the parties to the discourse. 
The features unifying a set of individuals into a group need to be World 3 
real to all members of the discourse (which is what makes the aggrega-
tion a useful shortcut), but they do not need to be World 1 actual: ‘Alf’s 
friends’ may not form a single group; and, with the modern social media 
culture, they may not even know each other. But they are linked by my 
belief that a good relationship with Alf somehow makes them all similar; 
and, if I can persuade you of the value of the aggregation, the contextual 
they becomes a valuable shared tool.
When THE GROUP IS AN ENTITY becomes a shared metaphor, 
it creates a new world of possibilities. Humans are able to form tribes, 
nations, chess clubs, academic conferences and so on creating a we and 
a not- we out of the negotiated they. The separation of in- group and out- 
group may appear logical and reasonable in all these cases, but it is often 
based on an evolutionarily inexplicable pretext. Why do individuals who 
are good at pushing bits of wood across a tessellated board according to 
arbitrary conventions need to group together? What fitness advantages 
do they get? To label it a costly signal of group membership somehow 
misses the point of what that membership represents to the individual.
The arbitrariness of the in- group and out- group division also 
has a dark side, where the out- group becomes the focus of attention 
rather than the in- group. This can manifest itself in persecution of the 
out- group and can lead to prejudice, social exclusion, dehumanisation 
and even genocide. The in- group is defined solely by not being the out- 
group. Unlike eusocial species, where wars happen between groups 
because individuals are not recognised as part of the in- group (usually 
by scent), human wars are often about punishing the out- group. Where, 
for eusocial species, the enemy of my enemy is usually my enemy also, for 
humans, the enemy of my enemy can be my friend. Only humans seem 
capable of world- straddling alliances defined less by mutual solidarity 
and more by mutual dislike of an arbitrary subset of not- we. Jane Goodall 
(1990, Chapter 10) has reported that chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) go 
to war, although it is a very different concept of war from the organised 
conflicts that even hunter- gatherers are able to mount against each other. 
And, even though they are territorial, it is very unlikely that any chim-
panzee would give cognitive houseroom to the idea, dulce et decorum est 
pro patria mori (‘how sweet and fitting it is to die for your country’).
Treating the group as an entity can make conformism to the arbi-
trary rules of the group into a fit strategy, but it also makes membership 
of multiple groups a fit strategy. Seeing the group as an entity allows a 
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society to consist of not just one group but many subgroups; and it allows 
individuals to be members of groups that cross what would have been 
in- group and out- group boundaries. I can be an atheist or theist or deist 
within the Labour or Liberal or Conservative parties: membership of one 
group does not automatically preclude or dictate membership of another. 
The arbitrary meta- rules of a culture determine the nature of the groups 
available for individuals to join, and the arbitrary rules within the group 
determine which individuals will join them.
The appearance of THE GROUP IS AN ENTITY metaphor in com-
munication, therefore, creates a very different kind of social structure 
from what was possible before. Individuals who can manipulate the con-
cept will have an important advantage over those who cannot, being able 
to create alliances in new ways; and, when the concept becomes more 
general, the manipulators are better able to negotiate the new and more 
complex social web that is likely to appear.
SELF IS OTHER
As the metaphor at the heart of this book, so much has been said about 
it already. It is, however, unlike the other four metaphors examined 
here, reversible, in that OTHER IS SELF represents a similar cognitive 
equivalencing to SELF IS OTHER. They both represent the idea that the 
modelled self and a modelled other are of the same nature: they are both 
models of individuals where the models represent but do not recreate. 
This is not that case with THE MODEL IS THE ACTUAL or THE GROUP IS 
AN ENTITY. The equivalencing of ‘model’ with ‘actual’, and ‘group’ with 
‘entity’, legitimises the model and the group by giving them more sig-
nificance – and more actuality – than they actually have; the first half of 
each pair is of a different nature to the second half. (This also applies to 
the metaphor I AM ME, but the metaphor ONE AMONG EQUALS is of a 
different type – as we shall see.)
Yet, despite the reversible nature of the SELF IS OTHER metaphor, 
there is also a difference of emphasis between the two forms. OTHER IS 
SELF implies that I can take your model of me as a basis for my model of 
me; it is the realisation that, if you are offering me a model of me, I need 
to have a model of me in my own social calculus – and the only model of 
me immediately available is what you have revealed to me about your 
model of me. Your ‘other’ model of me has to become my ‘self’ model if 
I am to have any model of me. In contrast, SELF IS OTHER implies that 
my model of me is of the same nature as your model of me. As your model 
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of me is a third- person model, and all the models of other individuals in 
my social calculus are also third- person models, so my model of me has 
to be a third- person model.
From the aspectual self of myself, through the more holistic selves 
of I and me, to the representative selves of one and we, the self is con-
stantly being linguistically modelled by the self as not the self. Where a 
chimpanzee, without the capacity to share social calculus, has to present 
their anger with another chimpanzee as an indexical temper tantrum, 
humans represent their emotions linguistically, using symbolic models 
of themselves: the phrase ‘You’re making me angry’ can be spoken with 
a level, emotionless tone which does not contradict its meaning. Yet the 
very act of presenting the Actual self’s anger through a linguistic model 
of the self dissipates or mutates the anger that the Actual self actually 
feels:  the modelled self becomes the vehicle through which the Actual 
self relates to other selves.
We thus find ourselves sharing models of ourselves with utterances 
such as ‘I think I’m not feeling myself today’. In this utterance, I  have 
modelled my self in three ways: as the originator of a thought (‘I think’); 
as the actor in the activity being described (‘I’m not feeling’); and as 
an idealised Cultural self  (‘myself’), the standard of which the actor 
in the thought does not currently meet (‘myself today’). Strangely, not 
only do we know what each of the selves represents when we make this 
utterance, we expect our interlocutors to know, too; and, even stranger, 
they usually do.
For the metaphor SELF IS OTHER to work, the individual must have 
a conscious concept of both ‘other’ and ‘self’. A concept of ‘other’ as an 
intentional being seems to be present in chimpanzees and orang- utans, 
but it is a naïve concept that can only handle the idea that others may 
know or not know things that the self knows, but not that they can believe 
things that the self knows to be false (Call and Tomasello 1999). The con-
cept that others may believe things that are not true seems beyond them. 
Residence in Popper’s World 1, actuality, is so important to the apes that 
the possibilities of Worlds 2 and 3 are beyond them. This does not mean 
that they are impervious to the needs of others, or excluded from cooper-
ation; but it does mean that they do not proactively help  – they only 
reactively help when solicited to do so (Melis et al. 2011).
Bonobos who have been raised with human- language- like commu-
nication as part of their experience and repertoire seem to have a more 
cooperative approach to each other, and to humans, than wild bonobos; 
and they seem also to have grasped the basics of self- awareness (Savage- 
Rumbaugh et  al. 2005). However, even here their behaviour is less 
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proactively cooperative than that of most human children (Carpenter and 
Tomasello 1995). Exposure to human culture can make other animals 
more humanlike by giving them the tools to negotiate toward meaning, 
but the meanings they negotiate toward are specific to the needs, wants 
and expectations of their species.
As we have seen, what allowed the concept of ‘self’ to become a con-
scious reality was the sharing of social calculus. Somehow a signalling 
system  – which already included segmented meanings, differentiated 
functions and probably hierarchical structures  – was co- opted for the 
exchange of A- Relationship- B social models. Some examples of this kind 
of signalling system have been discovered in nature, such as in the calling 
system of the putty- nosed monkeys (Arnold and Zuberbühler 2006) or 
the vocal behaviour of marmosets (Pomberger et  al. 2018), indicating 
that the tools for segmented, differentiated and hierarchical communi-
cation would have been available before they were needed for sharing 
social calculus. Scott- Phillips et al. (2009) have also shown that modern 
humans are ingenious in their efforts to negotiate toward meaning, and 
they seem able to generate effective rule- based communication systems 
for specific purposes in very short periods of time. In the circumstance 
described here, humans would already be using a cognitive grammar 
of A- Relationship- B constructs to run their internal social calculus, so 
quickly establishing a communication system that mapped this cognitive 
grammar onto a signal would be within the realms of possibility.
Once individuals are exchanging A- Relationship- B constructs, 
it becomes possible to share a construct involving a particular indi-
vidual with that individual. This poses a problem for the receiver of the 
signal: to integrate this particular A- Relationship- B construct into their 
social calculus, they have to be able to model themselves as a node in 
their social calculus network; but, as we have seen, modelling the self as 
other entails taking a dispassionate approach to the self, which brings its 
own disadvantages for the individual. The dispassionate view of the self 
seems to enhance group selection at the expense of individual fitness: like 
eusocial insects, we seem ready to sacrifice our selves to ensure the con-
tinuation of our ‘nest’ or ‘hive’. Alone among the non- eusocial species, 
humans are willing to sacrifice themselves for their group, even when 
there is no relatedness advantage: we are willing to sacrifice ourselves 
not just for the physical entity of the group but for an abstract concept of 
‘groupness’. In humans, self- sacrifice has become a powerful mechanism 
for ensuring the survival of the self’s cultural group; but this makes it 
a terrible tool in the hands of those who exploit the reverse- dominance 
rules underlying this social system (Boehm 1999). As van Vugt and Ahuja 
 
thE origins of sElf154
  
(2010) show, humans are eager to follow but less eager to lead; which 
means that we seem genetically predisposed to treat President John 
F. Kennedy’s inaugural speech as stirring rhetoric and not evolutionarily 
incomprehensible nonsense: ‘And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what 
your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country’.
The metaphor SELF IS OTHER emerged from the need to accept 
communicated models of our selves into our personal social calculus; but 
it seems to have then plugged into an existing social system of reverse 
dominance to create some very un- Darwinian effects. Clearly, exchanging 
social calculus constructs is sufficiently advantageous to the individual to 
outweigh any tendency to self- sacrifice; but how that equation of plusses 
and minuses plays out is currently still somewhat mysterious. Fortunately 
for the writer, it is an issue that does not need to be picked- apart here.
I AM ME
Once we have a third- person model of our self, we are faced with the 
problem of which roles our modelled self can undertake. The models 
of me offered to me by someone else will be of two types:  A in an A- 
Relationship- B construct (the instigator of a relationship); or B in an 
A- Relationship- B construct (the recipient of a relationship). These two 
selves could represent quite different things in our social calculus, but in 
practice we usually recognise them as the same self behaving in different 
ways:  In terms of social calculus grammar, instigator and recipient are 
roles that the self undertakes, treating the modelled self as a single 
representation of the unknowable Actual self, and not as a set of different 
representations of different selves. The roles of instigator and recipient 
are interchangeable, while the modelled self is cohesive.
This is odd, because, as we will see in Chapter 8, we do not actually 
have a cohesive model of our self; instead, we have a series of different 
models that we use for different purposes in our social interactions. It 
is, however, also useful to maintain the idea of a cohesive modelled self; 
and we do this by combining the several models of our self that have been 
offered by different people and generating an averaged self from them. 
Our self- modelling involves both separating our selves by function, so 
that we can model possibilities, and combining our selves to communi-
cate a unified selfhood to others. This may be why inconsistency in self- 
presentation is treated by others as both valuable and problematic (Laran 
and Janiszewski 2009):  the individual who adjusts their behaviour to 
meet the expectations of others is likely to be seen as more cooperative. 
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But if they are caught adjusting their behaviour in contradictory ways 
for different groups of others, then they will be seen as insincere and 
untrustworthy.
This is where the metaphor I AM ME becomes useful. It represents 
the capacity to merge different selves located in the same brain into an 
apparent amalgam self. Daniel Dennett (1991, 275– 81) discusses the 
possibility of a unified self as a product of episodic memory:  we stitch 
together the events of our life into a narrative to create what he calls a 
Joycean Machine. This machine adjudicates between different selves, 
adjusting the self I present to the world to match, as far as possible, the 
self I  wish to present and the self others expect me to present. In this 
projected model, the self- who- does and the self- who- experiences are 
merged, so that I can also be me.
The unified self remains a controversial concept in philosophy. 
Colin Marshall (2010) shows that Kant’s belief in a self unified meta-
physically is useful and valid only if there is actually a metaphysical com-
ponent to the self; if the metaphysical component is actual, then it fully 
explains the unified self – but it cannot explain why or how we use mod-
elled selves. Paul Katsafanas (2011) looks instead to Nietzsche’s concept 
of unified agency to justify a unified self: selfhood is expressed through 
activity, and activity is the outcome of an act of decision; decision means 
that a single, overriding self has made that decision, regardless of the 
number of selves that contributed to it. This, however, just kicks the 
problem down the road: is the overriding self actually a unified self, or 
does the need for an overriding self show that there must be a multipli-
city of selves to be overridden, and any one of the multiple selves could 
have won? David Rosenthal (2004) shows that we believe we are unified 
selves because of our belief in our freedom of choice: if we can choose 
freely, then there must be a unified self to make the choices. Our con-
scious choices, however, are usually dictated by our emotional responses, 
which are subliminally generated, and over which we have little, if any, 
control. What appears to be free will is only an explanation we give 
ourselves after the event of choice, and it cannot be used to support an 
overriding unified self.
In contrast to the unified self of philosophy, David Lester (2012), 
from a psychological viewpoint, proposes a multiple self theory of 
the mind where I AM ME reflects a holistic sub- self that both does and 
experiences; a person can have several sub- selves but, unlike the mod-
elled selves hypothesised in this book, Lester’s sub- selves do not merge 
to create amalgam selves, they remain separate and each has their 
moments of dominance. This, however, creates the counterintuitive idea 
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that every decision is arbitrarily affected by whichever sub- self is dom-
inant at the time; and it raises the question of why we see ourselves as 
unified individuals.
Allen McConnell (2011) provides a different model for multiple 
selves, which he calls the multiple self framework. Here, the models of 
the self that are negotiated with different groups tend to stay separate; 
so an individual may have, for instance, a family- directed self, a work- 
directed self, and a different self directed toward each of the individual’s 
social groups; each self has a set of personality aspects that work with the 
specific group and which will not necessarily work with other groups. In 
this model, the self making a particular decision is the self that is active 
in that particular context, so it is also the self that has to live with the 
decision made. In both the Lester and McConnell models, the I AM ME 
metaphor reflects the fact that the currently dominant self both does and 
experiences, but the different selves switch on and off rather than being 
merged together on an ad hoc basis.
The I AM ME metaphor, however, also seems to represent more than 
a simple equivalence of the self- who- does and the self- who- experiences; 
it represents the fact that these two selves can be merged to create a com-
posite self. Each of our selves consists of a set of aspects or attributes that 
may, or may not, be shared with other models of our self. In the end, it 
is not the integrity of a particular self- model that determines the model 
of our self that we project in a particular context; rather, it is the set 
of attributes that others believe us to have and which we can convince 
others we have. If people are expecting a level- headed me, and I have a 
model of me with a level- headed attribute, I can project the level- headed 
person I am expected to be; and if people are expecting a self- sacrificing 
me, and I have a model of me with a self- sacrificing attribute, I can be 
that self- sacrificing person. I  will be that level- headed, dispassionate, 
self- sacrificing person not because self- sacrifice is a direct evolutionary 
capacity, but because the modelled me that can experience the idea of 
self- sacrifice is also the I who can do self- sacrifice.
ONE AMONG EQUALS
The last metaphor of self that is reviewed here, ONE AMONG EQUALS, 
is different from the rest. Where the other metaphors collocate a World 3 
real thing (the model, the group, self, I) with a representation of a World 
1 actual thing (the actual, an entity) or with another real thing (other, 
me), ONE AMONG EQUALS establishes a social role for the individual, 
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collocating a representation of a World 1 actual thing (one) with a 
representation of a World 2 virtual thing (equals). The metaphor defines 
a social role that all individuals share, because every individual is a one, 
and they are all part of the group of equals. It may look, at first glance, 
that this is a recent cultural metaphor, a product of modern democracy; 
but it is actually a modern instantiation of an ancient human attribute 
that has allowed modern democracy to become a World 2 reality, as 
studies of human altruism show (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). Repeated 
interactions, reputation- formation and strong reciprocity combine to 
keep the majority compliant with the social compact of sharing fairly, and 
to facilitate punishment of the non- compliant. Human altruism has been 
somewhat usurped recently by pre- human alpha instincts, as modern 
economies of surplus seem to have mitigated the long- established human 
bias toward social equality (Charlton 1997). The alpha chimpanzees may 
be temporarily back in charge; but, eventually, robber- baron economies 
of surplus have a Malthusian tendency to adjust back to economies of 
scarcity (Malthus 1798). Already we are seeing shortages in basic sur-
vival resources (such as potable water; Suweis et al. 2013), demanding a 
more egalitarian solution to prevent social irruption.
Humans have, for a long time, been willing to demand equalisa-
tion in their social transactions; and Erdal and Whiten’s model of vigilant 
sharing (1994) provides an early model for how individuals could have 
prevented other individuals from dominating resources. By itself, vigi-
lant sharing is not a direct precursor of ONE AMONG EQUALS; instead, 
it corresponds more closely to Quentin Crisp’s aphorism, ‘Never keep 
up with the Joneses. Drag them down to your own level; it’s cheaper’. 
Vigilant sharing is about economic distribution rather than social equal-
isation; but it does demand a level of cooperation with other members of 
the group if alphas are to be punished by an altruistic ganging- up of the 
many against the one.
Boehm’s reverse- dominance model (1999) is the next step on the 
ladder toward ONE AMONG EQUALS. In this model, it is not enough to 
be fair; you have to be modest as well. Vigilant sharing still allows alpha 
behaviours to be overtly advertised, which means that alphas can still get 
preferential advantage from their prowess even if they do not use it to 
coerce advantage; reverse dominance is aimed at reducing this advan-
tage. Pride, bragging and boastfulness are condemned in the advisory 
texts of many cultures. The Jewish Torah and the Christian Bible say, 
‘Pride goes before destruction, a haughty spirit before a fall. Better to be 
lowly in spirit and among the oppressed than to share plunder with the 
proud’ (Proverbs 16: 18– 19). The Koran advises, ‘Do not treat men with 
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scorn, nor walk proudly on the earth; God does not love the arrogant and 
the vainglorious. Rather let your stride be modest and your voice low: the 
most hideous of voices is the braying of the ass’ (Koran, 31:18). Mana, 
or pride, is listed as one of the five poisons in the Mahayana Buddhist 
tradition and one of the ten fetters in Theravada Buddhism. In the Hindu 
Gita, ‘Hypocrisy, pride, self- conceit, wrath, arrogance and ignorance 
belong, O Partha, to him who is born to the heritage of the demons’ (The 
Gita, XVI, 4). For those of a more secular mindset, Blaise Pascal advises, 
‘Do you wish men to speak well of you? Then never speak well of yourself’ 
(Pascal 1846). It seems that un- Darwinian self- effacement is a key com-
ponent in the process of becoming a Good Human.
What keeps this natural self- effacement as a controlling force in 
human societies is probably not an un- Darwinian morality, however; it 
is much more likely to be Dessalles’ alpha- suppression through assas-
sination (Dessalles 2014). Unlike chimpanzee politics, where alliances 
are helpful but not vital, no human alpha can enforce their rule without 
allies. Modern history tells us that, even with allies and the support of 
a large part of the local population, no leader is completely safe from 
assassins. Even leaders who seem well- protected from their opponents 
can nonetheless succumb to popular uprising if they become unpopular 
enough (as Louis XVI of France, Nicholas II of Russia, Saddam Hussein of 
Iraq, and Muammar Gadaffi of Libya, among many others, attest). This 
vulnerability is a lesson that the more ostentatiously wealthy in modern 
cultures may wish to take more seriously.
Self- effacement does not mean that individuals need to have a 
Projected self of which they are aware, and of which they are aware that 
others are aware; all it needs is a sanctioning of braggers by the group. 
Braggers will then get fewer genes into the future, and self- effacers will 
get more. However, both bragging and self- effacement are commu-
nicative acts:  the first is the simple act of pointing out what you have 
done; the second is the more complex act of not pointing out what you 
have done, while making sure what you have done is widely known. 
Reputation becomes important; but this is not the described reputation 
allowed by the sharing of social models. This is the feeling by others that 
they like you and want you to like them. This is similar to the way that 
the fearsome reputation of chimpanzee alpha males prevents challenges, 
but this human reputation is not about fear. So how could a human indi-
vidual build a self- effacing reputation? Basically, by demonstrating their 
value. If a hunter brings home a large kill, drops it in the middle of the 
group, and walks away, they have demonstrated their relative worth as 
a provider, and their value to the group; if an individual engages and 
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drives off a predator, they have demonstrated their relative worth as a 
protector, and their value to the group; and so on. No words are needed. 
Of course, when social calculus models begin to be shared, reputation 
can be publicised freely by others. The self- effacers stand out even more, 
and the braggers really look bad.
In terms of early human culture, self- effacement seems to be suffi-
cient to produce the metaphor ONE AMONG EQUALS, but there remains 
one final step: the change of self- effacement from a strategy to a real belief. 
It is not enough to take the view of Groucho Marx when he said, ‘The 
secret of life is honesty and fair dealing. If you can fake that, you’ve got 
it made’; the honesty and fair- dealing required by ONE AMONG EQUALS 
must be sincere. This means that, somehow, an extra layer of cultural 
self- enforcement has to overlay any still- remaining Darwinian self- first 
prime directive. The selfishness of the gene must be projected through 
the organism onto the group, and then reflected by the group back onto 
the individual, creating a group directive toward individual unselfishness 
(Sober and Wilson 1998). As Alan Barnard (2012, Chapter 4) points out, 
human story- telling (in the guises of mythmaking, ritual and religion) 
provides a powerful basis for treating the ‘group’ as an ‘entity’, and a reli-
able way to transmit moral values between generations. It also supplies 
a ready- built cultural- self- model, providing a template from which a 
Projected self can be constructed as ONE AMONG EQUALS.
A cultural group directive can operate on the group in the same 
way as an environmental directive: it can drive the group in a particular 
evolutionary direction. Adami et al. (2000, 4463) define evolution as ‘a 
simple yet powerful process that requires only a population of reprodu-
cing organisms in which each offspring has the potential for a heritable 
variation from its parent’. This means that, as long as there are genetic 
variations in a population that favour a particular evolutionary direction, 
and advantages to the individual in taking that particular direction, the 
population will, over generations, migrate toward those favoured genetic 
variations. What makes a particular evolutionary direction advantageous 
really doesn’t matter:  where there is a continuing environmental dir-
ective of any kind on individuals, genetic conformity is a likely outcome.
Several theories have been proposed about what this environ-
mental directive could have been. For example, Chris Knight et al. (1995) 
have suggested gendered coalitions as the moral framework promoting 
self- effacing equality. In this theory, variously called Sex Strike Theory or 
Female Kin Coalition or Female Cosmetic Coalition, females and males 
are differentiated by role, with males hunting big game to bring home a 
cooperative kill (the male hunting group is subject to reverse dominance), 
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which is cooked and shared out by the women. The gendered coalition is 
maintained by policed access to sex (the female group controls access 
to fertile females, and therefore reproductive sex, through a coalition of 
related females). The whole system is driven by a lunar cycle whereby 
sex is withdrawn at dark moon, the men go hunting at full moon (when 
the night is bright enough to continue a hunt through the night), the kill 
is brought back and cooked soon after full moon, and sex happens until 
dark moon, when the cycle begins again. As a theory, it does explain some 
aspects of human anatomy and processes: the equivalence of the average 
human menstrual cycle and the synodic lunar month of 29– 30 days; the 
fact that female cycles may synchronise (McClintock 1971); the signifi-
cance of red ochre in the archaeological record (Watts 2017); ritualised 
group hunting (Lewis 2008); and the matrilocal, matrifocal regimes of 
many hunter- gatherer groups (Jordan et al. 2009). While it is more fully 
evidenced than other ideas about human evolution and cultural devel-
opment, Sex Strike Theory remains a theory; but it is a necessary theory. 
There must have been some form of cultural system similar to that of Sex 
Strike Theory that focussed the group on individual unselfishness; only 
with that cultural system in place could ONE AMONG EQUALS become a 
consciously enforced metaphor.
Mapping metaphor to rhetoric and deception
One major feature of the sharing of social models is that externally 
referenced truth is not needed. The information in a shared social model 
is so rich that even deliberate falsehoods reveal important truths about 
the speaker or sender of the message. As we saw in Chapter 4, deception 
in childhood is treated equivocally: antisocial deception is discouraged 
and punished; but shared deception, such as story- telling, and group 
deception, such as cultural conformity, are encouraged and rewarded. 
This reward and punishment approach to different truths prepares the 
child for a nuanced adult relationship with virtual and real truths, which 
may even contradict unpalatable actual truths.
Language is designed to encourage the right kind of deception 
and discourage the wrong kind, and metaphor is an important part of 
that training process. In fact, we have developed a set of skills based 
around the effective use of metaphoric language to convey the infor-
mation we want to convey, whether that information is explicitly true, 
implicitly true or cultural accepted. We call this skill- set ‘rhetoric’, and 
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whole industries have grown up around the need to inform and (mostly) 
persuade.
There is not enough room here to do justice to the industry of 
socialised deception that has become a mainstay of the group choices 
and individual preferences in our modern culture, so I  will provide 
only one, very small example of how language can subliminally affect 
our thinking  – and how our thinking can subliminally affect our lan-
guage. A commonly quoted description of rhetoric was given by Deirdre 
McCloskey, when she wrote:
Rhetoric is merely a tool, no bad thing in itself. Or rather, it is the 
box of tools for persuasion taken together, available to persuaders, 
good and bad.
(McCloskey 1998, 169)
In a discussion between Giles Brandreth and his son, Benet 
Brandreth, QC (Giles Brandreth and the Art of Persuasion, 31 March 
2018, BBC Radio 4), Brandreth Senior referred to rhetoric as ‘a toolbox 
or box of tricks’. His son then pointed out the vital difference in meaning 
between ‘box of tools’ and ‘box of tricks’:  the first treats rhetoric as a 
system for persuasion, the second as a system of deception. These, how-
ever, are not the only ways that McCloskey’s utterance can be varied. 
Instead of ‘box of tools’, rhetoric could be described as an engine or a 
system, metaphors for something more organised than a box of tools. Or, 
instead of ‘rhetoric … is a box of tools’, rhetoric could offer a box of tools, 
converting rhetoric itself from an inanimate to an animate thing, and 
giving it the power to act; or instead of being ‘for persuasion’ it could be 
to persuade, implying that there is a person to be persuaded as well as a 
persuader.
When McCloskey made her linguistic choices, were they choices of 
which she was aware? Or were they the outcome of subliminal intuitions 
about how she could best express herself in context? We can probably 
never know, because we produce language in both of those ways. In 
every utterance, we make choices about how we say or write things, 
and we select metaphorical relationships to express ourselves, whether 
those metaphors are consciously chosen, culturally dictated or sublimin-
ally dredged up from deep down in our psyche. Pennebaker et al. (2003) 
show that word choices reflect our subliminal cognition, both our current 
emotional state and our deep and unknowable self; and our uttered word 
choices have similar subliminal effects upon our listeners. We may think 
we have conscious control over what we are saying and the truths we 
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are giving out; but the truth of what we actually mean is usually there in 
what we actually say.
The power of metaphor converts a primate communication system, 
originally designed to mark actualities in the world, into a negotiation 
toward realities and virtualities. Even if we want them to, honesty and 
truth don’t really come into language.
  
163
8
What Is a Self? There and Back Again
‘What do you mean by that?’ said the Caterpillar sternly. ‘Explain 
yourself!’
‘I can’t explain myself, I’m afraid, sir’ said Alice, ‘because I’m 
not myself, you see.’
‘I don’t see,’ said the Caterpillar.
‘I’m afraid I  can’t put it more clearly,’ Alice replied very 
politely, ‘for I can’t understand it myself to begin with; and being so 
many different sizes in a day is very confusing.’
(Lewis Carroll 1865, Chapter 5: ‘Advice from a Caterpillar’)
Poor Alice! Not being Alice means that she cannot explain Alice to the 
Caterpillar; even worse, she cannot understand why she cannot explain 
Alice, because the Alice she has been since falling down the rabbit- hole 
has been inconsistent and unanchored. The Caterpillar, on the other 
hand, has a very firm understanding of the self he is, and cannot under-
stand why Alice is not equally certain about her self; yet, as Alice later 
points out, the Caterpillar will at some stage undergo his own trans-
formation, much more fundamental than hers, when he chrysalises 
and transforms into a butterfly. Will the butterfly- self recognise the 
caterpillar- self? And, if so, will he remember the caterpillar- self as being 
himself, or just a self? Or will there be a major dislocation of memory 
and selfhood, so the butterfly does not even remember its life as a cater-
pillar? There is some evidence that moths can retain aversive behaviours 
learned as caterpillars (Blackiston et al. 2008), but it is unlikely that a 
moth or butterfly knows that it used to be a caterpillar. At least Alice has 
continuity in her selfhood, so that the Alice of today is a product of, and 
remembers, the Alice of yesterday – even if she cannot explain what it is 
that defines today’s Alice.
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However, is there really a continuity of selfhood that humans can 
use to define their selves? Or is discontinuity actually the way our selves 
work? Is continuity yet another of the self- illusions (or self- delusions) 
that humans are so adept at modelling? To examine this debate, we need 
to look more closely at what kinds of self define us, how they define us 
and why we let them define us.
Let us start by setting out the types of self we need to talk about. Two 
of them have been discussed so far in some detail: the Social self and the 
Cultural self. Two have been mentioned in passing: the Episodic self and 
the Narrative self. And two have been rather underplayed, considering 
their importance: the self- model and the Projected self. That leaves the 
elephant in the room, which has been largely ignored so far: the actual, 
physical self that continues to sit on the sofa eating peanuts and ignoring 
all metaphysical attempts to wish it away. It is here that we need to begin 
our definition of selves.
To help us in our self- definition, we should start in a traditional 
fantasy- story way, with a map showing the journey ‘there and back 
again’.1 This does not mean that the story of the selves is a fantasy, but it 
is, like all good fantasy stories, a metaphor of a reality – and metaphors 
are both more entertaining and more revealing than gritty reality stories. 
Figure  8.1 shows us the map of our tour round the selves, and it also 
shows the relationships between the selves.
Social selves
The self others
believe me to be
Cultural self
The self I should be
Actual self
Unknowable
Narrative self
The remembered self,
the self with history
Episodic
selves
The self as
modelled in
individual
past events
Self
-mo
del
The
 sel
f I b
elie
ve m
e to
 be
Projected self
The self I want others
to believe me to be
Fig 8.1 Types of self
The arrows indicate information flows. The big ones represent information flows into and out of the 
individual’s cognition, the smaller ones represent information flows within the individual’s cogni-
tion. The direction of the arrow is the direction of the flow.
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The Actual self: unknowable
The fact that we have a physical self is inescapable: all selfhood resides in 
the brain, which is a component of the physical body; and it is the phys-
ical self in the brain that regulates the body. For practical purposes, and 
ignoring the unprovable non- physical, there is no existent self without 
the physical self. This makes the physical, or Actual, self a key feature 
of selfhood. The Actual self is a Darwinian gene- machine  – unlike all 
the other selves, which are cognitive products of a Darwinian gene- 
machine – which means that the Actual self is directly governed by the 
twin genetic imperatives to survive and thrive. It has no interest in philo-
sophical positions such as self- sacrifice or generosity, unless they directly 
lead to enhanced personal survival or enhanced reproductive success. So 
when William Hamilton said:
… in the world of our model organisms, whose behaviour is 
determined strictly by genotype, we expect to find that no one is 
prepared to sacrifice his life for any single person but that everyone 
will sacrifice it when he can thereby save more than two brothers, 
or four half- brothers, or eight first cousins …
(Hamilton 1964, 16)
… he was speaking for his Actual self. Three brothers, five half- 
brothers or nine first cousins all have more of my genes that I do – that is, 
if I can be assured of no sexual cheating by my mother, grandmother or 
aunts. In the actual world, this Hamiltonian kinship calculus is hedged- 
around with uncertainties, and not just in terms of non- monogamous 
relatives; so the safest strategy for the Actual self remains, look out for 
number one.
Unlike the other selves, the Actual self is not a conscious represen-
tation of the self. Yes, invasions of the self– other boundary cause 
discomforts or pleasure – injury causes pain, food causes satiation; but 
these are innate electrochemical reactions generated within the Actual 
self. They require no conscious attention – the Actual self does not need 
to be an aware self. An organism can handle pain and pleasure with its 
autonomic responses (involuntary, innate mechanisms) or its automatic 
responses (incidentally acquired mechanisms that are non- conscious but 
which may be subject to contextual override). For the organism to experi-
ence pain or pleasure, there is no need for a self that is able to recognise 
themself as being in pain or being happy.
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Also unlike the other selves, the Actual self is not a constructed 
model. Where the other selves represent, the Actual self just is. And 
where the modelled selves are either differentiated (different selves of 
the same type) or integrated (the outcome of merging different self- 
models to create a new modelled self) or both, the Actual self is neither 
differentiated nor integrated. There is only one Actual self, and it is not 
the product of modelling or other cognitive manipulation. However, 
because it is not a conscious representation, it is also rather dull. It may 
be the elephant in the room, sitting on the couch and eating peanuts, but 
we have no need to disturb it. It is happy being ignored, although it is not 
necessarily aware of being happy.
The Social self: the self others believe me to be
The Social self is the first self of which we are consciously aware – the 
model of my self offered by others as part of the exchange of social cal-
culus. Unlike most of the other selves, therefore, it is provided wholly 
from outside the self, and is therefore subject to the receiver’s dilemma 
that accompanies any shared information: why should I believe it?
The answer lies in the peculiar nature of social calculus information. 
First, it is opinion, not knowledge, and it is offered and received as such; 
it already contains its own veracity warning. Second, it is offered about 
me to me: the first time this happens, I have no pre- existing data against 
which to check the offered model, but at all subsequent times I have a 
growing database modelling how I am seen by others, so I can accept or 
reject this new opinion based on that database. Third, if it is offered in a 
social calculus equation, then I can check the offered information against 
my own social calculus: does it mesh with the information already in my 
system or does it produce anomalies or contradictions? Fourth, any social 
calculus information offered is a World 3 reality, not a World 2 virtuality 
or a World 1 actuality; all information is subject to negotiation toward 
meaning – both with the sender and with my models of my self.
These caveats to veracity mean that all models of me offered to me 
are factually relative: their ‘truth’ is relative to the social calculus of the 
sender and to my own social calculus. I should not expect to receive social 
models of me that give a single group impression of who I am; instead, 
I will receive a number of different, individual views. Some of these views 
will differ from each other only slightly, while others will differ mark-
edly; but their multiplicity means that the Social self is differentiated, 
with more than one model available to the self.
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The self- model: the self I believe me to be
Accepting models of my self from others is informative in building a pic-
ture of how I am viewed by others; but, more importantly for the story 
of selfhood, it provides a third- person model of me to sit in my social 
calculus system – and this model appears to be undifferentiated. So how 
to collapse the many Social selves into one self- model? The obvious solu-
tion is to merge the different social models into an integrated self- model, 
discarding contradictions; but, because of the wide variation in Social 
selves offered to me, this is neither possible nor necessary. Instead, we 
tend to hold cognitive representations of several self- models, although 
only one at a time (the self- in- context) is treated as the valid self for 
modelling purposes. Over time, we cycle through a range of self- models 
depending on our current electrochemical state, the context in which we 
are self- modelling and the company we are keeping.
Each of my self- models is integrated from sets of social models, but 
because I have more than one self- model they are also differentiated; and 
because the currently active model changes over time, the self- model is 
also protean – like an amoeba, it constantly changes its form. This vari-
able nature of the self can become an important source of self- anxiety: do 
my inconsistencies represent a failure or fraying of my integrated self-
hood? There is only one actual, physical me, so why do there seem to be 
several real me’s?
One way out of the dilemma is to ignore the differences and simply 
believe there is a fully integrated self- model that collocates with the 
Actual self. This seems to be the solution chosen by narcissists, who usu-
ally avoid internalised self- awareness in favour of externalised approba-
tion. Their internal self- models (their egos) are often brittle and easily 
damaged. Any criticism is not just criticism of the critic’s model of the 
narcissist, it is criticism of the single self- model the narcissist possesses; 
it is, therefore, criticism of the narcissist in every possible way. Critics 
are therefore dealt with vindictively and with an overkill out of propor-
tion to the criticism offered (Campbell and Baumeister 2006). However, 
while this is a description of people who would be clinically diagnosed as 
narcissists, it is also a description of most of us at one time or another: we 
all sometimes believe that the currently active self- model is our only 
self- model, and take criticism badly. What is being described here is a 
strategy of selfhood, not necessarily an aberrant psychological behaviour 
(Krajco 2007). What makes it aberrant is if it is an individual’s default, or 
only, strategy.
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A second way out of the dilemma is to believe that the differences 
amount to a negation of an integrated self- model. All I have to inform 
my self- model are the impressions that others have of me; and these 
can be manipulated by adopting whatever appearance- model will get 
me immediate gratification. This seems to be the solution of sociopaths 
(also called psychopaths), who take the protean aspect of self- modelling 
to extremes: they will do, say and be whatever they need to in order to 
manipulate others and satisfy their needs. There is no negotiation toward 
meaning for sociopaths because there is only one relevant meaning to 
the universe  – that of the undifferentiated self. And criticism does not 
matter, because there is no self- model to criticise, only a projected model 
or appearance that can be adjusted to meet current needs. If someone 
does not like the self you are projecting, project a different self (Gallagher 
2013b). To quote Groucho Marx, ‘Those are my principles, and if you 
don’t like them … well, I have others’.
Once again, it must be emphasised that what is described here is not 
a diagnostic aid for identifying clinical sociopathy. It is a self- modelling 
behaviour that we all display at one time or another. In fact, the frequency 
of clinical sociopathy in the general population (about 3 per cent of males 
and just under 1 per cent of females) makes them unusual but not rare 
(Mealey 1995). On any London tube train during rush hour, there are 
likely to be a dozen or more people who would be diagnosed as socio-
pathic if their behaviour warranted a diagnosis; but, in the vast majority 
of cases and for most of the time, it does not.
A third way out of the dilemma is not really a way out at all. It 
is possible to surrender to the multiple selves by losing the capacity 
to control which single self- model dominates at any one time. This is 
the problem that schizophrenics face, with the different self- models 
competing in the conscious mind, rather than being policed by the sub-
conscious mind and presented to the conscious mind one at a time. 
In this case, my inconsistencies do not represent a failure or fraying 
of the integrated model of my selfhood, they really are the fraying of 
my selfhood. This collapsing selfhood causes the boundaries between 
actuality, reality and virtuality to blur even more than usual, hence 
typical schizophrenic symptoms include hallucinations and delusions. 
The lack of a cohesive self- model also affects the self that the 
person can project, causing breakdowns in their social relationships 
(Bowes 2014).
Schizophrenia is a particularly interesting ‘solution’ to the many- 
selves dilemma, because it seems to be a by- product of having lan-
guage: the condition has been linked to language in several ways. First, 
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schizophrenia is linked to dysphasia, or the loss of communicative com-
petency; and it also seems to affect phonology, leading to flat- toned 
speech (Covington et al. 2005). Second, schizophrenia has been shown 
to be implicated in the language and social- modelling areas of the brain. 
Radanovic et al. (2013) discovered a link between formal thought dis-
order (a diagnostic criterion for schizophrenia) and language impair-
ment. The severity of both impairments was correlated with deficits in 
the left superior temporal gyrus and the left planum temporale, both 
areas in a Statistically Standard Brain (SSB)2 implicated in language; and 
in the orbitofrontal cortex, which is implicated in modelling for decision- 
making, including social calculus modelling. Pu et  al. (2017) identi-
fied correlated deficits in the anterior part of the temporal cortex, the 
ventro- lateral prefrontal cortex, the dorso- lateral prefrontal cortex and 
frontopolar cortex areas of the brain – all areas implicated in both social 
cognition (particularly ToM) and language production. It seems that 
schizophrenia is somehow involved in the neural connections between 
social cognition and language cognition.
It also seems that there may be a genetic basis to the link between 
schizophrenia and language. The gene FOXP2 is implicated in both lan-
guage production and hallucinatory episodes in schizophrenia (Tolosa 
et al. 2010); there does not seem to be a causal relationship, but there 
is a strong correlation. Srinivasan et al. (2016) showed that many of the 
genes implicated in schizophrenia are also involved in general cogni-
tive development, and specifically human versions of the genes seem to 
have appeared since the split between humans and Neanderthals. These 
gene- forms seem to be absent from chimpanzee genomes (Srinivasan 
et al. 2017).
Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is another condition in which 
the individual seems to surrender to the dilemma of multiple selves. This 
condition has similarities to schizophrenia, and it is often presented in 
the lay media as schizophrenia. In terms of the SSMH, it poses a slightly 
different problem for the individual:  it is not that the selves are indis-
tinct, it is that there is no concord between them; each self has somehow 
set itself up as an independent person – sometimes with recognition that 
there is only one shared body, but sometimes not. Whitehead points 
out that we all live with multiple modelled personalities when he says, 
‘Shakespeare can fill a stage with characters, all of whom act and speak 
convincingly as whole and distinct persons, though all were born within 
a ‘single’ mind’ (Whitehead 2001, 4). The problem with DID would 
seem to be that Shakespeare has left the stage, and all that is left are the 
characters.
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Depersonalisation Disorder is yet another condition on the schizo-
phrenia spectrum where SSMH may be relevant. In this condition, indi-
viduals feel they are somehow not a real person:  the modelling is still 
working, but the self has gone missing (Baker et al. 2003). It is a state 
that we are all in at some point in our lives, and it is only a disorder when 
it becomes prolonged. This condition shows that the metaphor SELF IS 
OTHER is more than just a cognitive explanation after the fact; it is itself 
a cognitive fact with consequences.
Between too little modelling, too many selves, and not enough self, 
the schizophrenia spectrum seems to be a product of self- modelling. 
However, as with narcissism and sociopathy, it must be emphasised that 
what is being discussed here is a self- modelling behaviour, and does not 
necessarily indicate a medical condition. Poor Alice could not explain 
herself because a very confusing day had exhausted her range of self- 
models, leaving her with no dominant self to rely on; but she did recover 
quite spectacularly by the end of the book. In a similar way, we can be 
left nonplussed and dumbfounded without needing a diagnosis of formal 
thought disorder and dysphasia. Life may currently be complicated; this, 
too, shall pass.
Most of us wander around in this triangle of selfhood extremes 
without particular difficulty, doing what we need to get by as a self- 
modelling entity; and mostly we do it without being consciously aware of 
the choices we are making about our self- modelling. The terminology of 
selfhood modelling often deceptively implies conscious choices are being 
made in self- modelling; but most self- modelling involves subconscious 
cognition, implicit knowledge and automatic responses. We first start 
to build our self- models when we receive our first recognised piece of 
information about our self from others; and this happens around age 2, 
when the child becomes aware of the dyadic negotiation toward meaning 
between them and their caregiver. ‘Daddy loves Baby’ may sound like a 
simple idea for adults to comprehend, but it makes huge demands on the 
social calculus and social modelling of the child, long before the child has 
conscious knowledge of their social selfhood.
The Episodic self: the self as modelled 
in individual past events
The Episodic self is a feature that emerges from the combination of 
self- modelling and conscious memory recall. As an emergent feature, 
the Episodic self is neither directly learned nor directly innate; it is 
what becomes possible when there is an interaction between two other 
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features that are, themselves, learned or innate (Pomerantz and Cragin 
2015). The emergent feature of the Episodic self seems to be particularly 
interesting, because one of the interacting features is learned and the 
other is innate: the combination of the capacity to self- model (learned) 
and the capacity to remember events in the past (innate) creates the pos-
sibility of modelling a self in a remembered past event. Instead of the 
event being passively visceral – the emotions of the event are remembered 
as emotions – it becomes actively visceral – the emotions of the event are 
remembered as my own emotions. The Episodic self is, therefore, more 
than just an episodic memory, and it is equally as real as any self- model.
An Episodic self is not a memory of a past self- model; it is a current 
representation constructed from the social- self evidence currently avail-
able. When we remember our self, we do not remember our self- model 
as it was when the memory was laid down; rather, we construct a current 
self- model to represent our previous self. Giorgio Marchetti (2014) 
says this is because we are prone to three ‘sins’ of memory:  we forget 
or mitigate the visceral emotions that were actually generated by the 
event, making our emotional memory of the event unreliable; we distort 
our memories by remembering the events themselves incorrectly, thus 
rendering our procedural memory of the event unreliable; and we over- 
emphasise some aspects of the event while under- emphasising others, 
thus pathologising our memory of the event. To use a von Neumann com-
puter metaphor, recalling a memory is not just accessing a fixed memory- 
image like a file on a hard drive; it involves copying the memory- image 
into working memory, adjusting the memory and then writing it back 
as a new image (Schiller and Phelps 2011). But memory is not just acci-
dentally inherently fallible; it is important that it be so, so that each time 
I recall the memory I can model the experiences in the past event as my 
experiences in relation to my current self- model.
Yet another feature makes an episodic self- model unreliable as a 
model of my previous self: it is composed of more than my own memory 
of the event. The sharing of social models is more effective if the contexts 
and evidence of those models are also shared; so any memory I have of a 
past event is overlaid with the memories of others about that event – and 
every viewpoint of the event is different. What I believe is my memory of 
the event, seldom is; instead it is, like my models of my self and others, 
an amalgam of viewpoints and opinions. The Episodic self is a memory of 
a self- model that was originally generated from the models of me offered 
by others, and when recalled it is then edited by my current model of me 
and by more models of me offered by others.
If the Episodic self is just a type of self- model, and self- modelling is 
an outcome of shared social calculus, and sharing social calculus seems 
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to be limited to humans, then is it possible for non- humans to have 
Episodic selves? The simple answer would seem to be no; but, because 
the Episodic self is an emergent feature, the actual answer is more com-
plex. One of the two components of an Episodic self is the capacity to 
recall past events, which Endel Tulving (2005) calls noetic memory, 
contrasting it with autonoetic memory (the capacity to recall past events 
that include the past self’s own perspective). Tulving takes the view 
that autonoetic memory is available only to humans. In his description, 
autonoetic memory seems similar to episodic memory, having both recall 
and a self- perspective. Tulving’s autonoetic self- perspective is that of a 
past self; but is that a true self- perspective, and is that past self really 
available to the current self as a self- model?
Some researchers disagree with Tulving’s view. Fabbro et al. (2015) 
propose that a capacity for autonoetic memory is likely to be present in 
non- human brains, because the neurologically complex brain areas 
associated with human selfhood have correlates in those non- human 
brains. However, it remains to be demonstrated that the correlate areas 
function in the same capacity in both brains. In contrast, Robert Numan 
(2015) differentiates non- human from human episodic memory by 
describing it as ‘episodic- like’. This is a more cautious approach that does 
not necessarily require the generation of an Episodic self. It also gives 
us a convenient way to label the difference between the autonoetic epi-
sodic selfhood of humans and the otherwise episodic memory that many 
mammals do appear to possess.
If episodic selfhood, like Tulving’s autonoetic memory, is an innate 
capacity in humans, then we have a problem explaining how it evolved. 
If, however, it emerges from the modelled self plus noetic memory, and 
the modelled self is an outcome of sharing social calculus, then we can 
say that episodic selfhood is a synthesis of pre- existing cognitive systems. 
It is a learned trick, a way of creating a third- person social calculus model 
that happens to represent the self. Autonoetic memory is not a species- 
difference requiring its own evolutionary explanation; it is just noetic 
memory plus a trick.
The Narrative self: the remembered self, the self with 
history
The concept of Narrative self, or narrative identity, was perhaps first 
codified by Paul Ricoeur (1990 [1992], Chapter 6) and Jerome Bruner 
(1990, Chapter  4). Although it had already been discussed by earlier 
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commentators, Ricoeur and Bruner were the first to define what a 
Narrative self is. Basically, the Narrative self is the model we make of our 
life experiences as an evolving story – a stitching- together of the various 
Episodic selves in such a way that they can be viewed as aspects of a single 
self. Where the Episodic selves, being self- models, are differentiated (a 
series of models instead of an integrated single model), the Narrative self 
is an integrated meta- model.
As the Narrative self is a product of the migration of selfhood, from 
the Social self through the self- model and then the Episodic self, it is 
more virtual than real; and yet it is the self we most often call on to define 
our me- ness. What is it that makes this self so attractive as a model of 
me? The answer appears to be that the Narrative self provides the indi-
vidual with a sense of unity and purpose. It establishes the two cognitive 
concepts that having a self is supposed to enact: the concept of the single 
me and the concept of the continuous me. Although we cannot know it 
from the inside, this is what the Actual self seems to be from the out-
side: an entity delimited in both space and time; but, within those limits, 
a single integrated entity.
However, the Narrative self is also the most controversial of the 
selves. As we saw in Chapter 1, for Thomas Metzinger the Narrative self 
is an illusion because ‘we are not things, but processes’ (2003, 325). 
He is correct in saying this, inasmuch as our cognition is a process; but 
our brains and our bodies definitely are things. Our self can be seen as 
a system (a set of processes reliant on a particular structure to convert 
inputs into outputs). And a system contains both structure (a physical 
organisation which, when activated, converts inputs to outputs in a pre-
dictable way) and process (a particular route taken through a structure 
by an input to become an output). The Narrative self may be a virtuality, 
but it is also a product of realities that are emplaced in actualities. The 
Narrative self may not work as a thing; but as a metaphor or representa-
tion of a thing, it works just fine.
We have also seen that, for Galen Strawson, a Narrative self is 
not a prerequisite for being human. He says:  ‘It is not true that there is 
only one way in which human beings experience their being in time. 
There are deeply non- Narrative people and there are good ways to live 
that are deeply non- Narrative’ (Strawson 2004, 13). Non- narrativity is, 
therefore, likely to be a correct diagnosis for some individuals without it 
affecting their cognition or socialisation. However, as Drummond et al. 
(2015) and Grossman et  al. (2017) show, deficits in Narrative self do 
seem, at least in old age, to be associated with deficits in other cogni-
tion: the absence of a Narrative self in these cases is a by- product of other 
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cognitive conditions that cause narrativity issues more extensive than 
just the lack of a Narrative self.
When it comes to efforts to recreate a humanlike experience in 
machine form, scientists working in artificial intelligence have a clear 
understanding of the need for a Narrative self. For Pointeau and Dominey 
(2017), the Narrative self is a necessary tool for sharing plans, and it 
allows individuals to negotiate toward meaning in joint enterprises. 
These authors equipped their iCub robot with an AutoBiographical 
Memory (ABM), which is a simulation of a Narrative self, and showed 
that, when the ABM is linked to language, plans and activities could be 
negotiated between the robot and the trainer:
We previously suggested that shared planning could be developed 
based on 5 prerequisites: (1) object and agent perception, (2) per-
ception of state changes (allows action perception), (3) ability to 
distinguish between self and other, (4) emotion/ outcome percep-
tion, and (5)  statistical sequence learning … These mechanisms, 
plus a specific ABM and methods for operating on the contents 
of the ABM allow for the capabilities reviewed in this report. As 
mentioned, we find the need for one additional capability, which is 
an interface between the language system and the ABM, in the form 
of a situation model. This is required in order to explicitly represent 
narrative relations between events that are not accounted for in 
the ABM.
(Pointeau and Dominey 2017, 16)
The six- feature ABM makes the iCub’s interaction with the trainer 
impressively humanlike. So we can see that, if Strawson is right that 
the Narrative self is not a necessity for a functioning human, or even if 
Metzinger is right that the Narrative self is not a thing, there is still a pur-
pose for a Narrative self in the interpersonal negotiation toward meaning 
and joint enterprise; and a deficit in Narrative self makes that negotiation 
harder. It may be completely virtual, but there does seem to be some 
practical use in having a Narrative self.
The Cultural self: the self I should be
A Cultural self, like the Social selves, is a model offered to the individual 
by others; but, unlike the Social selves, it is a virtual self. It is a model of an 
ideal individual in this particular culture, explicitly the ideal self that the 
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individual can be. A culture usually has many ideal models, differentiated 
by gender, role, lineage, age group and any other way that the culture 
divides up its population. For instance, the Hindu caste system is based 
largely on gender and lineage, and it delimits not just the range of roles 
possible for an individual, it dictates how they are treated, whom they 
can marry, what they can eat and even what or whom they can touch 
(Pratheesh 2015). There are four main castes: priests, warriors, owning 
professions and labouring professions – a pattern repeated in internally 
specialist societies across the world. Unlike most other systems, how-
ever, the four Hindu castes are formally subdivided into sub- castes (in 
other cultures this level of differentiation is usually informal); but, like 
many other systems, there is also a formal gender- based differentiation, 
further limiting life choices. The caste system is a powerful engine for 
ensuring that life goes on regardless of who is in charge; but this also 
allows one ruling class to be replaced by another relatively seamlessly, 
without affecting the day- to- day functioning of the society. After seizing 
power in India, the Delhi Sultanate, the Mughal Empire and the British 
Raj all re- emphasised the caste system to retain control over the popu-
lace. The Hindu caste system is one of several historical systems that 
modern, global, pluralistic societies are breaking down; but a socially 
differentiated system nonetheless remains an important feature of 
most cultures today. The limited mobility between British social classes 
remains a case in point.
However, even if the range of ideal, or cultural, selves offered by 
a culture is quite wide, the options offered to each individual usually 
remain quite limited; and out of the small range offered, each individual 
often chooses one model as their lifelong Cultural self. This limitation is 
even observable in perhaps the least class- bound society in the world, 
that of the USA. Kraus and Park (2014) showed that perceived social 
class is correlated with self- evaluation: the higher the former, the higher 
the latter. Yet individuals do not usually change their Cultural self to 
enhance self- evaluation; the model they have been given is the model 
they accept. This acquiescence to the group opinion is even more notice-
able in another modern culture, which places a high value on conformity 
to the Cultural self. As Markus and Kitayama (1991) say, ‘In America, 
“the squeaky wheel gets the grease.” In Japan, “the nail that stands 
out gets pounded down” ’ (224). They describe the American approach 
as an independent view of the self  – the cultural view of the self does 
not include other individuals; while the Japanese approach is an inter-
dependent view of the self – the Cultural self is projected into the social 
calculus of the individual. The authors suggest that Western belief in the 
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Cultural self as independent seems to produce a less happy and healthy 
human society than the interdependent model.
Toon van Meijl (2008) pursues a similar idea when he describes the 
need for a ‘dialogical self’ to counter the limiting idea of a single Cultural 
self. Nowadays, we are faced not with a single culture to which we must 
relate, but a multiplicity of cultures we dip into, and aspects of which we 
incorporate into our Cultural self. The Cultural self is no longer a single 
target of selfness for which I should aim – the best me I can be – it is a 
changing and moving target. To keep up with the changes to the Cultural 
self, we need a dialogical self between the received social models and 
the received Cultural self. This seems to be missing from the SSMH 
model presented here, but this is because van Meijl has agglomerated the 
Cultural self with the Projected self. Where the self- model acts as a buffer 
between the received Social selves and the Projected self in the SSMH 
model, van Meijl places the dialogic self between the received Social 
selves and the Cultural/ Projected self.
In the SSMH model, the main route by which the Social selves are 
incorporated into the Projected self comes around the other side of the 
‘wheel’, through the self- model, the Episodic and the Narrative selves. 
The Cultural self (the self I should be) stands alone as a separate soci-
etal imposition on the self- model and on the Projected self. The best me 
I can be is a different imposition on my selfhood from the social calculus 
models of me:  it is not how others see me but how others wish me to 
be. In the SSMH, there is no need to posit a novel mechanism to handle 
modern differentiated culture, because we could not have developed 
modern differentiated culture if the mechanisms for it were not already 
present in some form.
This does not mean, however, that modelling a Cultural self in a 
modern differentiated culture is simple or even linear. Navarro et  al. 
(2014) showed that, for Mexican American college students, there was 
an iterative relationship between the Cultural self and the personal self 
(or self- model), such that retention of cultural heritage increased self- 
esteem, and higher self- esteem led to greater heritage- culture retention. 
Nataliya Aristova (2016) showed that changes in the Cultural self can 
also feed back out to the culture via the Projected self: the Cultural self 
projected onto the individual by the culture is, in the end, just the sum 
of the Cultural selves projected onto the culture by the individuals. As 
Aristova says, ‘Self- identification through culture and building up new 
cultural identities in new socio- cultural environments will always remain 
very significant factors for the self- determination of nations, countries 
and regions of the world’ (Aristova 2016, 160).
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Chien- Ru Sun (2017) looked at a different issue regarding the 
Cultural self: the number of selves the culture imposes on the individual. 
Sun identified four types of self in the relationship between the individual 
and Chinese culture: the individual- oriented self (which collocates with 
the self- model), and three culturally imposed selves. The Cultural selves 
are: the models of my ideal self offered to me by individual others in one- 
to- one exchanges (the relationship- oriented self); the models of my ideal 
self offered to me by my family (the familistic [group]- oriented self); 
and the models of my ideal self implicit in my culture (the other- oriented 
self). Sun describes the other- oriented self as ‘the most undeniable’ 
(2017, 14): for an individual in a Chinese culture, the Cultural self plays 
a significant role in generating self- models, and the cultural- self- models 
of who I should be, as offered by the society around me, are more signifi-
cant than for a Western individual.
The Cultural self, like the Narrative self, is a virtual self; it has only 
as much value as its human society is willing to give it. This can vary from 
very little (in societies valuing independent selfhood) to very much (in 
societies valuing interdependent selfhood). However, the Cultural self is 
also an aspirational self: each individual has an individual relationship 
with their Cultural self, which varies according to their need or wish to 
conform, whether they see their Cultural self as attainable and (at the 
subconscious level) whether the Cultural self is more or less fit for them 
than other self- models. It is in the Cultural self that dispassionate self- 
sacrifice begins, so the Cultural self is the key to a large number of our 
anxieties and self- doubts; the Cultural self supplies both the angel on our 
right shoulder and the devil on our left. As Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn put 
it, ‘The battleline between good and evil runs through the heart of every 
person.’
The Projected self: the self I want others to believe 
me to be
What is the purpose of accepting all the offered models of my self and 
generating yet more models of my self from them? If the only product of 
self- modelling is self- sacrifice, then it seems a poor return for a hefty cost 
in terms of cognition. Two reasons why self- modelling should benefit the 
individual have been explored so far: first, that a more complete social 
calculus allows better representation of relationships within my group; 
and second, that being able to share social models increases the range of 
cooperative possibilities with other members of my group. In both cases, 
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the fitness of the individual is enhanced by being part of a fitter group. 
Another reason why self- modelling is so valuable may lie in the fact that, 
as well as being able to model my self, I can project that model back into 
the world. I  am no longer an it modelled by others to manipulate me; 
I  am a she or a he or a they. This makes me a person with an agenda, 
with whom meanings can be negotiated. Negotiating with others toward 
meaning about others makes me an active player in communication – a 
me and a you; which means that the self- model I  present to the world 
becomes part of the negotiation.
The Projected, or public, self is an emergent feature of the social 
models I  receive, moderated through three routes:  first, via self- 
modelling, Episodic self and Narrative self; second, directly via self- 
modelling; and third, via Cultural self. Or, to put it another way, the 
Projected self is an amalgam of my internal representations of myself 
and the expectations that others put upon me. However, there also 
seems to be a feedback loop outside of the self that allows the Projected 
self to affect the Social self: the self I want others to believe me to be can 
become one of the selves others believe me to be. Dianne Tice (1992) 
showed that, where a behaviour is performed as a public act (and, there-
fore, is available to be presented back to me as a Social self), it is more 
likely to moderate my Projected self than if it is performed as a private 
act. Where the individual has an ongoing interaction with a group of 
people, the more pronounced are the adjustments the received Social 
selves make to the Projected self.
Sedikides and Skowronsi (2000) describe how the public self 
emerges from the symbolic self (an amalgam of the self- model with the 
Social, Episodic, Narrative and Cultural selves) to control the presen-
tation of self to others. They see the public self as contributing to pri-
vate self- knowledge through ‘reflected appraisal (i.e., seeing the self as 
important group members see the self)’ (Sedikides and Skowronsi 2000, 
100). However, relying on self- appraisal in this way is not an internal 
process: the only way I can be aware of how others see me is via the social 
self- models they offer me. For Sedikides and Skowronsi, the symbolic self 
relies on the opinions we receive, and self- esteem (how much I person-
ally value my self- model as a person) is dictated by the interpersonal 
evaluations offered by others.
Yet the Projected self is not just an unconscious product of received 
models of my self; there is conscious input to the model, too. While the 
relationship between the self- model and the Projected self is largely not 
under cognitive control  – I  automatically project a version of my self 
composed from the models of my self I receive from others – the input 
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from the Cultural self is aspirational. The Cultural self is a virtual model 
that is not me, but rather what me could be; and it opens the way for 
any virtual self- model to be used in the creation of a Projected self. For 
instance, Nystedt and Ljungberg (2002), in a series of experiments, found 
that the public self is on a continuum between style- consciousness (what 
I am presenting) and appearance- consciousness (how I am presenting); 
and the private self is on a continuum between self- reflectiveness 
(knowing I have a self) and internal- state- awareness (knowing I am not 
invariant). They showed that treating the public and private selves as 
continua fitted the data from their studies better than treating them as 
monoliths. The nature of the Projected self seems to be contextual rather 
than fixed. Nigel Rapport found that we also tend to see our Projected 
self as aspirational rather than fixed; and, in a biography of the painter 
Stanley Spencer, he described the artist’s Projected self as ‘an individual 
engaged in a life project’ (Rapport 2005, 60).
The manipulation of the Projected self by others has become an area 
of interest recently. For instance, Lambros Malafouris (2008) showed 
how the Projected self can be socialised via the Social self (self- model) in 
quite unusual ways, creating selfhood beyond the bounds of the Actual 
self. He describes how a signet ring from a Mycenean tomb encompasses 
both a personal concept of me within a possessive concept of mine, and a 
sociocultural concept of him within a possessive concept of his. The fact 
that this beautiful and valuable artefact was entombed with the corpse 
means it was treated as part of the individual after death:  traditional 
ownership ceases at death, but tectonoetic ownership (the association of 
an object with an individual, and only that individual) does not.
Louis Rougier (2014) asked whether, in a modern marketing envir-
onment, advertising should be directed toward the consumer’s ‘real self’ 
(an amalgam of the Actual self and the self- model) or their Projected 
self. He took the view that both selves need to be addressed, but that 
‘the product design, packaging and communication must first inspire the 
projected self’ (Rougier 2014, 4). By addressing the should factor in the 
received Cultural self (‘the best me I can be’), the aspirations of the ‘real 
self’ can be manipulated toward a more conforming Projected self, one 
that will buy the product because they should rather than if they need to. 
The Projected self in this scenario has become a subconscious promise by 
the Actual self to adjust the self- model to be more like the cultural self- 
model. This is only a re- emphasis of the group culture’s expectations 
about the individual, conformity to which is a natural result of the 
individual’s gaining fitness from living in the group culture; but it is 
nonetheless somehow disturbingly coercive.
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Recently, Hazem et al. (2018) showed how the manipulation of the 
Projected self via the inputs of others to the Social self is a subconscious 
physical process:  we create our own automatic self- censorship. When 
others notice us (by calling our name or by physical touching) it sensitises 
us to, and primes us for, other bodily inputs; and this priming increases 
our physical self- awareness and receptivity. Hazem et  al. say that, in 
their experiments, ‘the effects of own name, social touch, and eye con-
tact on bodily awareness were subtended by common brain mechanisms’ 
and that ‘knowing that the contact is directly created by another human 
agent is essential to the effect of social contact on bodily self- awareness’ 
(Hazem et al. 2018, 6). They see human self- awareness as being an itera-
tive social process, with the group view of me affecting my own view of 
me, and my own view of me affecting the group view.
Looking back at Figure 8.1, a simple interpretation would be that 
the Projected self is the outcome of a process of cognitive self- definition, 
and provides the route by which I influence the group around me; but it 
turns out that the group influences me long before I can influence it. In 
evolutionary terms, this is all rather odd: I need to project my self onto 
my group to enhance my own agenda and limit those of others; and, for 
most species, if they do this in a subconscious, no- holds- barred way, 
using just their Actual self, then they have the best chance of achieving 
their aims. However, as a human, I  am cursed  – or advantaged  – by 
sharing social calculus, which requires me to consciously model a 
different kind of self. This self is, in turn, not one self but many selves, 
all of which are either real or virtual and not actual. They are not me 
selves but they selves, where they happens to represent me; they are 
emic selves rather than etic selves, true because the individual and the 
group agree they are true, not because they are definitionally true; and 
they can be both differentiated and integrated, generating a continu-
ously changing kaleidoscope of selves as my current Projected self. The 
self I  project to my group as the real me is one out of many possibil-
ities: a little bit of the me you tell me I am; a little of the me I believe 
I am; a little of the self I was; a little of the self I should, or hope to, be; 
and all heavily censoring the subconscious me I actually am. Yet, after 
all this, the Projected self is not the final product of the process; instead, 
it is part of a larger process where my projected model of me is further 
edited in the minds of other individuals in the group, and then offered 
back to me as a Social self – a self you tell me I am. This larger process 
is a continuous iteration through a life: it usually starts at about age 2, 
with a realisation that others are talking to me about me; and it usually 
only finishes with death.
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… And there’s more: some other selves
So far, the terminology of selfhood has been shown to be quite 
diverse. We have seen a multiplicity of terms (the Actual self is also the 
individual- oriented self, the Narrative self is also a narrative identity, and 
the Projected self is also the public self). We have seen amalgamation 
of terms (the symbolic or private self includes everything except the 
Actual and Projected selves; the autobiographical self is the Episodic and 
Narrative selves combined; and the real self is an amalgam of the Actual 
self and the self- model). We have also seen subdivision of terms (the dia-
logic self recognises that we have more than one cultural- self- model, and 
those Cultural selves – at least, in terms of Chinese culture – include the 
relationship- oriented self, the familistic [group]- oriented self and the 
other- oriented self). And we have seen evidence that the SSMH offered 
here may not be the whole story (the tectonoetic self includes all the 
selves plus objects beyond the boundary of the Actual self). Yet there still 
remain other important subdivisions of selfhood that have not yet been 
explored here.
One of these is Ulric Neisser’s Five Kinds of Self- Knowledge (1988). 
The significance of his work in the literature on selfhood means that 
the SSMH needs to be reconciled with the self- knowledge model if it is 
to be taken seriously. The two models are not that dissimilar, although 
one important difference is that Neisser discusses knowledge and not 
models, and he treats his selves as aspects of a single selfhood rather than 
different ways of being a self. Neisser’s five types of self- knowledge map 
across the SSMH as follows:
• The ecological self is the self as a natural and physical object, a 
relationship with the actual world. This maps well to the Actual 
self.
• The interpersonal self is the self in communication with other 
selves, the self presented for others to communicate with. This 
maps to the Projected self.
• The extended self is the self that incorporates remembered and 
planned events involving the self. It maps to an amalgam of the 
Episodic and Narrative selves.
• The conceptual self ‘draws its meaning from a network of socially- 
based assumptions and theories about human nature in general 
and ourselves in particular’ (Neisser 1988, 35). This is a good 
description of how the Social self (a network of socially based 
assumptions) and Cultural self (theories about human nature) 
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work together, using the inputs of other people as fodder for our 
cognitively generated self- definitions.
• The private self is the self we create to explain our self to ourself, a 
conscious representation of our internal, and therefore exclusive, 
cognition. The first impression is that this maps to the self- model; 
but, for Neisser, the private self represents a more fundamental 
and real idea of selfness than the ad hoc and easily changed self- 
model. To represent Neisser’s view in the SSMH, the private self 
is better represented by an amalgam of everything except the 
Actual and Projected selves, so it includes the extended self and the 
conceptual self.
Thus, while there are some differences between the two models 
regarding what a self actually is, Neisser’s kinds of self- knowledge and 
the SSMH use similar tools to describe how humans generate their self-
ness. Other models of selfhood are less easy to reconcile to the SSMH. 
For instance, as we saw in Chapter 1, Baars et al. (2003) introduce the 
concept of an observing self: if there is conscious perception of sensory 
inputs, then there must be a mechanism inside the brain that intervenes 
in the cognition of sensing and inserts that awareness. That mechanism 
is the observing self. Vast amounts of our sensory inputs are ignored by 
conscious awareness: our body sends over 10 million bits of information 
to our brain for processing every second; and, of that, about 40 bits are 
consciously processed (Nørretranders 1991, 125– 6). We are probably 
perfectly capable of operating without an observing self to generate con-
scious intervention; so the fact it needs to be posited to explain conscious 
awareness is significant.
The observing self poses problems for the SSMH. First, the selec-
tion of what is given attention must be a subconscious choice, but the 
giving of attention itself must be conscious; but how can something be 
both subliminal and intentional at the same time? Second, the diffe-
rence between the Actual self and the other selves is that the Actual self 
is unmodelled. Modelling is a matter of attention; so where in the SSMH 
would an observing self be able to provide that needed attention? Third, 
how does the observing self interface between the Actual self and the 
other selves? These are questions that the SSMH perhaps should, but 
does not at present, address.
On the other hand, a different question may indicate that the 
observing self is not without its own problems:  where in the act of 
observing is a self useful? Surely selfhood comes into the interpretation 
 
 
what is  a sElf? thErE anD baCk again 183
  
of observation, not into the act of observing? If this is the case, then the 
observing self is an aspect of the unknowable Actual self, and thus not a self 
that can be modelled; it is beyond the ambit of the SSMH. Krauzlis et al. 
(2014) argue from neurological evidence that attention is not a cause of 
decision- making but an outcome; it is not a part of the interpretation of 
observation, just a conscious recognition of the decision made by a sub-
liminal interpreting mechanism. Domenico Guarino (2018) argues that 
this provides neurological evidence for Daniel Dennett’s (2009) ‘strange 
inversion of reasoning’, thus linking together cognitive attention as an 
evolutionary outcome with most other evolutionary outcomes: attention 
and evolution occur because an event produces an outcome that becomes 
significant, not because the event itself is significant.
Another approach is the patterned self, proposed by Shaun 
Gallagher (2013a). This model of the self is more deeply differentiated 
than the SSMH, but the SSMH largely corresponds with the patterned self 
in terms of form. What differs is that, where the patterned self is a single, 
coherent self that can present different patterns generated from a set of 
innate and personal psychological aspects, the SSMH treats the Actual 
self as singular but subliminal (and therefore consciously unknowable), 
and the consciously modelled selves are disparate products of received 
models of the self. The aspects of the patterned self include:  minimal 
embodied and minimal experiential aspects; affective and psychological 
aspects; intersubjective, narrative and extended aspects; and situated 
aspects. However, within these aspects, it is not clear how much is under 
conscious control and how much is subliminal; and this matters, because 
humans are both slaves to our genes and controllers of our cognitive des-
tiny. Any theory of selfhood has to address the fact that we have both 
selfness and awareness of selfness (Edwardes 2014).
Of the two models, the patterned self seems to be intuitively closer 
to how we believe our selves to work: we think of our self as unitary and 
integrated, with every social projection of our self being in some way 
honest and faithful to that integrated self. However, we also recognise 
that our single, integrated self is mutable, so the projection we make 
today need not be the same as the projection we made yesterday; but 
we also intuitively believe that today’s and yesterday’s projections remain 
faithful representations of the integrated self. In addition, we recognise 
that we have the capacity to deceive (both others and our own self) 
when we socially project our self. This is a lot of things to simultaneously 
expect from our unitary and integrated self, which indicates that treating 
the self as unitary may be intuitive, but it may not match the way selves 
actually work.
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Another self is the culturally evolved self, proposed by Lloyd 
Hawkeye Robertson (2017). He takes the view that free will is an emer-
gent outcome of being immersed in a complex cultural environment, and 
self- awareness is an emergent feature of free will. He does not address 
the question of how a complex cultural environment could emerge or 
evolve, or why it should emerge or evolve in the particular case of human 
socialisation; and he does not convincingly explore why complex cultural 
environments should be exclusive to humans, although he assumes them 
to be so. There is also a hint of circularity in his argument: our culture 
gave us free will, and our free will gave us self- awareness. However, he 
also says that ‘Free will originates from the first person experience of the 
world and one’s self- constructed understanding of his or her agency in 
the course of action’ (Robertson 2017, 4). So, if self- awareness comes 
from free will, and free will comes from first- person experience, what is 
the difference between self- awareness and first- person experience? And, 
if there is no difference, where does free will come in? Robertson raises 
important questions about the relationship between free will, culture 
and selfhood, but he may not have them correctly sequenced to provide 
answers.
Robertson also says that, ‘Questions of free will could not have been 
asked by beings unable to visualize the concept’ (2017, 6). This reminds 
me of the exchange between Alice and the Red Queen:
Alice laughed. ‘There’s no use trying,’ she said:  ‘one can’t believe 
impossible things.’
‘I daresay you haven’t had much practice,’ said the Queen. 
‘When I was your age, I always did it for half- an- hour a day. Why, 
sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before 
breakfast.’
(Lewis Carroll 1872, Chapter 5: ‘Wool and Water’)
Indeed, the capacity to believe impossible things would seem a 
much more reliable definition of humanity than either free will or self- 
awareness. We live in a world of solutions that were, at one time, impos-
sible (metal ships, aircraft, cybernetic limbs, nanobots – the list is long 
and growing); but the problems were worried- at and debated until 
solutions were finally visualised and shared with others.
Another type of self that is not properly explored in the SSMH is 
what we can call the e- self. This is a version of my Projected self that is not 
subject to the knowledge others already have about me; it can therefore 
be more exploratory and less constrained than other Projected selves. The 
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e- self is not really a new phenomenon, and it has been described as an 
authorial self or authorial persona when discussed in relation to printed 
publications (Hyland 2001). However, the rise of electronic media and 
the appearance of the ‘casual’ (rather than ‘packaged’) author has meant 
that many more people are producing Projected selves directed at people 
who do not know the projecting individual except through the media. 
The Projected self in these cases is unverifiable, so one downside of the 
increasing technical sophistication that has made electronic media pos-
sible is the appearance of blocks of code complex enough to imitate a 
human e- self. They are often treated as actual humans, and they can be 
used to manipulate the gullible and cause havoc in a modern electronic 
democracy (Deb et al. 2017). This aspect of e- selves will not be further 
explored here, but the significance for the study of human selfhood is 
extensive.
The e- self is mostly unverifiable and uncensored. This means the 
individual has the potential to be brutally honest in their projected e- self, 
putting forward an image that they would never dream of presenting in 
face- to- face contact with longer- term acquaintances. Hu et  al. (2017) 
show that, in all forms of communication where the individual’s iden-
tity is known and their reputation is at stake, the individual projects 
a positive self, which agrees with their positive self- model (the ought 
self) and their Cultural self (the ideal self). By contrast, in cases where 
the individual believes they are anonymous, they project more of their 
socially negative self- model and mostly ignore their Cultural self. For 
some people, this can have the effect of making communication in the 
anonymised online environment more attractive than in the actual 
reputation- driven world:  some individuals seem to derive greater sat-
isfaction from online anonymous communication than from any other 
form of human contact.
On the other side, Gil- Or et al. (2015) showed that e- communication 
makes it easier to project a deceptive self- image. This deception involves 
not just the daily white lies of normal, reputation- driven communication; 
it allows the individual to alter major features of their Projected self  – 
age, gender, beliefs – anything, really. This creates what Gil- Or et al. call a 
false Facebook self, which can become a pathology in itself, or can license 
other psychopathologies the individual may have. Because of this, the 
creation of a false Facebook self is not just a personal choice, it can be a 
social problem; and the authors recommend that steps be taken to iden-
tify and suppress these pathological false Facebook selves. We are only 
now beginning to address the serious social issues that the projected e- 
self creates.
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The final approach to human selfhood examined here was provided 
by George Lakoff (1992) with his multiple selves. Lakoff approached the 
question in a very similar way to this book, giving a series of conceptual 
metaphors to show how human selfhood works; and I must acknowledge 
Lakoff’s inspiration for many of the ideas I have presented. He proposed 
a binary approach, with the Subject consisting of consciousness, will and 
judgement, and the Self being the rest of the person. However, there is no 
single way in which the Subject interfaces with the Self, creating different 
types of self- models within the individual’s Subject+Self cognition. The 
first of these is the Projectible Self Model, which is not the same as the 
Projected self; instead it is the capacity to produce a Projected self, using 
tools like pronominalisation. The second is the Objective Subject Model, 
which allows the Self to perceive the Subject as an object – somewhat like 
a self- model, but once again more about the capacity to produce a self- 
model than the self- model itself.
The Objective Subject Model gives Lakoff his first conceptual 
metaphor: KNOWING IS VIEWING allows us to treat our subject- model 
as if it were a thing, because we are consciously aware of ourselves as 
subjects. Two other conceptual metaphors Lakoff presents in relation to 
the Objective- Subject Model  – ENHANCED CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE 
ABILITY OF THE SUBJECT TO SEE THE SELF FROM THE OUTSIDE 
and OBJECTIVITY IS THE SEPARATION OF THE SUBJECT FROM THE 
SUBJECT’S VALUES AND PRESUPPOSITIONS  – are more definitions 
than metaphors, so will not be considered here.
The third way the Subject interfaces with the Self is the Separable 
Subject Model, which reverses the Objective Subject Model, allowing the 
Subject to perceive the Self as an object. Lakoff sees this as generating a 
series of metaphors, such as LACK OF NORMAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
CONTROL IS BEING OUTSIDE THE SELF, RETURNING TO NORMAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS IS COMING BACK and EUPHORIC STATES ARE UP. 
This leads on to the Scattered Self Model, which reflects the fact that the 
Subject can maintain several different selves (or several different loci of 
self) at the same time – for instance ‘I’m all over the place today, I don’t 
know whether I’m coming or going’; and the Scattered Self Model leads 
to Loss of Self models, where the self is separated from the Subject and 
even from other selves.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999, Chapter  13) revised the model, pro-
posing six selves: the Physical- Object Self, a self we can manipulate; the 
Locational Self, the self situated as an object in space; the Scattered Self, 
the result of trying to maintain several different self- models simultan-
eously; the Social Self, the self as a product of, and link to, other selves; 
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the Projecting Self, the self we present to other selves; and the Essential 
Self, a conscious representation of the unconscious Actual self. Lakoff 
and Johnson’s six selves have some correspondences with the SSMH, but 
there is one important difference:  Lakoff’s Multiple Selves are all con-
scious selves, whereas the SSMH includes the subliminal Actual self. This 
difference gives the SSMH, an origins model, a physical base on which the 
other aspects of selfhood can be anchored and from which they can be 
built; the Multiple Selves model, an embodied model, does not need this.
Why self defines us
What defines a self? Thagard and Wood (2015) produced a list of 80 
self- phenomena, grouping them into six main classes: self- representing 
(oneself to oneself, oneself to others, and evaluation); self- effecting 
(facilitating and limiting); and self- changing. This list of phenomena 
shows that, whatever a self is, it is a widespread feature of human cogni-
tion, being involved in sub- phenomena such as compassion, forgiveness, 
reliance, effacement, deception and realisation. The widespread effects 
of selfhood in cognition mean that a simple, one- line definition of self is 
probably impossible, and very likely deceptive.
Significantly, Thagard and Wood place consciousness under the 
experience of self- representing oneself to oneself:  in other words, they 
see awareness as a cause or outcome of selfhood. In this book, we have 
separated other- awareness and self- awareness, meaning that awareness 
can be treated as both a cause (other awareness) and an outcome (self- 
awareness) of shared selfhood: selfness and awareness of selfness emerge 
from the sharing of awareness of others through language. Thagard and 
Wood show that having a self, with its concomitant self- phenomena, is a 
defining feature of humans – both in terms of its source (social calculus 
shared through language) and in terms of its outcome (the enhanced 
cooperation of joint enterprise).
A self is a useful thing to have:  it allows us to show the persona 
we wish to show to the people around us. However, what makes it really 
useful is if other people have a self, too: when humans relate together 
through their Projected selves or personae, rather than their personal-
ities, they create a pragmatic layer in their communication. This prag-
matic layer acts as a lubricant between personalities, allowing them to 
cooperate efficiently enough to engage in complex joint enterprises. 
Human language is full of expressions that represent this pragmatic layer 
at work; for instance, ‘don’t take this the wrong way, but …’ (a way of 
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criticising a persona without involving the personality) or ‘let’s do this’ (a 
depersonalised way of generating provisional agreement between per-
sonae) or ‘so what do we do now?’ (an invitation to the other persona to 
offer a solution for consideration, not action). Our Projected selves are 
able to work together in ways that our personalities cannot.
Personality is not a human- only characteristic; many other animals 
display identifiable differences between individuals. Daniel Nettle 
(2006) reviewed several very different species, including birds, fish and 
insects, and found evidence of personality in all of them. Seyfarth et al. 
(2014) show that, while kinship is a major feature in determining rank 
for baboons, having a less aggressive, more conciliatory personality also 
has an effect on the individual’s rank. Baan et al. (2014) found the same 
was true for wolves. However, to date, there has been no evidence for 
persona in any other species. To select a persona to project, an individual 
needs to be aware of themself as a self – which we humans can do only 
because we share our social calculus using language. So language, shared 
social calculus and modelling a Projected self all seem to be markers of 
being human. Having selves is what makes human culture what it is: the 
reality of each individual self, both for others and for the individual, 
makes our self- driven society (as compared to the ego- driven society of 
chimpanzees) an actuality.
However, while the existence of a human self- driven society is an 
actuality, that society is composed of self- aware selves. Self- awareness is 
a modelling process; so, while the process of modelling can be an actual 
thing, the models themselves are mental constructs, which are virtual. 
We can agree to treat them as if they were real, but we cannot give them 
actuality with just our belief. This is where the link between the person-
ality (an aspect of the Actual self) and the persona (the Projected self) 
comes in:  inasmuch as the Projected self is treated as a personality by 
others, it is a proxy, or a metaphor, for an actual thing. This still leaves 
a dilemma: is the reality of selfness enough to prove that the aware self 
is not an illusion or delusion? The answer relies on how we define self-
ness, and what we want selfness to say about us. If selfness is a way of 
explaining how humans are able to work together, then the fact that we 
engage in actual joint enterprises is enough to justify selfness as a neces-
sary part of that process. If, however, I am looking for my self as a con-
crete example of selfness, then I am on a fool’s errand.
One feature of the SSMH still needs to be addressed: the hypoth-
esis relies on an ability to take models of my self offered by others and 
treat them as if they were third- person models of me. This means we 
would expect that modelling others and modelling me would be similar 
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cognitive experiences, using many of the same cognitive processes. 
Fortunately, this is just what Francesca Happé (2003) has found. She 
looked at nine brain- imaging studies conducted by seven teams to assess 
brain usage in ToM tasks, and found that the same areas were active in 
both self- and other- modelling. In her conclusion she says, ‘neuroimaging 
findings to date appear to suggest a network of regions involved in attri-
bution of mental states to others which largely overlaps with areas of 
activity in self- reflection tasks’ (Happé 2003, 141). It seems that, as the 
SSMH predicts, modelling others and modelling me are treated by the 
brain as similar processes.
In summary, therefore, we can say that having selfness is being 
human; and that is why self defines each of us – both from the outside, 
with others’ models of me, and from the inside, with my models of me.
Notes
 1. There and Back again is the second half of the title The Hobbit, or There and Back again by J.R.R. 
Tolkien – which starts with a map of the journey. There and Back again was missed off the cover 
of the first edition (George Allen & Unwin, UK, 1937), but has been reinstated in some subse-
quent printings.
 2. The Standard Statistical Brain (SSB) is a convenient model of language in the brain, which 
corresponds quite well to about 95% of actual brains; the other 5% can differ quite markedly 
from the SSB without the language capacity being affected. The SSB is a useful tool; problems 
only arise when it is seen as a real standard brain, an actual standard brain or, worst of all, an 
ideal standard brain.
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Epilogue: Snarks or Boojums?
‘Now, Kitty, let’s consider who it was that dreamed it all. This is a 
serious question, my dear, and you should not go on licking your 
paw like that— as if Dinah hadn’t washed you this morning! You 
see, Kitty, it must have been either me or the Red King. He was part 
of my dream, of course— but then I was part of his dream, too! Was 
it the Red King, Kitty? You were his wife, my dear, so you ought to 
know— Oh, Kitty, do help to settle it! I’m sure your paw can wait!’
But the provoking kitten only began on the other paw, and 
pretended it hadn’t heard the question.
(Lewis Carroll 1865, Chapter 12: ‘Which Dreamed It?’)
Kittens are not good at sharing their social calculus, if they do indeed 
have any; and, as far as we have currently discovered, they do not indulge 
in speculation about their dreams, as Alice does about hers. For Kitty, a 
firm follower of etic facts, the idea that a dream- thought could somehow 
be part of actuality is probably beyond the limits of its cognition; and the 
idea that a dreamed- up person could be part of the dream of a person 
dreamed up by the dreamed- up person is, in all likelihood, incomprehen-
sible to the kitten. Yet we emic thinkers accept that, for Alice, this is a 
conundrum worth pursuing. It is almost as if we were able to treat a mod-
elled person as if it were a real person, even if there is no actual person 
in our experience with whom we can associate our model. For us, Alice is 
both our model of Alice and a real person in an actual book; and the same 
goes for the Red King. If real people can create real dreams, then Alice 
can dream of the Red King and the Red King can dream of Alice; but, in 
the story, the two dreams form a single dream. So which dreamed it? We 
may, if we are in a particularly etic frame of mind, wash our paws of the 
whole nonsense; but, even then, there will be a faint voice telling us that 
this remains, for humans, a logical reality.
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Language does not help us out of this conundrum, because it lives 
in the same world as the social calculus we use to model Alice, Kitty, the 
Red King, Lewis Carroll as the writer, and ourself as the reader. The mod-
elling of others in our social calculus provides the basic structure of lan-
guage, and the sharing of social calculus through language provides us 
with the tools to begin modelling our self as another. But all of this is 
happening in Popper’s World 3 of reality, where actual and virtual things 
can only be represented, not exist. We cannot use a World 3 system to 
anchor another World 3 system into Worlds 1 and 2.
It also does not really help to appeal to the idea that I have a self 
because others believe me to have a self. The model of me that others 
carry around in their heads is just another World 3 object – and it is not 
even in the reality of my World 3.  We may treat our models as if they 
were the same as the actual things they represent, but a model is still just 
a representation – and, in uncommunicated social calculus, your model 
of me represents no more than what you need it to represent about me. 
Your model of me may be the only guide you have to me, but that does 
not mean it has to be an accurate representation of me. So when you 
share your model of me with me, you are not sharing an etic model of my 
self, you are sharing an emic model of your belief about my self; and that 
belief may well be arbitrary and partisan.
This inability to fix the nature of the objects in our real World 3 
means that we cannot be completely sure whether our social calculus 
self- model refers to a real interpretation of an actual object out there in 
World 1 (as words and cognitive models are traditionally believed to do), 
whether it refers to a real interpretation of a virtual World 2 item with no 
actual World 1 object (as words like unicorn and cognitive models like 
Alice can do) or whether it refers to a World 3 real concept (as words 
like nothing and empty are supposed, but usually fail, to do; they are 
supposed to refer to absence, but they are usually used to represent the 
presence of absence).
There is one final representation of a self that could actually refer 
to my self, and that is myself: the personal feeling that my self- reflection 
represents self- reflexion. ‘I am what I am,’ the song says, ‘I am my own 
special creation’ (Herman 1983); it’s rather like a modern version of 
Descartes’ Dubito ergo cogito, cogito ergo sum, but it suffers the same 
logical fate. When Descartes wrote his dubito construct, he was unaware 
that Augustine of Hippo (426 [1871]) had preceded him with a similar 
argument by twelve centuries:  Si fallor, sum (‘If I am mistaken, I am’). 
This idea fails, however, in one particular  – but fundamental  – case 
of being mistaken:  Si fallor ut sum, non possum esse (‘If I  am mistaken 
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that I am, I cannot be’); it may be only one case, but it is the case that 
disproves the rule. Myself cannot prove my self, because they are both 
World 3 concepts, and neither has the actuality to prove the etic existence 
of the other.
The route to self- modelling
How did we become the socially calculating, self- aware species we 
are? This book has looked at some of the mechanisms, but it has not 
indicated a timescale or a developmental map. Our study of our selves 
is still too basic to set out our cognitive and cultural capacities in a 
developmental calendar, but at least the capacities enabling social 
calculus to be shared, and self- modelling to begin, can be reasonably 
described.
The sharing of social calculus models would have required the pre- 
existence of several things. Foremost is the cognitive existence of social 
calculus itself:  we must have been consciously using the mechanics of 
social calculus in our interpersonal relationship cognition if they were to 
be available for voluntary communication. This cognitive social calculus 
relies on the pre- existence of at least three capacities, the first of which 
is the capacity to live in large social groups. Large social groups do not 
necessarily rely on large brains – eusocial insect societies work fine with 
tens of thousands of small- brained individuals – but, in social groups of 
volitional individuals, the individuals with a wider range of interper-
sonal strategies will fare better than those with a narrower range. In 
primates, therefore, large social groups generate a genetic trend toward 
larger brains to handle the interpersonal strategies involved in the larger 
group. This is convenient because cognitive social calculus is, itself, an 
interpersonal strategy, which both relies on, and generates, greater cog-
nitive sophistication. This was set out in Chapter 3.
The second capacity needed for social calculus is a willingness to 
work together in joint enterprises. These joint enterprises do not need to 
be the complex organisations we see today; they would have been sim-
pler groupings in which specialisations could begin to appear and begin 
to be valued. For instance, an individual who could make good throwing- 
stones had to work together with an individual good at throwing if they 
were to maximise the fitness of their individual skills. Of course, this will-
ingness to share skills had to be accompanied by a willingness to share 
the products of the joint enterprise; it would require a mutual altruism 
policed by reputation, as discussed in Chapter 5.
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The third pre- existent capacity required for sharing social calculus 
would have been a system of voluntary communication: we must have 
been able to exchange practical (non- interpersonal) information in some 
way for early socialisation and enculturation to spread through a popula-
tion. This intentional communication system would have emerged from 
an earlier attentional signalling system; but where the signalling system 
involved the production of vocal responses to environmental cues, which 
others could then treat as equivalent to the environmental cues, the 
communication system involved the intentional sharing of information 
between individuals. The signalling system relied on pre- established and 
indexical links between the signal form and the signal meaning; but the 
communication system allowed both sender and receiver to negotiate 
toward a shared meaning, by letting them establish ad hoc symbolic links 
between form and meaning.
What early humans were communicating about did not have to be 
social knowledge – in fact, it was probably environmental knowledge, as 
we see in the signalling systems of modern primates: warning signals, 
food indicators, locative vocalisations, attention- getting signals and emo-
tional displays. The main difference between a signalling system based 
on environmental knowledge and a communication system based on the 
same knowledge is not complexity of form but complexity of meaning. 
Indexes are simple one- to- one correspondences between actual- world 
events and cognitive meaning; symbols, in contrast, have many- to- many 
correspondences with cognitive meaning. For instance, the sound- 
symbol serpent may refer to an animal of the order Serpentes or any long 
and legless animal, or a treacherous colleague of the speaker – or even 
Alice, when her neck grows instead of her whole body, causing a pigeon 
she encounters to scream ‘Serpent!’ and attack her (Alice’s Adventures 
in Wonderland, Chapter 5). And all of these objects can equally well be 
represented by the sound- symbol snake.
What environmental knowledge signalling and environmental 
knowledge communication share in common is that they are both 
about events extrinsic to the communicating parties: the sender and the 
receiver do not signify in the meaning of the utterance. No structural 
or grammatical complexity is required, therefore, in either the signal-
ling or communication system:  whether signal or communication, the 
snake warning used by vervets is just a chutter (Seyfarth et al. 1980); the 
chimpanzee’s food call is just a grunt (Schel et al. 2013); and the gibbon’s 
‘I am here’ call is just a hoo (Clarke et al. 2015). In each of these cases, 
the call can often be modulated to more particularly reference the type of 
snake or food, or the individual calling, which is impressively subtle. But 
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the sounds all rely on extrinsic meaning (the meaning is out there in the 
world, whether it be an actual snake or Alice); they have no context- free 
generalised reference, or intrinsic meaning, as words like this and look 
have. This was discussed in Chapter 6.
Fortunately, the sharing of social calculus carries us over this divide 
between extrinsic and intrinsic reference. The A- Relationship- B social 
calculus construct requires A, B and the relationship to be individually 
meaningful:  the particular grunts that represent A  and B must mean 
A and B to the sender and receiver, and the relationship grunt must mean 
that particular relationship. But the form A- Relationship- B is a context- 
free framework into which any number of individual- representing 
grunts can be inserted, and any number of relationships can link them. 
In addition, sharing of social calculus requires an open- ended commu-
nication system:  as new individuals join the group, new representing 
grunts need to be generated and negotiated into meaning. And as new 
types of relationship develop, new grunts to represent the relationships 
must be agreed. The language of social calculus, therefore, is in a con-
stant state of renewal and negotiation toward meaning; and tools such as 
metaphor, as discussed in Chapter 7, facilitate this constant renewal and 
meaning- negotiation.
This leaves only the topic of Chapter  8, the appearance of self- 
modelling. It may only be a side- effect of shared social calculus, but it is a 
big factor in the life of almost every human on the planet. Our self- model 
feeds back into our social calculus, changing the social calculus we have, 
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Shared social
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Fig 9.1 The route to self- modelling
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changing the social calculus we share, and changing the way we share. 
The self- model, and the other generated selves in the SSMH, give us that 
particularly human feeling of believing we know who we are. We think 
we can have objective knowledge about ourselves because we can see our-
selves from outside ourselves. Yet there is something clearly wrong with 
this assumption: our senses, and the interpretation of them, are clearly 
‘inside’; how would a mechanism for putting our senses ‘outside’ work?
Yes, but … who am I?
So, at the end of this book, the final  – and perhaps biggest  – question 
of selfhood remains unanswered:  are Hume, Metzinger, Wegner, 
Nørretranders and Hood (and many others) correct when they say that 
we do not have an Actual self? Is every self I believe myself to be just a 
product of my social modelling of self as other? If we accept the absence 
of an Actual self, then we can treat the whole of selfhood as a World 
3 problem of reality; but this still leaves us with a serious definitional 
problem. Even if all conscious knowledge of selfhood were stripped away, 
I would nonetheless be different from you, because there is an individu-
ally differentiated core genetic being that is dictated by an actual World 1 
chemical code that I carry around in every cell of my body. Even without 
personae, I still have personality. Yet is this chemically driven personality 
sufficient to claim there is an Actual self in every human? Where would 
that self be located?
If we accept that having a World 3 real core self is sufficient, the 
question of what counts as the core self has not been answered. As 
was discussed in Chapter  8, we have access to many different types of 
self, and we can generate more than one version of each type of self. 
So which, if any, of those selves is the core World 3 real self? We have 
already dismissed the Actual self as unknowable; and we can dismiss the 
Cultural self, the Social selves and the Episodic selves as candidates – the 
first because it is an internalised target rather than an internal self, and 
the others because there is no dominant Social or Episodic self. But that 
still leaves three candidates for the core self.
So, is my self- model my core self, or is it just the self of which I am 
currently aware? Can it be the core self merely because I am currently 
thinking of it, and is my current commitment to it sufficient? Or is my 
Narrative self my core self because it has historical continuity with my 
self- model, and is therefore much more detailed than my current self- 
model? Or Was Richard O’Brien (1973) right when he wrote, ‘Don’t dream 
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it – be it’, and is my Projected self my core self because it is what I present 
to the world? Or does awareness of selfness mean that self- awareness is 
always a cognitive concept with no existence in actuality or reality – a 
mere metaphor? It is a choice between a Snark and a Boojum:  choose 
carefully, because choosing wrongly means your self may softly and sud-
denly vanish away:
They hunted till darkness came on, but they found
Not a button, or feather, or mark,
By which they could tell that they stood on the ground
Where the Baker had met with the Snark.
In the midst of the word he was trying to say,
In the midst of his laughter and glee,
He had softly and suddenly vanished away – 
For the Snark was a Boojum, you see.
(Lewis Carroll 1876, Fit the Eighth: ‘The Vanishing’)
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Glossary
Actual self The incontrovertible, physical self. The Actual self is a 
Darwinian gene- machine, unlike all the other selves, 
which are cognitive products of the Darwinian gene- 
machine; and this means that the Actual self is directly 
governed by the twin genetic imperatives to survive 
and thrive.
Actuality What continues to exist even in the absence of humans, 
such as ‘rock’. Also referred to as World 1 in Karl 
Popper’s terminology.
Affect Noun: An emotion.
Verb: To change.
Altruistic Self- sacrifice Reducing your own capacities to survive and thrive, to 
increase those capacities for others. The extreme end 
of altruism, the maximal version of the small, everyday 
sacrifices that are a frequent and commonplace 
expectation in our human social systems. Altruistic 
self- sacrifice is viewed as an honourable thing to 
display in most human cultures.
A- Relationship- B 
modelling
The capacity to model relationships between other 
individuals in the group. The reverse- dominance 
cultural environment means that my relationships 
are contingent and variable, so the binding of the 
relationship to the imaged individuals is weak. 
Segmented A- Relationship- B models are more 
adaptable to change than holistic models.
A- Relationship- B- by- C 
modelling
By tagging a received A- Relationship- B model with its 
source, I can measure it against my existing knowledge 
to identify C’s stance toward A and B. This enhances my 
knowledge of the group social relationships, and allows 
me to extract useful empirical data from an utterance 
that is, essentially, opinion.
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Autobiographical self With the Protoself and the Core self, this is one of the 
components of selfhood in Damasio’s (2010) model. It 
corresponds to an amalgam of the Episodic self and the 
Narrative self in the SSMH.
Automatic response Responses that are under a level of control by the 
organism, but which require no conscious attention 
from the organism to make them happen. Conscious 
attention can, however, suppress a response.
Autonoetic memory One of the two components of an Episodic self: the 
capacity to recall past events that include the past self’s 
own perspective.
Autonomic response An electrochemical response that does not involve choice; 
it is the inevitable response to a particular stimulus.
Awareness Conscious knowledge, the capacity to gather conscious 
knowledge, and the conscious manipulation of 
knowledge. Awareness is all about attention.
Awareness of other Explicit knowledge that the other individuals in the 
group are intentional beings who have relationships 
with each other; and I am able to consciously make and 
manipulate models of those relationships.
Awareness of self Explicit knowledge that I am able to make models of 
my self. I am a third party in the modelling of others, so 
A- Relationship- B constructs offered to me may include 
me as A or B. To incorporate these offered constructs 
into my cognitive social modelling, I have to be able to 
model myself as a third party.
Awareness of selfness Explicit knowledge that my modelled self is 
simultaneously a special first- person case and a 
mundane third- person case in my cognitive social 
modelling. By modelling myself as a third party, I am 
able to see my self from an external perspective. This 
carries with it all the concomitant advantages and 
disadvantages of Machiavellian Intelligence, but 
applied reflexively.
Clade Any logically consistent group of species. For instance, 
the several Homo species form a clade; the human 
lineage since the last common ancestor with the Pan 
clade is a clade; the Pan clade and the human clade are 
a clade; and so on. It is a very useful term to describe 
any non- arbitrary group of species.
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Code model of 
communication
The idea that communication involves the production 
and apprehension of a signal, and it is the signal that 
carries the meaning. For comparison, see Ostensive- 
inferential model of communication.
Cogitant ut sum, ergo 
sum
They think I am, therefore I am – the key argument in 
this book.
Cogito cogito, ergo cogito 
sum
Ambrose Bierce’s response to Descartes’ Dubito: I think 
I think, therefore I think I am.
Cogito ergo sum See Dubito …
Cognitive social 
modelling
The capacity to maintain a cognitive database of 
relationships in one’s social group. There are two 
types of social model possible: relationships with 
others, where the self is an unmodelled constant; 
and relationships between others, where the self is 
not needed. See Relationship- A modelling and A- 
Relationship- B modelling. Cognitive social modelling 
can be conscious and attentional, or it can be subliminal.
Conscious knowledge See Explicit knowledge
Core self With the Protoself and the Autobiographical self, this is 
one of the components of selfhood in Damasio’s (2010) 
model. It corresponds to an amalgam of the Social self 
and Projected self in the SSMH.
Conspecific An animal of the same species. Perhaps the earliest in- 
group (conspecific) versus out- group (heterospecific) 
distinction.
Costly signalling If it is important to the receiver that a signal be true, 
then it is worth paying attention to the cost of the 
signal (Zahavi and Zahavi 1997).
Cultural self A model of an ideal individual in a particular culture, 
particularly the ideal self that the individual can be. It 
is a virtual self.
Delusional 
Misidentification 
Syndrome
A failure to reliably identify self and others.
Differentiation The second of the four features of language. The 
‘atoms’ of cognition can have different roles in the 
construction of thoughts. In the minimal case of 
language (as conceived here), ‘words’ can represent 
entities or relationships between entities. See also 
Segmentation, Hierarchy and Recursion.
glossary200
  
Dispassionate self By modelling myself as a third party, I can treat my self 
as I treat other third parties.
Dubito ergo cogito, cogito 
ergo sum
The formula used by Descartes to prove his existence: I 
doubt, therefore I think; I think, therefore I am.
Effect Noun: An outcome or result.
Verb: To make or do.
Ego In Freudian psychology, the ego acts as a referee and 
arbiter between the subconscious id (what the physical 
person wants) and the super- ego (what the intellectual 
person believes is best).
Emic facts Emic facts are true because we agree they are true. 
They do not need to be based on evidence; they can be 
based on beliefs. Most cultural facts are emic facts. See 
Chapter 3, Language, culture and the self.
Episodic self The combination of the capacity to self- model 
(learned) and the capacity to remember events in the 
past (innate) creates the possibility of modelling a self 
in a remembered past event. This is the Episodic self.
Etic facts Etic facts are definitionally true, or verifiably true, 
regardless of human opinion. They have to be based 
on evidence; they cannot be based on beliefs. Etic facts 
are common throughout nature and, if they enhance 
individual fitness, can become genetic facts. See 
Chapter 3, Language, culture and the self.
Eusociality The social organisation of animals that live in large 
colonies of mostly sterile individuals, such as many 
species of ant, wasp, bee and termite, and naked mole 
rats. There is usually only one fertile female, with most 
of the offspring being infertile. The only way they can 
get their genes into the future is to protect their queen.
Explicable production Communication that is intended by the sender and 
can be explained by the sender. Produced from explicit 
knowledge only.
Explication The process of converting Implicit knowledge into 
Explicit knowledge. The Explicit knowledge represents 
the Implicit knowledge – it does not reveal it.
Explicit knowledge Explicit knowledge is conscious awareness of ‘facts’ 
about the universe (the facts do not need to be 
ontologically true, just culturally plausible). We must 
also be able to explain not just the facts but how and 
why we know or believe them. Because this type of 
knowledge is essentially cognitive, it is also known as 
‘head knowledge’.
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First person Probably the last of the language ‘voices’ to emerge. It 
allows me to represent my self in utterances made to 
others.
Group cooperation The capacity of members of a species to work together 
against common enemies or for common purposes. 
Group cooperation is difficult for either predator or 
prey to counter. Coordinated action against predators 
and prey is not an unusual capacity in nature, and is 
not limited to socially clever species. It does not take 
a high level of cognitive sophistication to produce 
the social cohesion needed for tactical defensive or 
offensive cooperation.
Hierarchy The third of the four features of language. The ‘atoms’ 
of cognition can be combined to make composite 
units that behave in many ways like ‘atoms’. See also 
Segmentation, Differentiation and Recursion.
Id In Freudian psychology, the emotional, primal and 
largely subliminal expression of the self.
Implicit knowledge Implicit knowledge is knowledge we have because we 
have inherited it genetically or we have acquired it 
subconsciously. It seems to be distributed through the 
body, even though the brain may be acting as a control 
node, so it is often referred to as ‘body knowledge’.
Inarticulate knowledge See Implicit knowledge
Incidental learning Learning that does not require attention, so we cannot 
explain what we learned, or how or when we learned it.
Individual- oriented self See Actual self
Inherent knowledge See Implicit knowledge
Innate knowledge Knowledge we have inherited genetically. It can be 
fundamental, needed to keep a person alive even 
when they are unconscious, such as breathing; it can 
be affective, used to handle emotional events; or it 
can be performative, controlling our locomotion and 
kinaesthetics. It cannot be learned.
Inner speech The ability to converse with our own self inside our 
heads, as if we were two (or more) selves.
Intentional learning Knowledge that we set out to acquire, which we may 
have used particular strategies to learn, and where we 
can explain not just the knowledge but the process of 
acquiring it. Intentional learning requires attention.
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Irreality A version of the world that is real because some people 
agree it is real, even though they have no evidence 
of (or consensus about) its reality – like the value of 
Bitcoin.
Joint enterprise If we can work together to achieve something we cannot 
each achieve alone, then it is worthwhile sharing 
information honestly (Melis and Semmann, 2010).
Kin selection I should share information with individuals who share 
my genes because their survival is also, in part, my own 
genetic survival. People with whom I have a familial 
relationship are more likely to share genes with me 
than unrelated individuals (Hamilton, 1964).
Machiavellian 
Intelligence
First described by Whiten and Byrne (1988), 
Machiavellian Intelligence is the capacity to model 
others as intentional beings, and use that intentionality 
to increase one’s fitness at the expense of the other 
individual. It is the main obstacle to sharing social 
models, creating the Sender’s and Receiver’s dilemmas.
MERGE See Recursion
Metaphysical self The idea that we have a component of our self that is 
not detectable.
Mirror test The idea that, if an animal can recognise its reflection 
in a mirror as itself, it must have a level of self- 
awareness (Gallup 1970).
Modality Utterances can have conditionality (they are true 
if …); they can have perspective (they are true to 
some individuals and not others); and they can have 
fictionality (they are true only within a non- existent 
scenario). If one type of modality is possible for a 
species, all types are possible.
Monomyth The idea, instigated by Claude Lévi- Strauss but named by 
Joseph Campbell, that there is a single mythic structure 
that reflects the structure of early human society.
Narrative self The model we have of our life experiences as an 
evolving story – a stitching- together of the various 
Episodic selves in such a way that they can be viewed 
as aspects of a single self.
Negotiation toward 
meaning
A feature of Ostensive- inferential communication, in 
that the sender anticipates possible misunderstanding 
by the receiver, and the receiver checks particular 
meanings with the sender. It is not a feature of Code- 
model communication, where the signal by itself is the 
carrier of meaning, not the signal– sender combination.
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Nested functionality Being able to nest a function inside another function 
is a necessary precursor to recursion. Arithmetic is the 
process of nesting quantities inside another quantity 
(e.g. 1+2=3), and therefore has nested functionality. 
The capacity to nest numbers inside each other (simple 
addition) has now been demonstrated in rhesus 
monkeys (Livingstone et al. 2014).
Noetic memory One of the two components of an Episodic self: the 
capacity to recall past events that do not include the 
past self’s own perspective.
Observing self The cognitive mechanism that allows us to see 
ourselves as if we were observers outside our selves. 
Composed of the parietal component, which places 
the self within a sensory context, and the frontal 
component, which places the self in a socio- cultural 
context. Proposed by Baars et al. (2003).
Ostensive- 
inferential model of 
communication
The idea that human communication is contractual, 
based on the provision and interpretation of evidence 
for meaning. Ostensive- inferential communication is 
an immediate negotiation toward meaning between 
two people, not a slow, evolutionary negotiation of 
signal and response.
Persona A modelled self. It can be a cognitively internal self- 
model or an externalised Projected self. When humans 
relate together through their Projected selves or 
personae, rather than their personalities, they create a 
pragmatic layer in their communication.
Personality The particular set of species- variable traits that an 
individual has. Unlike aspects of a persona, personality 
traits are not modelled – they are affective identifiers 
of the individual and are difficult to hide. Many non- 
humans have personalities, but modelling a persona 
may be a human- only capacity.
Physical culture A species that is able to transmit physical survival skills 
between individuals by teaching and learning has a 
physical culture. The transmission of termite- fishing 
skills between female chimpanzees and their offspring 
is an example of this.
Process A particular route taken through a structure by an 
input, to become an output. See also Structure, 
System.
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Projected self An emergent feature of the social models I receive, 
moderated through two routes: first via self- 
modelling, Episodic self and Narrative self; and 
second via Cultural self. To put it another way, 
the Projected self is an amalgam of my internal 
representation of myself and the expectations others 
put upon me.
Protoself With the Core self and the Autobiographical self, this 
is one of the components of selfhood in Damasio’s 
(2010) model. It corresponds to the Actual self in the 
SSMH.
Pseudo- eusociality A social organisation that is not completely eusocial. 
A fully eusocial species has high levels of socialisation 
and an extremely limited number of fertile individuals. 
There are two ways of being pseudo- eusocial: limited 
fertility with lower levels of socialisation (e.g. 
meerkats), and widespread fertility with high levels of 
socialisation (humans).
Psyche In Freudian psychology, the combination of the 
Ego,Super- ego and Id. The whole psychological self.
Public self See Projected self
Reality That which has actual existence without humans, 
but has meaning only because of humans, such as 
‘crayon’. Also referred to as World 3 in Karl Popper’s 
terminology.
Receiver’s dilemma If the sender is disadvantaged by giving me true 
information, but advantaged by giving me false 
information, why should I believe the information 
shared?
Reciprocal altruism I should help you today because you will help me 
tomorrow; and you will help me tomorrow because you 
will need my help the next day (Trivers 1971).
Recursion The fourth of the four features of language. Hierarchy 
can occur at multiple levels: composite units can 
contain composite units. Hauser et al. (2002) see 
recursion as a language- related evolutionary event; 
this book treats it as emergent from hierarchy 
and attribution of received utterances, with a 
genetic explanation outside of language. See also 
Segmentation, Differentiation and Hierarchy.
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Relationship- 
A modelling
I have models in my mind of my relationships with 
other individuals in the group. The reverse- dominance 
cultural environment means that my relationships are 
contingent and variable, so the binding between the 
imaged individual and my relationship to them is weak.
Second person Probably the second of the language ‘voices’ to emerge. 
It allows me to represent the receiver as a special class 
of ‘they’. This permits referential dialogue, and ‘talking 
to’ as an enhancement to ‘talking about’.
Segmentation The first of the four features of language. Utterances 
are composed of ‘atoms’ of cognition; they are not 
monolithic correspondences between thought and 
signal. See also Differentiation, Hierarchy and 
Recursion.
Self 1.  The physical body, including the conceptualising 
organ, the brain.
2.  The concept of the physical body as held in the brain.
3.  The concept of a non- physical self that transcends 
the body.
The first two types of self do not require selfness. 
The third type does.
Self- as- knower A meta- knowledge about the self’s knowledge. 
Generated from the Core self and the Autobiographical 
self. See Antonio Damasio’s (2010) model, Chapter 1.
Self- as- object A meta- knowledge about the self’s knowledge of itself. 
Generated from the Core self and the Autobiographical 
self. See Antonio Damasio’s (2010) model, Chapter 1.
Selfhood Having a self.
Self- model A composite picture of my self as presented to me by 
others, providing a third- person model of me to locate 
in my social calculus system.
Selfness Believing you have a self, or being aware of the self you 
have.
Self- sacrifice See Altruistic self- sacrifice
Sender’s dilemma Why give away valuable information? If having 
the information advantages me and not having it 
disadvantages you, why should I share it?
Sense of almost- self Electrochemical recognition by cells of their clonal 
relatives, allowing different reactions to clones and to 
alien cells.
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Sense of not- self Things outside a cell’s membrane are qualitatively 
different from things inside the membrane. It 
is therefore useful to be able to detect and react 
differently to items outside the cell membrane. For all 
practical purposes, this is a sense of not- self.
Sense of other An enhanced sense of not- self that can distinguish 
between different types of not- self. It operates at the 
level of the multi- cellular organism rather than the 
level of the cell.
Sense of self Not a conscious representation of the self, it is more 
akin to feelings of satisfaction when things are going 
well for the organism, and a sense of unease when they 
are not. It operates at the level of the multi- cellular 
organism.
Seven- Selves Modelling 
Hypothesis (SSMH)
The model of selfhood set out in Chapter 8. It consists 
of the Actual self, the Social self, the self- model, the 
Episodic self, the Narrative self, the Cultural self and 
the Projected self.
Shared Social Calculus The capacity to share modelled relationships between 
others, thus enhancing the receiving individual’s social 
calculus and the sending individual’s reputation.
Signature whistle The identity signal of dolphin (Tursiops truncatus), which 
seems to be used in the same way humans use names.
Social arithmetic The cognitive systems that allow an individual to 
maintain a social map of their relationships with 
others, and to use these models to manipulate those 
others. It is the mechanism behind Machiavellian 
Intelligence and it relies on Relationship- A modelling.
Social calculus The cognitive systems that allow an individual to 
maintain models of others and the relationships 
between others, and to use these models to 
accommodate the intentions of those others. It requires 
an Awareness of Other and a Theory of Mind, and it 
relies on A- Relationship- B modelling.
Social self The Social self is the first self of which we are 
consciously aware. It is the model of my self offered by 
others as part of the exchange of social calculus.
Soul See Metaphysical self
Structure A physical organisation that, when activated, converts 
inputs to outputs in a predictable way. See also Process, 
System.
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Subconscious 
knowledge
See Implicit knowledge
Sublimation The process of converting explicitly learned knowledge 
into implicit knowledge, which does not require 
attentional awareness to be used.
Subliminal knowledge See Implicit knowledge
Super- ego In Freudian psychology, the internalisation of 
externally enforced, cultural rules.
Survival of the fittest Herbert Spencer’s (1864) phrase to describe Darwin’s 
Descent through modification. Individuals in a species 
must have strategies to overcome challenges to their 
survival, and the individuals with a wider range of 
strategies can overcome more challenges.
Symbolic culture A species that is able to transmit social conventions 
between individuals has a symbolic culture. The social 
conventions do not directly enhance individual fitness, 
but they create social inclusion for the individual, 
which indirectly enhances their fitness. Burial practices 
provide an example of this.
System A set of processes reliant on a particular structure 
to convert inputs into outputs. See also Structure, 
Process.
Tacit knowledge See Implicit knowledge
Tectonoetic self All the selves in the SSMH plus objects beyond 
the boundary of the actual self that are intimately 
associated with the self.
Theory of Mind (ToM) The way humans model others as intentional beings. 
ToM is two things: a theory that others have minds, 
so they cannot be manipulated simply by using 
stimulus– response sequences; and a theory about the 
kind of minds they have, and how those minds can be 
manipulated by belief and expectation.
Third person Probably the first of the language ‘voices’ to emerge. 
Allows me to represent others as entities, initially in my 
cognition and later in my signalling.
Unaware knowledge See Implicit knowledge
Unconsciousness A cognitive state in which we are not aware of our self, 
e.g. deep sleep, general anaesthesia, vegetative state, 
or epileptic loss of consciousness.
Unmodelled self See Actual self
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Virtuality That which exists only inside human heads, such 
as ‘my’. Also referred to as World 2 in Karl Popper’s 
terminology.
Will to survive The genetic imperative to take advantage of things that 
enhance survival and avoid things that reduce survival. 
The will to survive involves biological imperatives that 
support surviving and thriving, such as territoriality, 
competition, reproduction and cooperation.
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